



**NOTTINGHAMSHIRE**  
**Fire & Rescue Service**  
*Creating Safer Communities*

Nottinghamshire and City of Nottingham  
Fire and Rescue Authority

# **FIRE COVER REVIEW 2010: NEXT STEPS**

Report of the Chief Fire Officer

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**Agenda No:**

**Date:** 16 December 2011

**Purpose of Report:**

To present the implications of Option 2 of the fire cover review (FCR) following consultation.

## **CONTACT OFFICER**

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## 1. BACKGROUND

- 1.1 As part of its integrated risk management plan for the county (entitled 2010 – 2013 Service Plan), Nottinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service used the opportunity to consult widely on whether it should review its fire cover arrangements. This was against a changing demographic profile and a reduction in the number of incidents year on year since 2003.
- 1.2 This process commenced in the spring of 2009 and the outcomes were incorporated into the current three year Service Plan. This plan was adopted formally by the Fire Authority in February 2010 and came into force in April 2010. Section 7.3 Response, specifically detailed that the Service was to review its fire cover and how it was to carry out the process.
- 1.3 The process of the FCR took place during 2010 and the final outcomes were presented to the Fire Authority at its meeting of 25 February 2011. At that meeting the Fire Authority considered the outcomes and made the decision to forward the review to a Member-led group for further scrutiny and to “look in depth at the implications relating to the review.”
- 1.4 The review group, through a series of meetings, looked at the process undertaken, the findings and outcomes of the process. They received submissions from representative bodies and sought additional information from the Chief Fire Officer and his team. Where there was uncertainty, the group sought clarity and received confirmation from Nottingham Trent University that the process and methodology applied were robust.
- 1.5 Following the final meeting of the group on Monday 13 June 2011, the Chief Fire Officer was tasked with presenting three options to the Fire Authority, including his preferred option, at their meeting on 24 June 2011 (Appendix A). This process took place and at that meeting, following an amendment, the Fire Authority agreed to consult on Option 2 which is detailed below:

### **“OPTION 2**

#### **3.2.1 Management Capacity**

*Subject to appropriate consultation, over the forthcoming period commencing at the earliest opportunity and concluding no later than the final year of the current CSR period, the Service will seek to make the following changes to its Operational Uniform Management Structure:*

*Brigade Managers will reduce from four to three\**

*Area Managers will reduce from five to three\**

*Group Managers will reduce from eight to six\**

*Station Managers (78 hr duty system) will reduce from 28 to 24\**

*\* All of the above will require senior management to renegotiate terms and conditions of employment and operational duty systems.*

*Station Manager (42 hr duty system) will be removed and all seven posts deleted.*

*Impact on staffing – this would reduce the current Officer establishment (Station Manager and above) from 52 to 36. This is a reduction of 30%.*

*3.2.2 Watch Manager (non ridership<sup>a</sup>) will see a reduction of 20 posts over the four year period.*

*Other Uniform roles not within the ridership<sup>a</sup> will be re-evaluated and where appropriate either removed or amended to a non uniform equivalent.*

*<sup>a</sup> For Fire Authority benefit the ridership constitutes the 456 members of the Wholetime Duty System (WDS) that form the core fire station personnel.*

*Impact on staffing – this would reduce the current uniform establishment, below the role of Station Manager, not associated with the ridership by a minimum of 20%.*

### *3.2.3 Stations and Appliances*

*Subject to full consultation with public and stakeholders, within the first year of the process (2012-2013), subject to formal consultation not changing any of these, and subject to formal consultation with all affected staff, the following proposals would be implemented:*

- The Service will remove from Service T29P3 (Highfields 3<sup>rd</sup> appliance).*
- The Service will replace T26P2 (Arnold 2<sup>nd</sup> appliance), with a TRV crewed flexibly with WDS.*
- The Service will upgrade to WDS T06P1 (Edwinstowe).*
- The 2<sup>nd</sup> appliance at West Bridgford will be replaced by a TRV crewed flexibly by WDS.*
- The Service will continue to actively pursue the relocation from the existing Station 18 Central to a location within the city but preferably as identified within the FCR within the London Road area.*
- The Service will start engaging with any developers over the potential to build or upgrade existing facilities (through Section 106 grants) within the South Clifton/Rushcliffe area to ensure an*

*enhanced operational presence will be provided in that area in addition and in support of existing resources.*

- *The Service will begin the establishment of a mobile RDS support pool which will ensure staff are available to enhance the numbers of crew available and ensure improved appliance availability at Retained stations, but as a priority Bingham.*
- *The Service will begin a widespread review of all pre-determined 1<sup>st</sup> attendances (PDAs)*

*Within the second year of the process (2013-2014), subject to formal consultation not changing any of these proposals, and subject to formal consultation with all staff affected, the following proposals would be implemented:*

- *The Service will remove from Service T27P2 (Carlton 2<sup>nd</sup> appliance).*
- *The Service will remove from service T01P2 (Mansfield 2<sup>nd</sup> appliance). (The longer term view will be to replace this with a third TRV depending on the operational capacity of the two implemented in year 1 and the ability of the Service to release further resources to the front line).*
- *The Service will change the duty systems of the following appliances to 12 hour day crewing – T12P1 (Retford 1<sup>st</sup> appliance) and T08P2 (Worksop 2<sup>nd</sup> appliance).*
- *The Service will commence the process of decommissioning the ALP currently based at Mansfield Station.*
- *The Service will look at options regarding the crewing of special appliances to ensure that the provision of primary fire appliances is not only maintained but improved against current levels.*

*Within the third year of the process (2014-2015), subject to formal consultation not changing any of these proposals, and subject to formal consultation with all staff affected, the following proposals would be implemented:*

- *The Service will begin the process of closing Station 15 Collingham with the removal from service of T15P1. This would be concluded within the 12 month period.*
- *The Service will begin the process of re-negotiating the current retained contracts along lines agreed in other Fire and Rescue Services.*
- *The CFO will report on any agreed discussions over the potential for operational rationalisation of resources along the*

*Nottinghamshire/Derbyshire border subject to the approval for discussions being given by the Fire Authority.*

*Impact on staffing:*

*WDS* – the current ridership figure of 456 will be maintained and potentially increased by the redeployment of existing uniform roles from day duty to operations. This means that the same or potentially more of our WDS will still be engaged operationally.

*RDS* – there will be a potential reduction of up to 100 RDS posts (or approximately 50 units) over the three years. This is from an existing establishment of 252 units. Therefore, about 20%. The current employment level is 351 staff (or 187.5 units).

*Approximately 20-25% of those likely to be affected are already employed as WDS fire-fighters and are on dual contracts (the total number presently is 65). With the retirement profile of the Service over the next three years and the need to maintain the existing ridership at 456, as well as other potential employment opportunities, the opportunity to redeploy a number of the staff affected also exists subject to appropriate human resources procedures.*

*This means the total number of personnel actually affected over the three year period could fall below 50.*

*3.2.4 Other Supporting Considerations*

*Over the three year period the following are also considerations that the Service would need to consider:*

- A review of the total Service structure, also affecting non uniform posts, to ensure that the Service provides a leaner more cost effective model without compromising service delivery.*
- A review of its estate to see what opportunities could be exploited and whether any further rationalisation could take place.*
- New collective agreements would be required to accommodate all of the changes on rotas and duty systems.*
- The training requirements on staff are likely to be increased following the publication of the HSE report and the Service will need to view how it accommodates this need.*
- The further impact of employment legislation and the ongoing claims under the less favourable treatment regulations.*
- Further work on major risk sites, including PDAs.*

- *A review of station cover moves to ensure that operational resources are adequately spread following any changes.*
- *The impact of any changes to the provisions of the Fire Control Centre.*
- *To keep the implementation of changes under constant assessment and maintain appropriate and relevant briefings to employees, press and Fire Authority as required.*

*Impact on staffing – a reduction in those non uniform posts that support the operational service delivery is an impact and full consultation with staff and the representative bodies will be required.”*

1.6 With the amendment that was tabled and agreed, the following recommendations were agreed:

**“RESOLVED**

- (1) *That the Fire Authority receive the three options put forward which will address the findings of the Fire Cover Review;*
- (2) *That the Fire Authority receive the Chief Fire Officer’s recommendation that Option 2 would provide a sound basis and best option on which to begin a comprehensive consultation process but did not accept his proposal to close Station 15 Collingham;*
- (3) *That the Fire Authority agree on the way forward with regard to consultation and the options presented, taking into account the Chief Fire Officer’s recommendation of Option 2 but removing the proposal to close Station 15 Collingham;*
- (4) *That the Chief Fire Officer be tasked with beginning internal consultation on any managerial changes contained within the Fire Cover Review;*
- (5) *That consultation with the wider public and stakeholders begin at the earliest opportunity and run for a period of no less than 12 weeks.*
- (6) *That the outcomes of the consultation process are presented back to a full meeting of the Fire Authority at the earliest opportunity post the consultation period closing”.*

1.7 As a consequence, a period of consultation commenced on 1 August 2011 and the full details of that consultation and its outcomes are presented separately to the Fire Authority today.

1.8 This report seeks to build on the process of the consultation and seek approval for a way forward for Option 2 of the FCR which addresses the risk profile for the Service over the forthcoming period.

## **2. REPORT**

- 2.1 As the report which details the consultation and its outcomes shows, the process of consultation has been extensive and meets all of the statutory obligations placed upon the Fire Authority. It can be considered robust and will stand up to scrutiny should the Service receive any direct challenge.
- 2.2 Option 2 provided a credible way forward for the Authority to address its risk profile and this has received broad support from across the community. Clearly there were some areas of concern and the Fire Authority should not ignore the concerns of staff whose views were considerably different to the public and stakeholders.
- 2.3 A clear and viable option for the Fire Authority therefore is to agree a way forward for Option 2, taking into account the concerns which have been expressed through the consultation process.
- 2.4 The clear imperative is to address the risk model to ensure that the Service continues to deliver against its IRMP and Service Plan proposals. These will be updated in 2013 for the following period 2014 – 2017.
- 2.5 Any option taken must take into account the financial uncertainties affecting the Service, the UK and Europe to ensure that any option taken is affordable in the long term. The Fire Authority can be re-assured however, that at this stage decisions taken can be based upon the risk and the needs of the Service.
- 2.6 It is therefore the recommendation of the Chief Fire Officer that the Fire Authority implement Option 2, giving consideration to the results of consultation, provided that the risk profile as delivered by the FCR is addressed.

## **3. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS**

- 3.1 Within its current budget planning cycle, the Fire Authority agreed a budget on 25 February 2011, which moved FCR savings from 2011/12 to 2012/13, but with all to be completed by Year 4 of the current comprehensive spending review period.
- 3.2 Prudent financial management and the current levels of balances will enable any decision on FCR to be phased in, although caution must be advised with regard to uncertainties around proposed Council Tax top-up grants and the re-distribution of business rates which will directly affect the Service from 2013/14 onwards.

#### **4. HUMAN RESOURCES AND LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS**

- 4.1 Any decision made in relation to the FCR will have significant human resources and learning and development implications for the Service. A recent freeze in wholetime recruitment and a targeted approach in retained areas has created vacancies within the Service. Additionally, the Service is managing vacancies within non-uniform roles and officer posts which will assist with any transition process.
- 4.2 Any development needs will be determined by the route taken by the Fire Authority.

#### **5. EQUALITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT**

Option 2 of the FCR was subject to an equality impact assessment process and any aspects of the way forward will also be subject to that process as the Service progresses.

#### **6. CRIME AND DISORDER IMPLICATIONS**

There are no crime and disorder implications arising from this report.

#### **7. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS**

- 7.1 Part 3, Section 21 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 requires the Secretary of State to prepare a Fire and Rescue Services National Framework. Amongst other things this document sets out “priorities and objectives for fire and rescue authorities in connection with the discharge of their functions”.
- 7.2 The current Fire and Rescue Services National Framework (Section 1.6) sets a requirement for fire and rescue services to have in place an IRMP which amongst other aspects “reflects up to date risk information and evaluation of service delivery outcomes.” The FCR is part of that evaluation process and clearly demonstrates legislative compliance and shows how the Authority will utilise its “prevention, protection and response activities ... will be best used to mitigate the impact of risk on communities in a cost effective way.”
- 7.3 In respect of the consultation process itself the approach taken “reflects effective consultation during development and at all review stages with representatives of all sections of the community and stakeholders.” It has also followed government guidelines and reflects good practice guidance with IRMP processes.



## **8. RISK MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS**

- 8.1 The FCR in its entirety is a risk assessment of the risks which face the Service, its employees and the public. The Option 2 which was consulted upon is a way for the Service to address that risk in a cost effective way, whilst maintaining a level of service to the community.
- 8.2 Any option considered from this point forward, providing it meets the risk model, will enable the Service to mitigate the risks it faces.

## **9. RECOMMENDATIONS**

It is recommended that the Fire Authority implement Option 2, giving consideration to the results of consultation, provided that the risk profile as delivered by the FCR is addressed.

## **10. BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR INSPECTION (OTHER THAN PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS)**

None.

Frank Swann  
**CHIEF FIRE OFFICER**



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# **OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING THE OUTCOMES OF THE FIRE COVER REVIEW 2010**

Report of the Chief Fire Officer

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**Agenda Item No:**

**Date:** 24 June 2011

**Purpose of Report:**

The purpose of this report is for the Chief Fire Officer to present three options to the Fire Authority which will address the findings of the Fire Cover Review. To give a professional recommendation on which is the preferred option for consultation, and to seek Fire Authority approval on which option(s) they would wish to take forward for consultation.

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
## 1. BACKGROUND

- 1.1 The current level and provision of fire cover is predominantly based around the requirements set by the Riverdale Committee report in 1936. This laid out specific provisions in respect of responding to certain types of building and the impact that this would have.
- 1.2 During the Second World War, the Fire Service was temporarily nationalised, and returned to Local Authority control in 1948 following the publication of the Fire Services Act 1947.
- 1.3 The Fire Services Act 1947 built on the provisions of the 1936 report and gave powers of providing and equipping a Fire and Rescue Service to the respective Local Authorities. There were also other specific duties. Within this Act however, were certain caveats which meant that if an Authority were to change its establishment or amend its cover in any way, then the permission of the Secretary of State would be required.
- 1.4 This was evident in the last full Fire Cover Review (FCR) – “Nottinghamshire Fire Brigade – The Next Ten Years” – undertaken by Chief Fire Officer Wilson in July 1986. Here recommendations made would be subject to the approval of the Secretary of State.
- 1.5 In 2004, as part of a Fire Service modernisation programme, a new and revised Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 was introduced. This Act served to reinforce the provisions of responsibility for Local Authorities and Fire and Rescue Authorities that were contained within the 1947 Act, but removed any central restrictions on decision making regarding fire cover and establishment numbers.
- 1.6 The new Act also introduced the concept of Integrated Risk Management Planning, where the Local Authority responsible for its Fire and Rescue Service would deliver a plan as to how it was going to use its resources to reduce risk and best serve the needs of its community. This concept was first introduced by Fire and Rescue Services Circular 7/2003, but was enshrined within the Act and the associated Fire and Rescue Services National Framework.
- 1.7 Nottinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service delivered its first Integrated Risk Management Plan (IRMP) in 2004 following guidance issued by the then Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM). This IRMP delivered some changes to operational service delivery and refocused many resources upon the prevention rather than the response side of the Service.
- 1.8 Subsequent IRMPs have confirmed this trend, although there has been a refocus in recent years on staff development and operational standards. This has followed the outcomes of reports from around the country, changes in working practices, and the need to develop new staff following a significant turnover in numbers due to the Service’s retirement profile.

- 1.9 As part of the previous Community Safety Plan which covered the period 2006-2009, some minor amendments were made to fire cover arrangements. Most notable was the merger of the two stations at Dunkirk and Beeston into the new Highfields station. This had been previously recommended in the 1986 report. The impact was limited in scope as at this time it was felt that the IRMP process and the data capture was too immature to undertake a full and comprehensive review of the nature being carried out previously.
- 1.10 However, the effort the Service has made to influence and reduce the impact of fire and other associated accidents has been significant. As the chart below shows, the Service has seen a decline in the number of incidents attended from 20,196 in 2001 to 13,175 in 2010. This included a dry summer peak in 2008 and also absorbed the floods experienced in 2007.

### Annual Totals of Incidents Attended in Nottinghamshire

2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
20,196	21,712	23,949	18,910	18,128	18,110	17,502	15,808	15,359	13,175



- 1.11 In all, the Service's activity levels from an operational perspective have declined 34.77% in just under 10 years, yet the level of operational cover has only marginally been amended. Additionally, levels of activity have moved with demographic change, revealing that areas of less resources were beginning to demand more of the Service's operational response element.
- 1.12 It is for this reason that during its preparation for the 2010-2013 Service Plan, Nottinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service used the IRMP process to consult widely on whether it should review its fire cover arrangements. Commencing in the spring of 2009, the Service engaged widely with its staff and communities on a range of issues, including the concept of a Fire Cover Review.

- 1.13 The outcomes of the consultation were incorporated into the IRMP process and the Service's 2010-2013 Plan was formally adopted by the Fire Authority at its meeting in February 2010, coming into force from April 2010. Section 7.3, Response, specifically detailed that the Service was to review its fire cover and how it was to carry out the process.

## **2. REPORT**

- 2.1 The FCR entitled "Your Service – Our Vision" took place during 2010 and the final outcomes were presented to the Fire Authority at its meeting of 25 February 2011. The report took into account all of the factors influencing the Service at this time, including legislative, operational and training, resilience, regulatory and safety implications.
- 2.2 In totality the FCR presented a picture of the operational arm of Nottinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service, from the management hierarchy through to individual fire stations.
- 2.3 At the Fire Authority meeting of 25 February 2011, the outcomes of the FCR, which was presented to Members, was received and forwarded to a Member-led working group for "a look in-depth at the implications relating to the review".
- 2.4 The review group, through a series of meetings, have met to look at and examine the process undertaken, and the findings and outcomes of the review. Requesting the support of the Chief Fire Officer (CFO) and members of his team as and when appropriate, and engaging with the representative bodies, has formed part of this overall scrutiny.
- 2.5 The review group at all times has sought clarity and examined all of the implications of addressing the findings. Recognising the need for the FCR to contribute to the Service's overall budget savings and still maintaining a service delivery model which meets the requirements of the risk assessment, has been paramount. The review group also took into account the independent verification undertaken by Nottingham Trent University, which verified that the process and methodology applied to the review was robust.
- 2.6 Following their final meeting on Monday 13 June 2011, the FCR Group advised the CFO that the FCR Group have tested the review, the robustness of approach used and weighed up the risks. Further, that advice was taken from the CFO and members of his team, and the Group has also noted that Nottingham Trent University have looked at the Fire Cover Review and confirmed it as robust. The Group further advised that they had looked at areas of risk and taken them into consideration where possible, and consider that the risk map should be reviewed annually and work undertaken to validate and further develop the methodology. The Group confirmed that, as tasked by the Combined Fire Authority on 25 February 2011, and within the timeframes available, the Group had looked at the implications relating to the Fire Cover Review, and as part of that process, following their meeting on 13 June 2011, requested the CFO present a number of options for the Fire Authority to consider – along with an outline of the CFO's preferred option – as to how to address the outcomes of the review.

- 2.7 Although it can be seen that these timeframes were tight, the FCR Group recognised the importance of a full and comprehensive consultation process before any final decision could be made. Clearly that consultation process will need to be extensive, engaging employees, the community, stakeholders and other interested parties. It will also need to be of a type, nature and timeframe conducive to that recommended by government when engaging in consultation.

## **The Recommendations**

- 2.8 Although many communities will view their local fire station provision as being 'their' provision, the reality is that in terms of delivery of a county-wide service, management has to take a holistic view. It is therefore not feasible to present to the Fire Authority a series of recommendations, or indeed options, around individual units.
- 2.9 The reality is that for every action there is a consequent reaction in the provision of fire cover. Changing the availability of one appliance or station will have a knock-on effect to the next nearest appliance or station. This is why it is so important to consult fully on any changes so that as broad a range of people understand the importance of any changes.
- 2.10 Taking this into account, and following consultation and engagement with the FCR Group, the CFO and his team have worked hard to look at alternative options, that are affordable and sustainable in the longer term, and that would meet the requirements of both the community from a service need, and the organisation from a health and safety perspective. In doing so this paper outlines three potential options as entire packages that could fulfil all of the requirements. It must be stressed that the temptation to interchange various elements has to be avoided as this could undermine other elements and each option has to be considered as an entire package.
- 2.11 It is also important for the Authority to be informed as to why only three options have been put forward. This is because the Service has limited capacity, when utilising its existing resources, to respond to addressing the areas of need. In effect the Fire Authority is not considering an option that would increase the workforce by increasing the budget. It is consulting on how to use what it has differently and this is why the scope is limited.
- 2.12 Whichever option the Fire Authority chooses to consult upon there will be a need to relay to the general public why the changes are being made and what the key aspects will be. It is likely that this will be challenging and it is important that the consultation is both constructive, widespread and reaches all of our stakeholders and service users.
- 2.13 A key part of the review, which the FCR Group have considered, is the proposed changes to the managerial structure that supports the service delivery. Any changes to this area, as identified within the review, will also act as a catalyst for change and the need to progress this aspect is pressing. As it will primarily be a Service matter, with limited impact for the wider community, it would be important to commence internal consultation on these changes at the earliest opportunity. Any ongoing scrutiny will be applied by the Fire Authority through its appropriate Committee structures.

- 2.14 The CFO also considers it vital that although there are three options for the Fire Authority to consider, he must identify which of the options is his preferred one. This is to ensure that the Fire Authority has the ability to apply appropriate scrutiny to the others and establish why the CFO has come to that view. Those Members who have been involved in the detail through the FCR Group will have the benefit of a greater depth of knowledge and it is important that this is transferred to the whole of the Fire Authority through due process.
- 2.15 The full FCR report is appended to this paper and the options contained within this report should not be read in isolation. They are just a summary of the proposals that would allow the Service to meet the requirements of the findings. Likewise all of the district overviews and data which helped formulate the final report are key to these options. They should not be taken in isolation nor should they be seen as a final proposal. These are options on which to consult the public. This does not rule out any amendments should the Service discover through the process of consultation that staff or the community come up with viable, operationally sound and economically sustainable ways of addressing any changes.
- 2.16 To assist with the scrutiny that clearly needs to be applied, the options are broken down into sections covering management capacity, stations and appliances, and other supporting considerations. In each case the CFO would ask the Fire Authority to agree with immediate effect those elements that are contained within the management capacity options and any of the supporting considerations that would not impact on any consultation with the public over potential changes to the front line service delivery model. This will ensure that the Service can begin incremental changes to organisational structure and begin to scale down the establishment in an orderly fashion taking account of retirement profiles and other factors that would reduce the potential for compulsory redundancies and the associated costs that will present to the Fire Authority.
- 2.17 Clearly the Fire Authority may decide that it wishes to consult on one or more of the options as part of its engagement with the broader community. If this is to be a route that the Fire Authority wish to consider, it will be important to identify that aspects within each of the options are not interchangeable. As explained in Paragraph 2.8 above, each option takes a holistic view on fire cover for the county and it is important that this is expressed. It must also be stressed that whilst the consultants have stated that multiple option consultation is achievable, it may complicate the process, exaggerate the community reaction and confuse any returns when the Service reports back later in the year.

### 3. OPTIONS

The options are summarised as follows:

#### 3.1 OPTION 1

##### 3.1.1 Management Capacity

Subject to appropriate consultation, over the forthcoming period commencing at the earliest opportunity and concluding no later than the final year of the current CSR period, the Service will seek to make the following changes to its Operational Uniform Management Structure:

Brigade Managers will reduce from four to three\*

Area Managers will reduce from five to three\*

Group Managers will reduce from eight to six\*

Station Managers (78 hr duty system) will reduce from 28 to 20\*

\* All of the above will require senior management to renegotiate terms and conditions of employment and operational duty systems.

Station Manager (42 hr duty system) will remain at the current level of seven having been reduced from nine already. An operational rota will be implemented following negotiation.

Impact on staffing – this would reduce the current Officer establishment (Station Manager and above) from 52 to 39. This is a reduction of 25%.

3.1.2 Watch Manager (non ridership<sup>a</sup>) will see a reduction of 20 posts over the four year period.

Other Uniform roles not within the ridership<sup>a</sup> will be re-evaluated and where appropriate either removed or amended to a non uniform equivalent.

<sup>a</sup> For Fire Authority benefit the ridership constitutes the 456 members of the Wholetime Duty System (WDS) that form the core fire station personnel

Impact on staffing – this would reduce the current uniform establishment, below the role of Station Manager, not associated with the ridership by a minimum of 20%.

##### 3.1.3 Stations and Appliances

Subject to full consultation with the public and stakeholders, within the first year of the process (2012-2013), subject to formal consultation not changing any of these, and subject to formal consultation with all affected staff, the following proposals would be implemented;

- The Service will remove from Service T29P3 (Highfields 3<sup>rd</sup> appliance).



- The Service will remove from Service T27P2 (Carlton 2<sup>nd</sup> appliance).
- The Service will replace T06P1 (Edwinstowe) with a WDS appliance from Station 19 West Bridgford. This appliance will be based at Station 6, Service Development Centre (subject to planning) or any other location subject to the financial arrangements being agreed by the Fire Authority.
- The Service will continue to actively pursue the relocation from the existing Station 18 Central to a location within the city, but preferably as identified within the FCR within the London Road area.
- The Service will start engaging with any developers over the potential to build or upgrade existing facilities (through Section 106 grants) within the South Clifton/Rushcliffe area to ensure an enhanced operational presence will be provided in that area in addition and in support of existing resources.
- The Service will begin the establishment of a mobile RDS support pool which will ensure staff are available to enhance the numbers of crew available and ensure improved appliance availability at Retained stations, but as a priority Bingham.
- The Service will begin a widespread review of all pre-determined 1<sup>st</sup> attendances (PDAs).

Within the second year of the process (2013-2014), subject to formal consultation not changing any of these proposals, and subject to formal consultation with all staff affected, the following proposals would be implemented:

- The Service will remove from Service T26P2 (Arnold 2<sup>nd</sup> appliance).
- The Service will commence the process of closing Station 7 Warsop with the removal from service of T07P1. This would be concluded within the 12 month period.
- The Service will change the duty systems of the following appliances to 12 hour day crewing – T12P1 (Retford 1<sup>st</sup> appliance) and T08P2 (Worksop 2<sup>nd</sup> appliance).
- The Service will commence the process of decommissioning the Aerial Ladder Platform (ALP) currently based at Mansfield Station.
- The Service will look at options regarding the crewing of special appliances to ensure that the provision of primary fire appliances is not only maintained, but improved against current levels.

Within the third year of the process (2014-2015), subject to formal consultation not changing any of these proposals, and subject to formal consultation with all staff affected, the following proposals would be implemented;

- The Service will begin the process of closing Station 15 Collingham with the removal from service of T15P1. This would be concluded within the 12 month period.
- The Service will begin the process of re-negotiating the current retained contracts along lines agreed in other Fire and Rescue Services.
- The Service will move to replace T29P2 (Highfields 2<sup>nd</sup> appliance) with two TRVs. One to be based at Highfields, with the second based at Mansfield.
- The CFO will report on any agreed discussions over the potential for operational rationalisation of resources along the Nottinghamshire/Derbyshire border subject to the approval for discussions being given by the Fire Authority.

#### Impact on staffing:

WDS – the current ridership figure of 456 will be maintained and potentially increased by the redeployment of existing uniform roles from day duty to operations. This means that the same or potentially more of our WDS will still be engaged operationally.

RDS – there will be a potential reduction of up to 100 RDS posts (or approximately 50 units) over the three years. This is from an existing establishment of 252 units. Therefore, about 20%. The current employment level is 351 staff (or 187.5 units).

Approximately 20-25% of those likely to be affected are already employed as WDS fire-fighters and are on dual contracts (the total number presently is 65). With the retirement profile of the Service over the next three years and the need to maintain the existing ridership at 456, as well as other potential employment opportunities, the opportunity to redeploy a number of the staff affected also exists subject to appropriate human resources procedures.

This means the total number of personnel actually affected over the three year period could fall below 50.

#### 3.1.4 Other Supporting Considerations

Over the three year period the following are also considerations that the Service would need to consider.

- A review of the total Service structure, also affecting non uniform posts, to ensure that the Service provides a leaner more cost effective model without compromising service delivery.
- A review of its estate to see what opportunities could be exploited and whether any further rationalisation could take place.
- New collective agreements would be required to accommodate all of the changes on rotas and duty systems.

- The training requirements on staff are likely to be increased following the publication of the HSE report and the Service will need to view how it accommodates this need.
- The further impact of employment legislation and the ongoing claims under the less favourable treatment regulations.
- Further work on major risk sites, including PDAs.
- A review of station cover moves to ensure that operational resources are adequately spread following any changes.
- The impact of any changes to the provisions of the Fire Control Centre.
- To keep the implementation of changes under constant assessment and maintain appropriate and relevant briefings to employees, press and Fire Authority as required.

Impact on staffing – a reduction in those non uniform posts that support the operational service delivery is an impact and full consultation with staff and the representative bodies will be required.

## 3.2 **OPTION 2**

### 3.2.1 Management Capacity

Subject to appropriate consultation, over the forthcoming period commencing at the earliest opportunity and concluding no later than the final year of the current CSR period, the Service will seek to make the following changes to its Operational Uniform Management Structure:

Brigade Managers will reduce from four to three\*

Area Managers will reduce from five to three\*

Group Managers will reduce from eight to six\*

Station Managers (78 hr duty system) will reduce from 28 to 24\*

\* All of the above will require senior management to renegotiate terms and conditions of employment and operational duty systems.

Station Manager (42 hr duty system) will be removed and all seven posts deleted.

Impact on staffing – this would reduce the current Officer establishment (Station Manager and above) from 52 to 36. This is a reduction of 30%.

3.2.2 Watch Manager (non ridership<sup>a</sup>) will see a reduction of 20 posts over the four year period.

Other Uniform roles not within the ridership<sup>a</sup> will be re-evaluated and where appropriate either removed or amended to a non uniform equivalent.

- <sup>a</sup> For Fire Authority benefit the ridership constitutes the 456 members of the Wholetime Duty System (WDS) that form the core fire station personnel.

Impact on staffing – this would reduce the current uniform establishment, below the role of Station Manager, not associated with the ridership by a minimum of 20%.

### 3.2.3 Stations and Appliances

Subject to full consultation with public and stakeholders, within the first year of the process (2012-2013), subject to formal consultation not changing any of these, and subject to formal consultation with all affected staff, the following proposals would be implemented:

- The Service will remove from Service T29P3 (Highfields 3<sup>rd</sup> appliance).
- The Service will replace T26P2 (Arnold 2<sup>nd</sup> appliance), with a TRV crewed flexibly with WDS.
- The Service will upgrade to WDS T06P1 (Edwinstowe).
- The 2<sup>nd</sup> appliance at West Bridgford will be replaced by a TRV crewed flexibly by WDS.
- The Service will continue to actively pursue the relocation from the existing Station 18 Central to a location within the city but preferably as identified within the FCR within the London Road area.
- The Service will start engaging with any developers over the potential to build or upgrade existing facilities (through Section 106 grants) within the South Clifton/Rushcliffe area to ensure an enhanced operational presence will be provided in that area in addition and in support of existing resources.
- The Service will begin the establishment of a mobile RDS support pool which will ensure staff are available to enhance the numbers of crew available and ensure improved appliance availability at Retained stations, but as a priority Bingham.
- The Service will begin a widespread review of all pre-determined 1<sup>st</sup> attendances (PDAs)

Within the second year of the process (2013-2014), subject to formal consultation not changing any of these proposals, and subject to formal consultation with all staff affected, the following proposals would be implemented:

- The Service will remove from Service T27P2 (Carlton 2<sup>nd</sup> appliance).
- The Service will remove from service T01P2 (Mansfield 2<sup>nd</sup> appliance). (The longer term view will be to replace this with a

third TRV depending on the operational capacity of the two implemented in year 1 and the ability of the Service to release further resources to the front line).

- The Service will change the duty systems of the following appliances to 12 hour day crewing – T12P1 (Retford 1<sup>st</sup> appliance) and T08P2 (Worksop 2<sup>nd</sup> appliance).
- The Service will commence the process of decommissioning the ALP currently based at Mansfield Station.
- The Service will look at options regarding the crewing of special appliances to ensure that the provision of primary fire appliances is not only maintained but improved against current levels.

Within the third year of the process (2014-2015), subject to formal consultation not changing any of these proposals, and subject to formal consultation with all staff affected, the following proposals would be implemented:

- The Service will begin the process of closing Station 15 Collingham with the removal from service of T15P1. This would be concluded within the 12 month period.
- The Service will begin the process of re-negotiating the current retained contracts along lines agreed in other Fire and Rescue Services.
- The CFO will report on any agreed discussions over the potential for operational rationalisation of resources along the Nottinghamshire/Derbyshire border subject to the approval for discussions being given by the Fire Authority.

#### Impact on staffing:

WDS – the current ridership figure of 456 will be maintained and potentially increased by the redeployment of existing uniform roles from day duty to operations. This means that the same or potentially more of our WDS will still be engaged operationally.

RDS – there will be a potential reduction of up to 100 RDS posts (or approximately 50 units) over the three years. This is from an existing establishment of 252 units. Therefore, about 20%. The current employment level is 351 staff (or 187.5 units).

Approximately 20-25% of those likely to be affected are already employed as WDS fire-fighters and are on dual contracts (the total number presently is 65). With the retirement profile of the Service over the next three years and the need to maintain the existing ridership at 456, as well as other potential employment opportunities, the opportunity to redeploy a number of the staff affected also exists subject to appropriate human resources procedures.

This means the total number of personnel actually affected over the three year period could fall below 50.

#### 3.2.4 Other Supporting Considerations

Over the three year period the following are also considerations that the Service would need to consider:

- A review of the total Service structure, also affecting non uniform posts, to ensure that the Service provides a leaner more cost effective model without compromising service delivery.
- A review of its estate to see what opportunities could be exploited and whether any further rationalisation could take place.
- New collective agreements would be required to accommodate all of the changes on rotas and duty systems.
- The training requirements on staff are likely to be increased following the publication of the HSE report and the Service will need to view how it accommodates this need.
- The further impact of employment legislation and the ongoing claims under the less favourable treatment regulations.
- Further work on major risk sites, including PDAs.
- A review of station cover moves to ensure that operational resources are adequately spread following any changes.
- The impact of any changes to the provisions of the Fire Control Centre.
- To keep the implementation of changes under constant assessment and maintain appropriate and relevant briefings to employees, press and Fire Authority as required.

Impact on staffing – a reduction in those non uniform posts that support the operational service delivery is an impact and full consultation with staff and the representative bodies will be required.

### 3.3 **OPTION 3**

#### 3.3.1 Management Capacity

Subject to appropriate consultation, over the forthcoming period commencing at the earliest opportunity and concluding no later than the final year of the current CSR period, the Service will seek to make the following changes to its Operational Uniform Management Structure:

Brigade Managers will reduce from four to three\*

Area Managers will reduce from five to three\*

Group Managers will reduce from eight to six\*

Station Managers (78 hr duty system) will reduce from 28 to 24\*

\* All of the above will require senior management to renegotiate terms and conditions of employment and operational duty systems.

Station Manager (42 hr duty system) will be retained and officers will be conditioned to an operational rota to be negotiated.

Impact on staffing – this would reduce the current Officer establishment (Station Manager and above) from 52 to 43. This is a reduction of 17%.

3.3.2 Watch Manager (non ridership<sup>a</sup>) will see a reduction of 20 posts over the four year period.

Other Uniform roles not within the ridership<sup>a</sup> will be re-evaluated and where appropriate either removed or amended to a non uniform equivalent.

<sup>a</sup> For Fire Authority benefit the ridership constitutes the 456 members of the Wholetime Duty System (WDS) that form the core fire station personnel.

Impact on staffing – this would reduce the current uniform establishment, below the role of Station Manager, not associated with the ridership by a minimum of 20%.

### 3.3.3 Stations and Appliances

Subject to consultation with public and stakeholders, within the first year of the process (2012-2013), subject to formal consultation not changing any of these, and subject to formal consultation with all affected staff, the following proposals would be implemented:

- The Service will remove from Service T29P3 (Highfields 3<sup>rd</sup> appliance).
- The Service will remove from Service T27P2 (Carlton 2<sup>nd</sup> appliance).
- The Service will remove from Service T19P2 (West Bridgford 2<sup>nd</sup> appliance).
- The Service will upgrade to WDS T06P1 (Edwinstowe).
- The Service will begin an investment programme retaining Central Station on its existing site and ensuring the accommodation is fit for purpose.
- The Service will start engaging with any developers over the potential to build or upgrade existing facilities (through Section 106 grants) within the South Clifton/Rushcliffe area to ensure an enhanced operational presence will be provided in that area in addition and in support of existing resources.
- The Service will begin the establishment of a mobile RDS support pool which will ensure staff are available to enhance the numbers

of crew available and ensure improved appliance availability at Retained stations, but as a priority Bingham.

- The Service will begin a widespread review of all pre-determined 1<sup>st</sup> attendances (PDAs).

Within the second year of the process (2013-2014), subject to formal consultation not changing any of these proposals, and subject to formal consultation with all staff affected, the following proposals would be implemented:

- The Service will remove from service T29P2 (Highfields 2<sup>nd</sup> appliance).
- The Service will change the duty systems of the following appliances to 12 hour day crewing – T12P1 (Retford 1<sup>st</sup> appliance) and T08P2 (Worksop 2<sup>nd</sup> appliance).
- The Service will commence the process of decommissioning the ALP currently based at Mansfield Station.
- The Service will look at options regarding the crewing of special appliances to ensure that the provision of primary fire appliances is not only maintained, but improved against current levels.

Within the third year of the process (2014-2015), subject to formal consultation not changing any of these proposals, and subject to formal consultation with all staff affected, the following proposals would be implemented:

- The Service will change the duty system of T16P1 (Newark 1<sup>st</sup> appliance) to 12 hour day crewing.
- The Service will introduce one TRV in the conurbation at Highfields fire station.
- The Service will begin the process of re-negotiating the current retained contracts along lines agreed in other Fire and Rescue Services.
- The CFO will report on any agreed discussions over the potential for operational rationalisation of resources along the Nottinghamshire/Derbyshire border subject to the approval for discussions being given by the Fire Authority.

#### Impact on staffing:

WDS – the current ridership figure of 456 will be reduced by up to 45 staff reducing this number down to approximately 410. A total reduction over the three years of around 10%

RDS – there will be a potential reduction of up to 25 RDS posts (or approximately 12.5 units) over the three years. This is from an existing



establishment of 252 units. Therefore, about 5 %. The current employment level is 351 staff (or 187.5 units).

Approximately 5% of those likely to be affected are already employed as WDS fire-fighters and are on dual contracts (the total number presently is 65). With the WDS reducing in capacity there will be limited opportunity to offer re-deployment within the Service to those RDS affected.

#### 3.3.4 Other Supporting Considerations

Over the three year period the following are also considerations that the Service would need to consider:

- The Service will review its current attendance time standard and consult the public on a different approach based upon high / medium / low risk areas as identified in the FCR.
- A review of the total Service structure, also affecting non uniform posts, to ensure that the Service provides a leaner more cost effective model with compromising service delivery.
- A review of its estate to see what opportunities could be exploited and whether any further rationalisation could take place.
- New collective agreements would be required to accommodate all of the changes on rotas and duty systems.
- The training requirements on staff are likely to be increased following the publication of the HSE report and the Service will need to view how it accommodates this need.
- The further impact of employment legislation and the ongoing claims under the less favourable treatment regulations.
- Further work on major risk sites including PDAs.
- A review of station cover moves to ensure that operational resources are adequately spread following any changes.
- The impact of any changes to the provisions of the Fire Control Centre.
- To keep the implementation of changes under constant assessment and maintain appropriate and relevant briefings to employees, press and Fire Authority as required.

Impact on staffing – a reduction in those non uniform posts that support the operational service delivery is an impact and full consultation with staff and the representative bodies will be required.

- 3.4 It is important to stress that all of the three options will address the outcomes of the Fire Cover Review and will be affordable and

sustainable as the Service moves forward within a contracting economic climate.

- 3.5 In respect of the options, the CFO also needs to advise the Fire Authority of which, in his opinion, is the recommended option for consultation. To do this the SWOT analysis which is appended to this report and referenced in Paragraph 2.11 has been used. This process helps identify the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of each proposal. In effect it forms the basis of a risk appraisal of the options. Utilising this process, it is the recommendation of the CFO that Option 2 forms the best way forward on which to base the consultation process.
- 3.6 In respect of the consultation process, the Fire Authority will be aware of the need to engage appropriate support for the Service as it engages widely over any proposals. The Service is in dialogue with a supporting organisation and can confirm that should the Fire Authority approve the commencement of consultation as a result of this paper, then they are available to support the Service in this process. This will be important as any previous challenges to changes made by Fire and Rescue Services and any other public service bodies, through judicial review, have been mounted on the basis of consultation.

#### **4. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS**

- 4.1 The financial implications arising from this report will primarily be determined by the outcomes of any consultation process and any subsequent decisions that will be taken.
- 4.2 Whilst the FCR is not a means in itself for reducing the Service's budget requirements, it will help to contribute to the Service's overall reduction strategy for the next three years. An early outcome from consultation will allow the Authority to receive clear plans from Senior Officers as to the best way to move forward, whilst ensuring the Service is financially stable, efficient and continuing to deliver the level of service that the community expects.
- 4.3 By incorporating a wider re-organisation of the Service and its management structure, the Authority should be able to realise approximately £3.2 million in the forthcoming period. It has previously been identified that just over £1.2 million of this can be realised from re-organising front-line operational services. The anticipated savings for the Service over the next three and a half years are predicted to be circa £6.5 million and the Service is aware that the Minister for Fire and Resilience is being consistent in his message that things will be tougher in year three and four. The outcomes from any consultation will help the Service prepare for this and be able to develop and incremental plan for implementation.
- 4.4 Principal Management will continue to make savings in other areas, utilising a range of options which have been developed with senior managers of the organisation.

## **5. HUMAN RESOURCES AND LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS**

- 5.1 The human resources and learning and development implications will be fully risk assessed with regard to whichever option the Fire Authority takes forward for consultation. The following identify some key issues which will be part of that consideration and will be presented to the Authority in due course through the Committee structure process.

### Human Resources

- 5.2 Proposals to amend the structure of the workforce in relation to any of the options presented are significant. Lengthy processes of engagement and compliance with employment law will be key if the Service is to avoid any challenge to its changes. It is also important to keep staff informed and be able to establish a two way consultation process.
- 5.3 The Service is already addressing the outcome of pension claims, and the move towards greater equality between its WDS and RDS employees at a national level will continue to have a direct impact on the Service. Any specific changes will have to be accommodated.
- 5.4 Engagement with the representative bodies through existing consultative forum will be key, particularly if Nottinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service has to affect redundancies. The Fire Authority can receive reassurance that all of the correct processes are currently in place.

### Learning and Development

- 5.5 In terms of learning and development, the Fire Authority will be aware Part 2, Section 6, Paragraph 2(b) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 places a specific legal duty to “secure the provision of training for personnel.”
- 5.6 With the recent consolidated health and safety report into the Great Britain Fire and Rescue Service (October 2010) making topic specific recommendations into breathing apparatus, incident command and core skills training, the Service will need to ensure it is organised, ready and has the capacity to respond to such recommendations.
- 5.7 Responding to changes in the national recruitment and selection tests, assessment and development centre processes and staff promotion criteria, will be key if the Authority is to meet its statutory obligation.

## **6. EQUALITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT**

- 6.1 Whilst an initial impact assessment will suffice for each of the proposed options contained within this report, a full equality impact assessment will need to be undertaken on whichever of the options are taken forward for consultation.

6.2 A number of judicial reviews have been taken over the last four years demonstrating that some public bodies have failed to take their duties under equalities legislation seriously. The areas identified in judgements where organisations were found lacking included:

- Awareness of the statutory duty.
- Proper time.
- Proper consultation.
- Assessing justification.
- Proportionality.
- Transparency.

6.3 It is therefore vital that the Service conducts this process in a comprehensive and appropriate manner, thus ensuring the organisation is fulfilling its statutory duty under the Equality Act.

## **7. CRIME AND DISORDER IMPLICATIONS**

There are no specific crime and disorder implications arising from this report. The Service is reviewing its obligations as part of its wider service review and engaging with partners on any specific outcomes.

## **8. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS**

8.1 The obligations placed upon the Fire Authority under Part 2, Section 7, Paragraph 2 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 outlines the following:

*“In making provision . . . a Fire and Rescue Authority must in particular –*

*(a) Secure the provision of the personnel, services and equipment necessary efficiently to meet all normal requirements.”*

8.2 In addition, Paragraph 1.6 of the Fire and Rescue Services National Framework 2008-11, which is issued under Part 3, Section 21 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, states:

*“Each Fire and Rescue Authority must produce a publicly available IRMP covering at least a three year time span which:*

*. . . demonstrates how prevention, protection, and response activities will be best used to mitigate the impact of risk on communities in a cost effective way.”*

8.3 The Service’s current three year plan and the outcomes of the Fire Cover Review, fully comply with the legal obligations as laid down by this primary legislation.

8.4 Additionally, in the formulation of the Fire Cover Review, Officers have had to consider other aspects of law, such as the Category 1 obligations of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, Health and Safety at Work Act, Working Time Regulations, Part-Time Workers Regulations and other directives issued under various law.

## **9. RISK MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS**

- 9.1 The FCR is a product of a risk assessment process and presented to the Fire Authority are the outcomes of that risk assessment. This report identifies three options as to how the Fire Authority can re-organise its operational cover to mitigate the risk. Through the FCR group process, the Fire Authority can demonstrate a robust approach to scrutinising the findings of the review and therefore have applied due process to meeting their statutory obligations.
- 9.2 Each of the options put forward have received an individual risk assessment to determine which would provide the best basis for consultation, although all will help the Service meet the requirements of the FCR.
- 9.3 This subsequently mitigates the risks of potential challenge to any proposals that the Fire Authority may wish to adapt in the future, although legally these can never be ruled out.

## **10. RECOMMENDATIONS**

It is recommended that:

- 10.1 The Fire Authority receives the three options put forward which will address the findings of the Fire Cover Review.
- 10.2 The Fire Authority receives the Chief Fire Officer's recommendation that Option 2 would provide a sound basis and best option on which to begin a comprehensive consultation process.
- 10.3 The Fire Authority agree on the way forward with regard to consultation and the options presented, taking into account the Chief Fire Officer's recommendation.
- 10.4 The Chief Fire Officer is tasked with beginning internal consultation on any managerial changes contained within the Fire Cover Review.
- 10.5 Consultation with the wider public and stakeholders begins at the earliest opportunity and runs for a period of no less than 12 weeks.
- 10.6 The outcomes of the consultation process are presented back to a full meeting of the Fire Authority at the earliest opportunity post the consultation period closing.

## **11. BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR INSPECTION (OTHER THAN PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS)**

- Fire Authority Report – Fire Cover Review – 25 February 2011.
- Nottinghamshire Social Overview.
- Broxtowe Social Overview.
- Bassetlaw Social Overview.
- Ashfield Social Overview.
- Mansfield Social Overview.
- Gedling Social Overview.
- City District Social Overview.
- Newark and Sherwood District Overview.
- Rushcliffe District Overview.
- FCR TRV Appendix.

Frank Swann  
**CHIEF FIRE OFFICER**

# **“Your Service, Our Vision”**

**(Fire Cover Review (FCR) 2010)**

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## Glossary of Terms

<b>ABI</b>	Association of British Insurers
<b>AC</b>	Audit Commission
<b>ACF</b>	Arson Control Forum
<b>ALP</b>	Aerial Ladder Platform
<b>APB</b>	Arson Prevention Bureau
<b>ATF</b>	Arson Task Force
<b>ACFO</b>	Assistant Chief Fire Officer
<b>ACO</b>	Assistant Chief Officer
<b>AM</b>	Area Manager
<b>B.A.</b>	Breathing Apparatus
<b>B.A.U</b>	Breathing Apparatus Unit
<b>BM</b>	Brigade Manager
<b>CBRNE</b>	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive
<b>CCA 04</b>	Civil Contingencies Act 2004
<b>CCC</b>	Close Call Crewing
<b>CCS</b>	Civil Contingencies Secretariat
<b>CDRP</b>	Crime & Disorder Reduction Partnership
<b>CFA</b>	Combined Fire Authority
<b>CFO</b>	Chief Fire Officer
<b>CFOA</b>	Chief Fire Officers Association
<b>CFRA</b>	Chief Fire and Rescue Advisor
<b>CFS</b>	Community Fire Safety
<b>CIPFA</b>	Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accounting
<b>CLG</b>	Communities and Local Government
<b>CMB</b>	Corporate Management Board
<b>CM</b>	Crew Manager
<b>COBR</b>	Cabinet Office Briefing Room
<b>CRR</b>	Community Risk Register
<b>CS</b>	Community Safety
<b>CSR</b>	Comprehensive Spending Review
<b>CSTF</b>	Community Safety Task Force
<b>CWM</b>	CadCorp Workload Modeller
<b>DC</b>	Day Crewing

<b>DCFO</b>	Deputy Chief Fire Officer
<b>DCLG</b>	Department for Communities and Local Government
<b>DEFRA</b>	Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
<b>DFRS</b>	Derbyshire Fire & Rescue Service
<b>DIM</b>	Detection, Identification and Monitoring
<b>DRA</b>	Dynamic Risk Assessment
<b>DTI</b>	Department for Trade and Industry
<b>ECSV</b>	Enhanced Command Support Vehicle
<b>EIA</b>	Equality Impact Assessment
<b>EPU</b>	Environmental Protection Unit
<b>EMDA</b>	East Midlands Development Agency
<b>FCO</b>	Fire Control Operator
<b>FCR 2010</b>	Fire Cover Review 2010
<b>FDS</b>	Flexible Duty System
<b>Ff</b>	Fire-fighter
<b>FI</b>	Fire Investigation
<b>FP</b>	Fire Protection
<b>FPSC</b>	Fire fighter Pension Scheme Circular
<b>FRSA 04</b>	Fire & Rescue Services Act 2004
<b>FRS</b>	Fire & Rescue Service
<b>FSEC</b>	Fire Service Emergency Cover
<b>FSO</b>	Fire Safety Order
<b>GIS</b>	Geographic Information System
<b>GM</b>	Group Manager
<b>GUC</b>	Gill Usher Consulting
<b>Hazmat</b>	Hazardous Materials
<b>HMEPO</b>	Hazardous Materials and Environmental Protection Officer
<b>HSE</b>	Health and Safety Executive
<b>IC</b>	Incident Commander
<b>ICS</b>	Incident Command System
<b>IFB</b>	Insurance Fraud Bureau
<b>IIWG</b>	Insurance Industry Working Group
<b>ILO</b>	Inter-Agency Liaison Officer
<b>IMD</b>	Indices of Multiple Deprivation

<b>KTP</b>	Knowledge Transfer Partnership
<b>LAA</b>	Local Area Agreement
<b>LDTG</b>	Local Delivery & Tasking Group
<b>LLAR</b>	Low Level Activity and Risk
<b>LRF</b>	Local Resilience Forum
<b>IRMP</b>	Integrated Risk Management Plan
<b>LSOA</b>	Lower Super Output Area
<b>LSP</b>	Local Strategic Partnership
<b>MMC</b>	Modern Methods of Construction
<b>MOBS</b>	Mobilisation System
<b>MIS</b>	Management Information System
<b>NBS</b>	Nottingham Business School
<b>NCAF</b>	National Coordinating and Advisory Framework
<b>ND</b>	New Dimensions
<b>NFD</b>	National Framework Document
<b>NFRS</b>	Nottinghamshire Fire & Rescue Service
<b>NRR</b>	National Risk Register
<b>NTU</b>	Nottingham Trent University
<b>ONS</b>	Office of National Statistics
<b>ORS</b>	Opinion Research Services
<b>OTR</b>	Off The Run
<b>PPE</b>	Personal Protective Equipment
<b>RA</b>	Risk Assessment
<b>RCC</b>	Regional Control Centre
<b>RB</b>	Representative Bodies
<b>RDS</b>	Retained Duty System
<b>RMB</b>	Regional Management Board
<b>RR</b>	Regulatory Reform
<b>RRF</b>	Regional Resilience Forum
<b>RRP</b>	Risk Reduction Plan
<b>RSS</b>	Regional Spatial Strategy
<b>RTC</b>	Road Traffic Collision
<b>SC</b>	Security Clearance
<b>SCS</b>	Sustainable Communities Strategy
<b>SFU</b>	Small Fire Unit

<b>SM</b>	Station Manager
<b>SMT</b>	Strategic Management Team
<b>SOA</b>	Super Output Area
<b>SRA</b>	Specialist Rescue Adviser
<b>SSC</b>	Special Service Call
<b>TRV</b>	Targeted Response Vehicle
<b>UwFS</b>	Unwanted Fire Signal
<b>VCS</b>	Variable Crewing System
<b>VfM</b>	Value for Money
<b>WDS</b>	Wholetime Duty System
<b>WM</b>	Watch Manager
<b>WTD</b>	Working Time Directive
<b>WTR</b>	Working Time Regulations

## 1.0 Executive Summary

1.1 Fire Cover Review 2010 has been a project to deliver one element of the CFA's agreed Service Plan, which set itself a clear agenda to address those most vulnerable areas and ensure NFRS strive in "**Creating Safer Communities**".

1.2 Having received the benefit of a full consultation process the following report is a product of those previous decisions. As such, this does not present the CFA with any surprise as a product, although its contents will be subject to great debate.

1.3 Fire Cover Review 2010 delivers a comprehensive review of current provisions to take into a full and meaningful consultation process. The aim of the project has been to find and strike a reasonable and proportionate Balance between the Services key areas of activity, namely, Prevention, Protection and Response.

1.4 As the five-year data sample (See County Overview) contained throughout the report clearly shows the requirement for NFRS to respond to operational incidents has decreased year on year, yet our resource commitment has remained consistent and independent of risk, this is becoming an increasingly outdated approach.

1.5 Much was made of the standards of fire cover that all UK FRS's previously provided under a generic approach, however, the implementation of IRMP (2004+) effectively challenged this process and all FRS's are now far more advanced in risk assessment, analysis methods and the application of resulting control measures.

1.6 Local risk assessment, demonstrated within this report provides the opportunity for the Fire Authority to use its resources to better effect in those areas of actual need Based on a relevant risk model. Additionally, this also provides the communities of Nottinghamshire with a model that ensures that its funding of NFRS is appropriate and targeted to be effective, economic and efficient at the point of need.



**1.7** The outline findings are contained within this Executive Summary section and the detail that supports each conclusion is found throughout main sections and body of this report, the evidence detail being within the attached appendices.

**1.8** This report has provided a Balance at all tiers of the service that will reflect the future needs of a professional emergency service. However, it is also cognisant of the changes and dilemma's this will present decision makers and staff within NFRS and all key stakeholders will need to see that as risk has changed within the City and County, so must our Response model.

**1.9** Findings of this review indicates an over provision of officer posts, notably:-

- Brigade Manager (BM) x1
- Area Manager (AM) - x2.
- Group Manager (GM) - x2; and
- Station Manager (SM) - x8.

**1.10** If the Service were to reduce its officer numbers by the levels identified within 1.9 the Service would realise a saving annually in the region of £800k - £ 1 million. This must be taken in context that the service may be required to reallocate work and may require non-operational staff to perform roles or commission external providers, incurring cost and reducing the savings above.

**1.11** NFRS will be mindful of its wider commitments and demands, embedded from our Civil Contingences activity, for example, support to Multi Agency Command and Co-ordinating groups. For these reasons, uniformed roles that are under-used operationally may provide operational cover on a pre-planned Basis, for example, SM (42) posts.

**1.12** Specifically in relation to Officer provision, work is required to identify and support the growing National Security Framework, for example, Security Clearance (SC) levels and numbers of staff who would be required.

- 1.13** Work has commenced and is linking to CFOA activity nationally and by Corporate Services locally, the extent of future implications will become clearer in the early part of 2011. Part of this work has already been actioned, in the form of Inter Agency Liaison Officers (ILO) and we will incorporate this and continue to expand it as a credible corporate function.
- 1.14** Further conclusions are drawn in relation to Day Duty (uniformed) roles and it is one of the outcomes of this review that this number could be reduced where appropriate to do so, for example, the number of Watch Manager (WM) roles are significantly higher (94) than peer, comparable organisations (e.g. 75), therefore a reduction of approximately 20 could be achieved. Previous reasons for these uniformed roles have included that operational experiences provided by post holders are key to performing within these roles and that they offer organisational resilience, in extraordinary times of demand.
- 1.15** The individual departments affected, coordinated by the FCR implementation team, would be well-placed deliver the reduction in uniformed roles. This work is interlinked with our budget savings programme and could be supported by a single implementation team.
- 1.16** Current, relevant legislation, for example, FRSA 04, CCA 04 and the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order, have replaced much of the legislation that FRS's had evolved from and supported. This now provides NFRS opportunity to look at post holder skill requirements and therefore the person that best fits the role of the future e.g., whether a post is to be uniformed.
- 1.17** An understanding is required, that where the organisation is subject to an unplanned and significant event (e.g. Business impact) leading to the loss / lack of access to people, NFRS is unable to plan for Day Duty staff to be any more available than its shift Based staff. This is a reliance on sheer weight of numbers across the whole service alone and not the result of a robust and evidence led Business Continuity Management (BCM) approach.

- 1.18** The approach to identifying the service's resilience figure within NFRS e.g. 56 Day Duty staff as a minimum when applying a (BCM) approach has been assessed via the audit commission as satisfactory in their national report. However, it is a further conclusion that the BCM arrangements be periodically reviewed within NFRS to take into account the future we are moving into and any resulting gaps are addressed.
- 1.19** The arrangements for BCM should use the skills of employees across the whole organisation when supporting major events and not limit itself to uniformed employees, for example, our Administrative and Support staff could provide loggist support at multi agency coordinating groups or logistical support to incidents e.g transport and stores teams.
- 1.20** Over the next four years, NFRS will see approximately 25 Watch Manager (WM) employees retire from the service; this does provide an opportunity to assess, if and how they are to be replaced.
- 1.21** One area already a proven case is Fire Protection with staff on Green book terms and conditions performing roles that would have previously seen Grey book personnel. As such, it is the findings of the review that post conversions could be expanded, taking into account any BCM review outcomes and the increased capacity that non-uniformed employees offer NFRS, with no requirement to maintain operational competencies.
- 1.22** The implementation of findings will also require the fundamental reallocation of staff from day-Based roles to response Based roles to allow for a far more flexible crewing and response model. It is also likely to require the conversion of posts across the NFRS establishment, for example, across uniformed Bands e.g. Crew Manager to Fire fighter or uniformed to non-uniformed roles, the location and number will only be clear on the acceptance and implementation of any findings contained within this report.
- 1.23** The approach of post conversion will also mean that career progression for individual (uniformed) employees will be more limited than that previously available. For example, remaining '*in Band*' longer, however, this will also mean their knowledge and experience may be more extensive than that observed by the Service nationally in recent years due to the larger number of leavers.

**1.24** In relation to Stations and Appliances, not all approaches and factors covered by the review apply equally to all sites. This is due to the level and detail of specific local issues used in the FCR project, for example, Risk Mapping outcomes, deprivation and issues around the delivery of NFRS Prevention and Protection initiatives, or the demand upon our current Response resources.

**1.25** In simple terms, the FCR is a risk assessment. The inputs and outcomes are a result of a risk analysis utilising the service's activity levels over the last five years. This risk assessment finds the service in general good health and identifies that the large majority of our operational stations are located and staffed at the appropriate level. However, like any updated risk assessment, changes to the risk outcome and subsequent areas of priority will emerge.

**1.26** Areas that the FCR has identified as requiring an enhanced provision supplementary to that already in place include, but are not limited to:

- the Centre and North-West of the county;
- retained sections that would include locations such as Bingham;
- London Road, City.

**1.27** In relation to the North-West, the fire station at Worksop currently locates one full-time duty appliance and one retained duty appliance. The Fire Cover Review shows that this provision would benefit from being enhanced at peak times of delivery.

**1.28** As with the previous Fire Cover review in July 1986, the process has also identified that the service would benefit from a 24-7 permanently crewed appliance within the centre of the County. The risk assessment shows that the ideal location is the Ollerton / Boughton area. Clearly, the costs associated with addressing this issue could be significant and any considerations made in addressing this shortfall would need to take into account areas of over-provision.

- 1.29** Although the Service has a retained station within the Bingham area, its availability has not been good over the last five years. The FCR identifies significant development within the area associated presently with the A46 widening. This presents an area of growing and strategic risk and should be addressed.
- 1.30** Research around the FCR has revealed that the Rushcliffe area could be subject to significant development during the forthcoming years with both housing and infrastructure plans being evident. The relocation of the Central station to the London Road area could present opportunities to re-position the West Bridgford site further into the Rushcliffe district. This is not an immediate problem but one that the Service should maintain on its capital-planning programme should the developments mentioned begin to come to fruition.
- 1.31** The decision to relocate from the current Base of Central Fire Station on Shakespeare Street was made in the original IRMP of 2004. Despite the complexities of the current site, work has been ongoing with all concerned parties on the option of relocation, which is still very viable. This FCR has helped identify the ideal location in respect of the risk model used. The London Road area of the City provides excellent access routes to both the City Centre and surrounding areas and will greatly improve response times to those areas of greater risk.
- 1.32** In respect of the FCR, the outcomes have also revealed that the Service does have excess operational capacity available to it. Whilst this capacity is not a risk, it does provide the Authority with unnecessary and additional costs that could be reduced. This could also be achieved without presenting additional risk to the community. Areas where excess capacity exist have been revealed as follows:
- Greater Nottingham
  - North-East of the County
  - East of the County

- 1.33** There could also potentially be the need to rationalise arrangements in the Centre of the County (Warsop and Edwinstowe) depending on whether the Fire Authority addresses the findings with regard to the provision of a 24-7 availability of fire cover within the centre of the County. It is important that all of these issues are considered as a whole and not in isolation as the impact on the Service delivery model needs to be managed holistically.
- 1.34** There are currently thirteen operational appliances within the Greater Nottingham area. This is significantly more than like-sized fire and rescue services and is very rarely used to its capacity. The FCR reveals that four of these appliances can either be redeployed to areas of greater need or withdrawn from service without any intolerable level of negative impact on service delivery.
- 1.35** In respect of the Retford area, the operational provision is equal to that provided in areas such as Worksop and Mansfield where activity rates are significantly higher. There is no strategic reason for this and options to vary this provision do exist without detriment to the local community or the number of appliances available.
- 1.36** The East of the County is well served by both Wholetime and retained stations given the level of demand and risk on the service at any given time. The FCR has revealed that the service could reduce this provision and still maintain effective service delivery to this area and the local communities within it. If a decision was taken to reduce the available appliances, the risk assessment shows that the appliance that would have least impact is the one currently Based at Collingham.
- 1.37** Lastly, the FCR has found that the current ALP provision can afford to be reduced to one. The current activity levels and costs associated with such vehicles identify two as being something of a luxury. Expansion of current 13/16 arrangements within peer FRS providing resilience would be beneficial to NFRS. The SRT are also identified as being the best resource to crew the ALP making it readily available.

**1.38** The FCR has also considered the concept of target response vehicles to address Secondary incident types that continue to require a FRS response, proportionate to the incident type. This type of incident accounts for a large percentage of the demand placed upon Response resources currently, as evidenced in (Section 14) on which these are based. Initially this would see two TRV's introduced, in the North of the County and within Greater Nottingham.

- These draw personnel from existing posts across NFRS e.g. WDS personnel currently used on standard appliances, Day Duty personnel and station capacity in the ridership.
- These vehicles will be available at hours of greatest demand, which vary throughout the year but are typically contained within the period of 1100 – 2300 hrs.

**1.39** Contained throughout this report are findings that include the introduction of new crewing models, but allow for the continuation of a self-rostered ethos, which has been a welcomed move in general and has further potential in the years to come, allowing further flexibility to individual employees.

**1.40** An area that will require updating is that of '**Cover moves**' these being the movement of appliances to cover areas that have seen the deployment of appliances to incidents and continue to be detained. This is a process operated by NFRS now and will continue post implementation and will allay fears that, Based upon risk, communities would be left without appropriate levels of fire cover, given demand, this will not be the case.

**1.41** The introduction of new or additional crewing arrangements should look to access the capacity that exists within the Ridership, for example, at one-appliance WDS stations, distributing this capacity into other areas e.g. TRV or RDS station support during key times of demand or RDS availability, predominantly during a week day.

**1.42** Although not a recommendation for this report, a number of alternative crewing models have been reviewed from across the UK FRS that may well provide a favourable cost model for the future and these should be considered in more detail as part of future IRMP's.

- 1.43** The implementation timescales of introducing the findings of this review would span an initial period of four years, however, like all review and change programmes; this will need to allow for delay and amendment. Some findings are for the longer term but should be acknowledged by the Service earlier rather than later. A key area outside of this to note will be where station locations are to be considered for change, therefore, being subject to land procurement, planning and the capital assets being available to NFRS.
- 1.44** The Capital programme would be adjusted by the FCR project and will result in revised schedules for both our vehicle Fleet and building replacement programme, forming the sustainable capital programme.
- 1.45** The review finds that the Service could reduce its building stock and make maximum use of those sites / stations it needs, for example, release the Clifton site, and the reduction in size of sites. Such approaches will realise Capital receipts to invest into the FCR implementation and change programme.
- 1.46** Distribution of special appliances will also be impacted upon, if there is a reduction of appliances. For example, which sections are to crew them, how many are to be trained in their use etc. This report also highlights proposals to deal with this scenario and should be addressed once consultation is complete and the Service is aware of what changes are to be supported.
- 1.47** Cognisance is required that the review is unable to estimate the time taken in dealing with any challenges to, or delays in its implementation plans, as such, these challenges are highly likely to absorb considerable time to action / reply to, directly impacting upon the services business planning approach and ability to achieve its objectives. This has been the experience of peer FRS's who have made similar recommendations. Clear Political / Fire Authority support is essential to have any realistic likelihood of being actioned; a further key to any level of success is the openness of the review.



**1.48** Openness during the FCR 2010 project has included internal departments, following their consultation and briefing around the scope of the project and the briefing of the Fire Authority Members by the Chief Fire Officer (CFO) and the Strategic Management Team (SMT), this has been key, for example, SMT Open Forums. Equally, supervisory managers have all received invites to and had the opportunity to attend FCR 2010 briefings carried out at multiple sites across NFRS.

**1.49** The FCR 2010 project has devoted a significant amount of attention on the critical need to Base its findings upon evidence, as this is clearly, where challenge and scrutiny will be focused. In reply to such future challenge, a number of modelling systems have been researched and ultimately procured; this has been developed by the NFRS Information Systems team and the FCR project team collectively. This work must continue to be developed and advanced in future years, as these will provide substantial benefits in resource planning for NFRS.

## 2.0 INTRODUCTION

**2.1** The provision of Fire Cover within the City and County of Nottinghamshire and the model applied has evolved over many years and will continue to evolve as society and risk change and interface with one another. Previous standards of fire cover had been in place for the best part of 60 years following the Riverdale committee work in 1936 and (1947) introduced in a post war environment, periodically reviewed with reports in 1958 and 1985. The standards were to take account of the following:-

- Congested urban areas;
- Smaller towns with mainly residential property, more widely spaced, and few, if any important risks; and
- Mainly rural areas with scattered villages and hamlets and remote homesteads.

**2.2** The United Kingdom (UK) risk profile and considerations have moved considerably since this model was applicable or valid. They have still provided sound foundations on which to build and develop new approaches to the identification of risk and our subsequent planning and response to emergencies.

**2.3** The Fire Cover Review (FCR) 2010 Project is one element of NFRS's 2010 – 13 Service Plan, as follows:

*“The Service’s operating environment is constantly changing, with new demands caused by climate change, demographic changes and advances in technology. We need to ensure our resources are appropriately targeted.*

*Our intention is to review fire cover across the whole Service area, focusing on community needs. We will consider whether or not our current response standard is providing an efficient and effective service, as well as ensuring the highest standards of Fire fighter safety are maintained. Currently we have a 10-minute attendance standard.*

*The Service will carry out detailed analysis across each fire station area to decide if we can deploy our resources more efficiently and effectively. We will measure current performance against the highest risks to life, society and the environment within our area.*

*We will review our response standard using a variety of nationally-recognised tools including the Fire Service Emergency Cover modelling software, as well as local data”.*

**(NFRS 2010 – 13 Service Plan)**

- 2.4** NFRS's 2010–13 Service Plan, supported by its Fire Authority received extensive consultation throughout 2009 via its 'Talk2Us' campaign, as required by the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 and good practice / guidance on consultation, specifically in relation to Integrated Risk Management Planning (IRMP). This report is the outcome of that part of our 2010 – 13 proposals.
- 2.5** Previous IRMP's had already consulted on a number of recommendations referenced within this review, for example, the relocation of Station 18 (Central) which was not actioned.
- 2.6** Any findings identified within this review will also be subject to wide consultation before any implementation team led by the Corporate Services department can be established and begin work.
- 2.7** The scope of FCR 2010 project established key objectives that deliver its aim, as set by NFRS's Strategic Management Team (SMT). It received full approval from the Combined Fire and Rescue Authority (CFA) Members following their consultation, in that, the review should examine how the operational response of NFRS should look in the Backdrop of a changing risk environment and more, the potential financial environment of the future. NFRS aim for this review to ensure the communities within the City and County of Nottinghamshire continue to receive a high quality service from a well-regarded public body.
- 2.8** The County and City will see large amounts of change in land use and building development in the coming years, formally covered by the Regional Spatial Strategy and supporting Aligned Core Strategies. These growth points need consideration by NFRS to ensure it is able to provide the right level of service that has a longer - term vision for local residents, in those areas that present the greatest levels of risk.

**2.9** This means NFRS must take account of Fire Cover requirements in terms of the years ahead and not be limited to just the short-term of one Service plan. This will enable a far more accurate reflection of need within our Capital programme for buildings and vehicle fleet.

**2.10** An area highlighted through the FCR 2010 project in relation to development has been the nationally publicised approach to Modern Methods of construction (MMC) and the growing profile of Domestic sprinklers. The Thames Gateway project has been subject to a CLG project and a Cost Benefit analysis, specifically looking at the value of Sprinklers within new builds / development.

**2.11** That report (Fire Research Series report 1 /2010) which should be considered in full, concluded that:-

*“The findings from our modelling are consistent with previous studies in suggesting that the benefits of installing sprinklers in all new housing, in terms of reduced fatalities, injuries and property loss, would fall far short of the costs (for example, see sections 5.5 and 7.1). We find some limited and uncertain evidence that installing domestic sprinklers in new social housing could lead to similar net social benefits as providing additional FRS resources.*

*The limited and uncertain evidence for installing domestic sprinklers in new social housing suggests that sprinklers may be cost-effective in some cases. It may therefore be appropriate for providers of new social housing to consider sprinklers on a case-by-case Basis.*

*However, the cost benefit evidence from this study does not support the mandatory installation of sprinklers in all housing or social housing in the Thames Gateway. The benefits from installing sprinklers in social housing would be reduced in particular by the current government planning policy of mixing social and private housing, as the scope for FRS savings would be reduced where both housing types share the same FRS resources.*

*Beyond the discrete policy options examined in this report, it is of course possible that some combination of fire prevention measures, such as targeting domestic sprinklers in social housing, smoke alarms, education, or other measures at the highest risk areas would provide more net social benefit than any one single measure”.*

*The cost benefit analysis has been carried out from the perspective of society as a whole. To compare the options from other perspectives (e.g. central Government), it is necessary to understand who incurs the costs of the different policy options. **For example, the costs of installing (although not necessarily maintaining) sprinklers may be faced partly by housing developers, but extra FRS resource costs may require extra public funds or they may be financed by developers under Section 106 agreements.***

- 2.12** Given the conclusions into the Thames Gateway project, the use of Domestic Sprinklers are recommended by this review and should be pursued by NFRS as one element of its strategic approach in reducing the risk to life from fire and reducing the impact this has upon homeowners and the wider economic impacts for the whole County.
- 2.13** The reviews focus on the financial commitments of the public sector has grown and this report will detail how it is best able to recommend the Service's response model to and mitigation of risk given the funding it is likely to have access to in future years. The Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) gave FRS UK an idea of what this reduction could mean over the next four years. For NFRS this could be in excess of £7 million from the current budget.
- 2.14** FCR 2010 was not actioned as a cost saving exercise, but would highlight resources to be allocated to other activities as part of its findings, clearly, given the CSR outcomes the review will now need to contribute to those savings.
- 2.15** NFRS, alongside the FCR 2010 project initiated other activities that will shape the Service, being the budget review and impact assessment work of internal departments and the longer-term application of the Knowledge Transfer Partnership (KTP).
- 2.16** The KTP will evaluate the most appropriate interventions for our Prevention work, specifically, what provides the greatest return in risk reduction across Nottinghamshire in relation to the resources available, this is expected to last for approximately 2 years.

**2.17** However, the findings of this report will directly affect how we deliver interventions, as it requires the redistribution of uniformed employees around the Service, for example, the Community Safety Task Force (CSTF) as well as other posts that are not primarily operational.

**2.18** The FCR 2010 project, through its approach, does not focus on one single area or layer of the Service, however, given the close operating environment; each outcome has implications right across the service, for example, the reduction in the number of Officer's and the Service's managerial capacity post implementation.

**2.19** NFRS fully expect and understand that this review will be subject to wide ranging scrutiny. Therefore, the review has collated extensive evidence from the previous five-year period (2005-09), as seen within its content, that robustly support its findings.

### **3 FCR 2010 Project Aim, Objectives and Deliverables**

- 3.1** The Fire Cover Review 2010 (FCR 2010) Project is an integral part of NFRS's current 2010 - 13 Service Plan (Section 7.3.1) having been widely consulted upon during 2009 prior to its implementation in April 2010 as per Central Government and lead department guidance and good practice.
- 3.2** The FCR 2010 project was implemented via the Services Chief Fire Officer (CFO) and supported by the Combined Fire Authority (CFA) and received corporate sign up via the current project management framework within NFRS.
- 3.3** The Corporate Management Board (CMB) received and agreed the scope for FCR 2010 and detailed in the following points below, in relation to what would be the expected project outcomes and its deliverables.
- 3.4** To deliver a Strategic review of the current / existing Fire Cover arrangements provided by Nottinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service (NFRS); to include all existing response delivery sites and appliance / vehicle provisions.
- 3.5** To review the disposition and usage of operational staff within the service that provide, or have the potential to provide an operational element within their roles.
- 3.6** This is to be presented in the form of an options report that will inform the services strategic decision-making process with a view to subsequently initiating an implementation project.

## **4 Expected benefits**

**4.1** As per NFRS policy and procedural approach within its agreed project framework and specifically the work proposal, clearly stated the expected benefits / desired outcomes and are re-iterated in the following points, and will:

- 4.1.1** Identify areas of opportunity for Response service delivery in relation to proportionate and appropriate allocation of resources to address risk internally and externally to the City and County of Nottinghamshire.
- 4.1.2** In pursuit of its statutory obligations, service interventions delivered will reflect the future needs of the service, community and county in relation to community risk within its operating parameters;
- 4.1.3** Ensure the service is able to satisfy existing and future / anticipated legal obligations as a public body and further, an emergency service;
- 4.1.4** Ensure that NFRS is able to provide the most appropriate level of service whilst ensuring that it is effective, efficient and economic (VFM);
- 4.1.5** Identify opportunities to reduce the operating costs of the service moving forwards;
- 4.1.6** Identify opportunities in the allocation of resources Based on evidence of need within Nottinghamshire as to ensure risk areas are addressed equitably and fairly in relation to the levels of risk identified; and
- 4.1.7** To ensure that the Fire Authority are fully appraised, through the provision of appropriate information and evidence of the Basis on which the operational reasons of the organisation is constructed.



## 5 National perspective

**5.1** The following section provides a national context and overview within which NFRS must operate to fully comply with its duties, it does not however contain all associated statute and supporting regulation that as an emergency service apply within the workplace as a public body, it is taken that these are already in place and considered within core activity.

**5.2** The Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (FRSA 04) - provides the Statutory umbrella under which NFRS discharges its functions and clearly details what those functions are, to include, but not exclusive, the following:-

### Core Functions

- Fire Safety
- Fire-fighting
- Road Traffic Collisions (RTC).
- Emergencies.

### Other Functions

- Direction relating to particular fires & emergencies.
- Power to respond to other eventualities.
- Other services

**5.3** The role of UK FRS now includes far more areas of responsibility, however, given that most areas already saw FRS's performing those roles, it can be seen as a mere formalisation process. Other areas naturally sit within our duties, which may not be specified, but FRS's have both the technical and personnel resources to best deliver that function e.g water rescue.

**5.4** The immediate and medium term position for all public service providers will see increasing pressure to reduce operating costs; indeed, all local authorities will be required to find more innovative and collaborative means of delivering services.

**5.5** The FRS will need to look at, actually what it delivers first and foremost, before looking into how it delivers those service's, NFRS will not be exempt from this process and will look to identify its key functions and those areas that it can highlight savings outside of its front line services. A key point to note is being clear as a service, as what is actually frontline.

- 5.6** FCR 2010 has sought to ensure that the scope of review and resultant findings will ensure the continued legal compliance of NFRS in the discharge of its duties, but also recognises that, Based upon risk; NFRS must provide an adaptive service that addresses risk in an appropriate and proportionate manner.
- 5.7** It is essential to recognise that the Response function of any FRS must work intrinsically with its Prevention and Protection functions and increasingly its partners; this is the central element to positively influencing upon the continued reduction of risk within Nottinghamshire.
- 5.8** NFRS's operating environment has clearly evolved over time and all public service providers must be able to reflect and serve their communities in the most efficient and effective manner by appropriately deploying the resources at their disposal.
- 5.9** FRSA 04 also provides the facility to combine an individual Fire Authority with another, for example, Devon and Somerset, its aim to make better use of available facilities and resources and improve service delivery to communities, e.g. economies of scale.
- 5.10** The CFA have taken the principled position that it wishes NFRS to remain sovereign and therefore not plan for combinations in the immediate or medium term operating environment. This will however, place some degree of pressure upon NFRS to implement changes in practice, requiring better use of resources for this to continue indefinitely.
- 5.11** This is also of specific relevance when considering geo-political boundaries and the provision of resources close to those boundaries e.g. Heanor fire station (Derbyshire) and Eastwood fire station (Nottinghamshire). Where, for the absence of such a boundary a single FRS may not have two stations located in such proximity and would potentially be addressed via Regional Management Boards (RMB) where they continue or individual FRS's, by agreeing Section 13 (*Reinforcement schemes*) and Section 16 (*Arrangements for the discharge of functions by others*).

**5.12 Section 13 (Reinforcement schemes)**, obliges FRA's to group together, so far as practicable, to provide mutual assistance. If there are cases where FRA's are unable to come to an agreement about forming such a group, and one of the Authorities concerned requests it, Section 14 enables the Secretary of State to direct FRA's involved to make, vary or revoke such a scheme. Before doing so the Secretary of State must give all FRA's concerned the opportunity to make representations to him and he may hold an inquiry.

**5.13 Section 16 (Arrangements for the discharge of functions by others)** providing fire and rescue authorities with the ability to enter into contractual arrangements with others (including other fire and rescue authorities) to provide services in the execution of their functions (covered by sections 6 to 9 and 11).

**5.14** An example would be an agreement where a fire and rescue authority contracts with a local education authority to promote fire safety within its schools. Another example would be where a fire and rescue authority specialises in rope rescue and a neighboring authority contracts with it to provide some or all of its response to incidents requiring rope rescue.

**5.15** However, a fire and rescue authority can only delegate its fire-fighting functions to another fire and rescue authority or others that employ fire-fighters. An example of such an agreement could be delegating to the licence-holder of a nuclear site, which employs its own fire service, the responsibility for preparing for, and dealing with, fires within the area of the site.

**5.16** Section 17 provides the Secretary of State with the ability to require fire and rescue authorities to enter into contractual arrangements under section 16 (or to vary or cancel any such arrangements). The Secretary of State can exercise the power on his own initiative or where one of the authorities has asked him to intervene, but the power must be exercised in the interests of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Before issuing a direction the Secretary of State must give the fire and rescue authorities affected the opportunity to make representations to him and he may hold an inquiry.

**5.17** It should be considered also that the traditional view of 13/16 arrangements have focused upon individual fire appliances in specific geographic locations. This approach has the potential to be far wider in its coverage, for example, Incident command / management and other specialist functions; this is already an area of great expansion nationally via the New Dimension (Resilience) programme.

**5.18** It should be remembered that fire and other emergencies are not cognisant of geo-political boundaries and do not discriminate as such. It therefore makes sense to engage with bordering partners in an attempt to better identify, reduce, manage and ultimately respond to realised risk. This being able to justify resource allocation, deliver continuous improvement and achieve better value for money.

**5.19** This relates to station locations at or near the County boundary and other functions covered by this review, some elements have been addressed piecemeal (via M of U) and are not providing the robust service delivery for which they were intended, for example, HMEPO and Fire Investigation

**5.20** In relation to the provision of an emergency response, that satisfies all elements of the 13 / 16 approach of FRSA 04, this review identifies that the current agreement be either revoked or replaced to be far more holistic in its approach.

## **5.21 National Framework Document**

**5.21.1** It is the responsibility of the Secretary of State to ensure NFRS have clear direction in terms of expectations. This section lifts the legal obligations that NFRS seek to discharge within its Service Plan.

**5.21.2** The Fire and Rescue National Framework is contained within Part 3 - **Administration** (Sect. 21) Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004. The following sections are a direct lift from the Act and clearly detail the UK FRS's responsibilities as being:-

*(1) The Secretary of State must prepare a Fire and Rescue National Framework.*

*(2) The Framework-*

*(a) Must set out priorities and objectives for fire and rescue authorities in connection with the discharge of their functions;*

*(b) May contain guidance to fire and rescue authorities in connection with the discharge of any of their functions;*

*(c) May contain any other matter relating to fire and rescue authorities or their functions that the Secretary of State considers appropriate.*

*(3) The Secretary of State must keep the terms of the Framework under review and may from time to time make revisions to it.*

*(4) The Secretary of State must discharge his functions under subsections (1) and (3) in the manner and to the extent that appear to him to be best calculated to promote-*

*(a) public safety,*

*(b) The economy, efficiency and effectiveness of fire and rescue authorities, and*

*(c) Economy, efficiency and effectiveness in connection with the matters in relation to which fire and rescue authorities have functions.*

*(5) In preparing the Framework, or any revisions to the Framework which appear to him to be significant, the Secretary of State –*

*(a) Must consult fire and rescue authorities or persons considered by him to represent them;*

*(b) Must consult persons considered by him to represent employees of fire and rescue authorities;*

*(c) May consult any other persons he considers appropriate.*

*(6) The Framework as first prepared, and any revisions to the framework which appear to the Secretary of State to be significant, have effect only when brought into effect by the Secretary of State by order.*

*(7) Fire and rescue authorities must have regard to the Framework in carrying out their functions.*

**5.21.3** The Fire and Rescue Service National Framework Document (NFD) 2008-11 is the approach Government has taken to set its priorities to the UK FRS and will make clear the following:-

- Governments expectations;
- Those things expected of the Fire and Rescue Authority; and
- The support Government will provide.

**5.21.4** The current NFD aims to give the UK FRS a strategic foundation on which to build its activities and discharge its functions, this achieved via individual IRMP's.

**5.21.5** Since the change in Central Government, the relevance of the current (08-11) framework has been subject to review and the Coalition Government will not look to enforce all elements, instead, it will only require NFRS to provide an IRMP. This will be how the performance of NFRS is judged. This review clearly supports the IRMP ethos, works to provide NFRS with continued positive improvements, and is the next logical step of the IRMP approach.

**5.21.6** The Comprehensive Spending Review 2010 (CSR 10) has now made the need for a realistic and proportionate IRMP even more relevant. This will ensure that the right type and level of resources are available where they are most required, again, it combines the Prevention, Protection and Response elements of NFRS, and one is not and cannot be independent of the others.

**5.21.7** Given the financial environment of the immediate years ahead, NFRS must take the initiative to ensure its organisational structure is able to flex internally and better interface with its peer FRA's. This being achieved with better use of its own and access to other Service resources, for example, the amendment to and introduction of a more far-reaching 13 / 16 agreement.

## **5.22 Integrated Risk Management Planning (IRMP)**

**5.22.1** IRMP, introduced following the 'Bain' review into the UK Fire and Rescue Service designed to allow for individual FRS's to assess risk at a local level and introduce control measures that are risk-Based in relation to the outcomes of that local assessment.

**5.22.2** This has seen a wider range of approaches to the provision of services by FRS's nationally, including its response to incidents once they have / are actually occurring. The approach of risk Based Fire Cover has evolved over many years with the priority and central element changing over time also, for example, standards of Fire Cover (pre-Bain) made great emphasis on building density, and therefore, city centres would receive higher levels of resource allocation. It can also apply where the central and driving element is actual risk to people within specific building types.

**5.22.3** NFRS have not removed the previous standards in a practical sense as the direct result of IRMP, in that, NFRS has not moved all of its stations as the result of this change in approach. IRMP does apply a mainstream and understandable risk management approach, i.e. it aims to be proportionate in its response to risk and could be argued is no different to older standards in that respect, it is the variables included that change.

**5.22.4** In support of FCR 2010, the project team have been fully cognisant of the need to support NFRS's IRMP / Service Plan and referred to the national IRMP guidance notes, specifically No. 1.

In that, an effective IRMP should:

- Identify existing and potential risks to the community within the authority area.
- Evaluate the effectiveness of current preventative and response arrangements.
- Identify opportunities for improvement and;
- Determine policies and standards for prevention and intervention and determine resource requirements to meet these policies and standards.

**5.22.5** Each FRS is duty bound to produce an Integrated Risk Management Plan (IRMP) to ensure they deliver their duties under the Act. This has seen a variety of approaches deployed across the wider UK FRS and continues to attract attention from interested parties connected to the FRS.

**5.22.6** IRMP nationally, has seen the progressive removal and replacement of the National Standards of Fire cover; within Nottinghamshire this is delivered by our attendance standard of 90% of incidents will receive an attendance within 10 minutes. The Strategic Management Team has confirmed their intention that this should continue.

*“To enable a comparison to be made we have examined our historical data and found that we currently have a vehicle in attendance at all types of incidents within ten minutes on 90% of occasions, this is a level of performance to be proud of”.*

(NFRS – IRMP 2004)

**5.22.7** NFRS are coming to the end of year one in their current IRMP and the FCR 2010 work previously consulted. The outcomes of this review will require further and extensive consultation over its period of implementation.

**5.22.8** It is also recommended that the IRMP Annual update should reflect and communicate the FRA’s intentions about proposed changes to the Emergency Response provision.

**5.22.9** Response times are one element that FCR 2010 has included within its approach, response times are taken against the likelihood of incidents occurring, that require an FRS response, for example, low risk areas are generally less likely to have an incident in comparison to high-risk areas, and the review data included supports this assessment.



**5.22.10** Currently it is only within the City that we are able to meet our own performance measure of ten minutes. However, the risk profiling Based upon the preferred option has demonstrated the Service would be able to show a general improvement in attendance times (see County and District data) by the redistribution of fire appliances from lower risk to higher risk areas. The CWM software predicts that in medium and low risk areas NFRS will see better performance. This should attract greater emphasis as the level of risk increases, for example, the City area sees the best attendance levels achieved.

**5.22.11** The GeognoSIS software has enabled NFRS to graphically show what areas can be reached and in what timeframes, of note is that GeognoSIS uses assigned road speeds in its assessment and not 'Blue light' conditions, these are then compared to NFRS actual incident data (see district data) that would include travel time under blue light conditions.

## **5.23 Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA 04)**

**5.23.1** Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 ("the Act") establishes a consistent level of civil protection activity across the UK. Greater consistency is sought too in the way the function is carried out between the local Category 1 and 2 responders as partners covered by the Act and in different parts of the country.

**5.23.2** The Act provides a Basic framework defining what tasks should be performed and how cooperation should be conducted. The Government does not consider that it is necessary to radically change the way things were done prior to civil protection being placed on a statutory Basis. It aims to consolidate and strengthen what exists.

**5.23.3** Working to a common framework, local responders will make their own decisions in the light of local circumstances and priorities about what planning arrangements are appropriate in their areas.

**5.23.4** The definition of “emergency” - “Emergency” is defined in Part 1 of the Act as:

*“An event or situation, which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK, the environment of a place in the UK, or war or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the UK”.*

**5.23.5** The definition of “emergency” is concerned with consequences, rather than with cause or source. Therefore, an emergency inside or outside the UK is covered by the definition, provided it has consequences inside the UK.

**5.23.6** An emergency is considered to have consequences inside the UK if the serious damage is within the territorial sea of the UK. The territorial sea is the area of sea up to 12 nautical miles to seaward of the UK coast (or, more accurately, to seaward of the coastal Baseline established by statute).

**5.23.7** A place in the UK may be anything from a small village to a town square to a large city. It may also include a part of a region or an entire region.

**5.23.8** Determination of when an emergency has occurred, or is likely to occur, is addressed in three ways. The Act provides:

- A specification of the kinds of event or situation which may cause “damage”; and
- Two tests for determining whether an event or situation threatening such damage constitutes an emergency (one of which must be met).

**5.23.9** The Regulations require:

- Category 1 responders to adopt a standard procedure for making the decision to activate a business continuity or emergency plan.

**5.23.10**      **Damage** - The Act sets out a list of events or situations, which may be considered to pose a threat of damage to human welfare, the environment or security.

### **5.23.11 Two tests as to whether a response is required**

A Category 1 responder must perform its duties under the Act only in relation to two situations, either of which poses a considerable test for that organisation's ability to perform its functions. In this way, the Act narrows the range of events or situations to which the duties apply to those, which test the Category 1 responder i.e.

- where the Category 1 responder: would consider it necessary or desirable to act to prevent, reduce, control, or mitigate the emergency's effects, or otherwise take action; and
- Would be unable to act without changing the deployment of its resources or acquiring additional resources.

One of these two tests must be met for the main duties of the Act to apply.

**5.23.12** CCA 04 is familiar to NFRS and its involvement in the proliferation of structures build up around its framework to discharge duties under it. These include the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS), Regional Resilience Forums (RRF) and ultimately Local Resilience Forum (LRF), all with specific contributory working / liaison groups.

**5.23.13** From a National risk perspective, the National Risk Register (NRR) serves to identify key themes and issues that local bodies should factor into the production of the Community Risk Registers (CRR).

**5.23.14** Locally, NFRS continue its proactive involvement with the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) and nothing in this review should prevent that from developing, it is both a statutory duty and provides NFRS access in partners to assist with the delivery of key messages, which should be used as a vehicle to address vulnerability that will increase community resilience.

## **5.24 National Security**

- 5.24.1** Within the UK FRS, involvement is growing to support the National Security Strategy and the Governmental approach to Counter Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) the clear role NFRS has is to support other agencies within the key strands, being Prevent, Protect, Prepare and Pursue. This further updated following the Defence and Security Review, undertaken by the Coalition Government. This is delivered by our interactions with the LRF and our provision of the National Resilience assets that have now been transferred to NFRS under the Long-term Capability Management Programme.
- 5.24.2** This responsibility will need to be reviewed in light of this reports recommendations and will require the implementation team to co-opt activity from the emergency and resilience team to ensure NFRS maintain its support of the national framework.
- 5.24.3** Many FRS's have already established strong links into this area, for example, London Fire Brigade, since the introduction and development of Inter Agency liaison Officers (ILO's). NFRS have commenced its engagement in this area with two trained ILO's.
- 5.24.4** To assist UK FRS CLG has implemented the National Co-ordination and Advisory Framework (NCAF) with a coordinating role via CFRA.
- 5.24.5** The purpose of the NCAF is to enable the provision of support and advice to the Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) and central government during incidents that are of national significance and/or require national co-ordination. The NCAF will provide a clear and coherent methodology for co-ordinating national resource mobilisation when preparing for and responding to such incidents.

- 5.24.6** The framework has been designed for co-ordination, advice and to ensure there is the provision of national support to the affected FRS. This document should be considered as the overarching document for the NCAF structure; however, it does not imply that all of the components will be automatically activated during every incident that requires a national response. The NCAF structure has been designed to be flexible enough to adapt to the nature, scale and requirements of the incident and to support those managing it.
- 5.24.7** This document seeks to strengthen FRS resilience in the preparation of, and the response to, incidents of national significance and/or require national co-ordination. It will be subject to continuous review following lessons learnt from such incidents.
- 5.24.8** The framework is designed to provide national advice and co-ordination in order to support the safe and speedy resolution of any emergency which may have national significance, whether national assets are deployed or not.
- 5.24.9** The *Fire and Rescue Service National Framework 2008-11*, provides information on the role of the Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser and identifies some of the responsibilities of that officer for national co-ordination and advice during incidents which have national significance. It also identifies the role of the National Strategic Advisory Team and the Communities and Local Government Emergency Room.
- 5.24.10** This Framework supplements and augments existing response arrangements – it does not replace them. The responsibility for resolving such incidents effectively and safely is still one that belongs to the local FRS together with the adoption of safe systems of work, such as the National Incident Command System. However, the introduction of this Framework does offer additional support with the intention of taking away some of the added burdens associated with such incidents from the affected FRS, and helping them to resolve the incident more effectively.

**5.24.11** NFRS will be required to deal with the means by which it initiates and interacts in any future incidents, which require external support in this format, and it is a recommendation that this work form part of the implementation activity, thereby ensuring a more holistic approach is delivered.

## **5.25 Organisational security**

**5.25.1** Fire and Rescue Service Circular 64/2009 "Implementation of the Protective Security Strategy" informs fire and rescue authorities of the issues surrounding the implementation of a Fire and Rescue Protective Security Strategy developed under CONTEST and Based on the SPF.

**5.25.2** Whilst adoption of the Protective Security Strategy is not mandatory, there is a clear onus on fire and rescue authorities to support CONTEST by adopting and implementing the strategy - *although it is strongly emphasised that implementation of the SPF should be proportionate to the risks involved.*

**5.25.3** In parallel with any legal (or business) imperatives to comply with the (relevant) MR's, fire and rescue authorities must also consider carefully the need for the FRS's to be seen as trusted partners in their dealings with the police and security agencies in the effective delivery of CONTEST and other security-related objectives, such as Interoperability.

**5.25.4** As part of the National Security Framework, NFRS are required to implement a wide range of tasks that better Prepare and Protect the Service. As a Category 1 responder within the CCA 04 and a contributor to the Critical National infrastructure (CNI), NFRS has a number of key areas to which it needs to focus attention in coming years, as such, FCR 2010 highlights some of those generic areas that should see the recommendations of this report as a driver to deliver also, namely:

- Information security;
- Property, and
- Personnel.

**5.25.5** As with all objectives, they are time bound and in relation to Security, it is that expectation that the framework be implemented within FRA's by the 2012 Olympics. This work will be completed within Corporate Services; however, it will require Service Wide involvement.

## **5.26 Audit Commission – Rising to the Challenge**

**5.26.1** The Audit commission through its '*Rising to the Challenge*' publication laid down a number of challenges to the UK FRS, in that it should identify future savings. Arguably, since the publication of that report, in some respects it has been superseded or indeed is obsolete, on the contrary given the speed at which the (2010) coalition government aim to reduce the cost of the public sector. The report now offers itself as a suite of questions that NFRS should ask itself to assist in the identification of areas in which cost may be reduced, yet remain able to provide the best practicable model for response services within Nottinghamshire.

**5.26.2** Rising to the challenge detailed that the fire service's role is now about much more than just putting out fires. The following points within this section are taken directly from that report, it should also be placed in context of time, when the report was released and how national events have moved on since that time. Ultimately it is for individual Fire Authorities to consider the points and act / or not upon them as they see fit within their agreed IRMP to address risk.

- Successive reports have encouraged the fire service to focus more on community fire safety (CFS), leading to a 50 per cent expenditure increase since 2004/05.
- Fire services have conducted 2 million home fire safety checks (HFSC's) since 2004 and fitted 2.4 million smoke alarms; both help to reduce deaths and serious injuries in fires.
- Fire services contribute to a variety of projects in their communities, for example improving road safety and reducing anti-social behaviour; their contribution and can-do attitude is widely praised.
- Better strategy and evaluation are required to ensure that fire services are getting value for money from their community work.

### **5.26.3 The fire service could be more efficient and effective if it improved regional and local collaboration.**

- Fire services already support one another across borders.
- They could save more by sharing good practice and collaborating on training, procurement and other Back office services.
- National and regional governance arrangements have at times inhibited local collaboration and need to be reconsidered.
- Formal Regional Management Boards (RMB's) have not driven effective regional collaboration, government and fire and rescue authorities (FRA's) need to reform them or abandon them.

### **5.26.4 Fire services need a more diverse workforce**

- To play fire and community safety roles well, fire services need to reflect the communities they serve.
- Fire services aspire to improving diversity in the workforce, and some have recruited more women and people from minority ethnic groups.
- However, it will take a long time and changes in culture before the fire service workforce is representative of the communities it serves.

### **5.26.5 Fire services need to continue to adapt to changing circumstances**

- The context in which fire services operate, and their roles and responsibilities, have changed dramatically over the last 40 years.
- Successive reviews of the fire service in that time have encouraged an increased emphasis on prevention, changes in duty systems and standards of fire cover in the interests of efficiency.
- While some fire services have led the way in modernising and improving efficiency, not all have followed.
- Strong leadership from FRA Members and Chief Fire Officers (CFO's) is needed to overcome resistance to change.



#### **5.26.6 Fire and rescue authorities should:**

- Challenge themselves and their CFO's to improve efficiency as well as performance;
- Lead their communities by taking hard decisions affecting staffing levels and deployment in the interests of efficiency;
- Ensure that they have the right information to justify those decisions;
- Defend decisions publicly once they have been made;
- Challenge their CFO's to improve the diversity of their workforce;
- Define their objectives for RMB's, and participate beyond where required to in;
- RMB's only where there is a good business case for doing so; and
- Provide leadership on equality and diversity issues, supporting and encouraging effective culture change within the fire service.

#### **5.26.7 Chief Fire Officers should:**

- Aim to meet or beat government savings targets by improving operational efficiency;
- Continue to use those savings to invest in CFS;
- Identify the benefits of initiatives for the wider community and invest in them in proportion to their value;
- Adopt good ideas for improving efficiency from other fire services, or adapt them to their own circumstances;
- Systematically explore the available options for working with neighbouring fire services and pursue those that deliver the biggest efficiency savings;
- Improve strategic planning and performance management of partnership working;
- Improve the ability of managers at all levels to manage change; and
- Provide leadership on equality and diversity issues, taking a lead in challenging behaviour that does not promote equality and diversity.

### **5.26.8 Central government should:**

- Actively publicise those fire services delivering all elements of modernisation, including efficiency, and encourage those with the furthest to travel;
- Implement agreed proposals for developing operational guidance with the Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser (CFRA) and other stakeholders;
- Review the role of RMB's and their place in the improvement infrastructure; then define and communicate its expectations of them and their potential value to FRA's;
- Advocate the role the fire service can play in achieving broader community outcomes to other public services;
- Publish data on efficiency savings by fire services; and
- Provide leadership and guidance on equality and diversity issues and the development of an organisational culture that embraces equality and diversity.

**5.26.9** The Coalition Government have initiated, via CLG the '**Fire Futures**' work streams and these may well deliver on some areas detailed by Rising to the Challenge.

**5.26.10** At the time of this report, the Fire Futures work streams are delivering their own reports on how the Fire Sector is best placed to face the challenges ahead, but as an overview the following have been included:-

- Funding of FRS – e.g. pre-cepting etc;
- Collaborations / mutualisation's;
- Charging and trading;
- Retained duty system;
- Skills and training;
- Risk Based response models;
- Pay and conditions;

**5.26.11** Clearly, from the points above the Fire Sector faces a time of significant change and this should be included within the work of the Implementation and change team over the coming years.

**5.26.12** The legal and policy parameters in which we are obliged to work, like the risk profile of the City and County are inevitably changing. The key for NFRS is not to remain static or inflexible but to distribute its resources within the new parameters to address the changing risks to our communities.

## **5.27 Sustainable Communities Act (2007)**

**5.27.1** The Sustainable Communities Act (2007) aims to promote the sustainability of local communities. It begins from the principle that local people know best what needs to be done to promote the sustainability of their area, but that sometimes they need central government to act to enable them to do so.

**5.27.2** It provides a channel for local people to ask central government to take such action. It is also a new way for local authorities to ask central government to take action, which they believe, would better enable them to improve the economic, social or environmental well-being of their area. This could include a proposal to transfer the functions of one public body to another.

**5.27.3** The scope of the Act is very broad, covering economic, social and environmental issues. It does not limit the type of action that could be put forward, provided the actions within that broad scope. It is for local people to decide what they think needs to be done to promote the sustainability of their area.

**5.27.4** The Act is designed to strengthen the role of communities. It provides a simple process by which the ideas generated by local communities are fed through their local authority and a body known as the “selector” (which we envisage will be the LGA) to central government.

**5.27.5** As it will not be possible for all suggestions to be put direct to central government, local authorities and the selector will have a “short-listing” role. The government will consult the selector and try to reach agreement on which of the proposals on the short-list should be implemented. The government will respond to all of the suggestions that are short-listed by the selector and will publish an action plan setting out how it will take forward the suggestions that it adopts.

**5.27.6** As well as enabling local communities and local authorities to make suggestions for government action, the Sustainable Communities Act also ensures that communities are better informed about the public funding that is spent in their area. New “Local Spending Reports” will provide quick and easy access to information about where public money is spent. This will enable local authorities, their partners and communities to take better-informed decisions about the priorities they choose to pursue to promote the sustainability of their local community.

## **5.28 Localism**

**5.28.1** FCR 2010, in delivering the attached recommendations has considered the position held by an Emergency Service, such as NFRS and the great value communities place upon the specific Response element once an emergency is occurring.

**5.28.2** It is an objective for all FRS’s to reduce the need for this Response to be necessary. The recommendations, via consultation, will generate emotive reactions from many individuals, combined with the Coalition Governments drive for the local determination in the delivery of public services. This means that NFRS must ensure that their consultation ensures that all those affected are engaged communicated with and understand how the recommendations have been generated, Based upon risk exposure and actual need in the society of today and beyond.

**5.28.3** The Coalition Government has communicated its intention to promote and support the decentralisation of power e.g. ‘Big Society’ stating:-

*“The Big Society is what happens whenever people work together for the common good. It is about achieving our collective goals in ways that are more, more local and more personal”.*

*“The best contribution Central Government can make is to devolve power, money and knowledge to those best placed to find solutions to local needs: elected representatives, frontline public service professionals, social enterprises, charities, co-ops, community groups, neighbourhoods and individuals”.*

**5.28.4** IRMP is a process by which NFRS delivers on those expectations, by planning a Response model for many years ahead; a complex system that extends beyond any one locality and beyond the County boundary. Emergency Response is our service delivery model at the end of an unfortunate chain of events, whereby earlier preventative and Protective measures would reduce and in some cases negate the need for our Response.

**5.28.5** With the findings of this report, the Fire Authority will be well positioned to ensure the equitable distribution of resources Based upon its risk modelling that will also satisfy Local needs. This will see further success in driving down the requirement for emergency responses.

**5.28.6** The Localism approach contains six key actions, as follows:-

- Lift the burden of bureaucracy;
- Empower communities to do things their way;
- Increase local control of public finance;
- Diversify the supply of public services;
- Open up government to public scrutiny; and
- Strengthen accountability to local groups.

**5.28.7** These will provide new avenues by which NFRS may be challenged, by working with interested parties and our diverse, established partnership network, NFRS will continue to make significant progress in driving down risk, that may ultimately require an emergency response, for each reduced incident is a real, tangible success for the service and society.

## **5.29 Community Resilience**

**5.29.1** Community resilience is a composite of many elements; the previous section also has potential to build this resilience in relation to fire and emergency risk within Nottinghamshire.

**5.29.2** The risk mapping produced by FCR 2010 has clearly identified those areas of highest incident demand and the location relative to communities. This has also reinforced the work by NFRS in identifying Vulnerability and how this must be proactively addressed rather than reactively by emergency response.

**5.29.3** Clearly, FCR 2010 is not suggesting an emergency response model is unnecessary, on the contrary, it will remain integral, but will seek to be appropriate. It is accepted that Response is a tool to mitigate the impact of incidents and lessen the degree of loss where this is achievable and practicable to do so, once the chain of events lead to this.

**5.29.4** The risk mapping and supporting software tools are the product of a vulnerability assessment of Nottinghamshire Based upon historical activity. Vulnerability is recognised and expressed as:-

- Risk (emergency), Vulnerability and Hazard, where relations we find it convenient to place in a pseudo-equation:-

$$\text{E.g. } R = H \times V$$

**5.29.5** There is a wider distinction between risk and vulnerability, in that, vulnerability actually is referring to the potential for casualty, destruction, damage, disruption or other form of loss in a particular element, therefore, risk is a combination with probable level of loss to be expected from a predictable magnitude of hazard (which can be considered as the manifestation of loss).

**5.29.6** With this in mind then, risk assessment and the attached mapping details, that there is a social vulnerability which encompasses the susceptibility that a social group may have through their interactions with the physical environment.

**5.29.7** The Preventative and Protective work of NFRS with its delivery partners therefore is the route to reducing vulnerability of our communities, will improve their resilience to any future shock, and will provide a clear coping capacity that may well prevent future incident occurrences.

*E.g., "The capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and structuring. This is determined by the degree to which the social system is capable of organising itself to increase its capacity for learning from past incidents for better future protection and improve risk reduction measures".*

## 5.30 Health and Safety

**5.30.1** The HSE have consistently worked with the UK FRS to assist the industry to understand its working environment and the impact this has upon our employees, with a view to managing the workplace better.

**5.30.2** This has resulted in the joint publication of the policy statement '***Balancing operational health and safety in the fire and rescue service***'. Endorsed by key stakeholders, the statement recognises the '*special nature*' of the service and the necessary risks taken to secure the wider benefit to public safety. This does not exempt the service from its statutory duties, but is recognition of the role and risk our staff are expected to take in times of emergency response.

**5.30.3** As part of the collaboration and previously identified between the HSE and UK FRS, had been the need to ensure that the enforcing body was consistent across the whole service in relation to inspection and likely issue of enforcement actions. This has resulted in the 8 targeted inspections of FRS's, these have further coincided with serious incidents in which fire-fighter fatalities have resulted, further inspections are planned to commence from 2011 and it is reasonable to expect NFRS will be one of those to be inspected.

**5.30.4** The HSE's consolidated report highlights 2 specific areas that were consistent across the UK FRS:-

- Competence assessment for fire-fighters at all levels, including management; and
- A proportionate approach to risk assessment.

**5.30.5** The future context of any inspections has also been detailed by the HSE and will include the following:-

- HSE are led to believe that due to a decrease in the occurrence of serious large fires that fire-fighters have less direct exposure to the risks they create; nevertheless, this remains the most common setting for fire-fighter deaths;

- The extent to which FRS can create realistic and effective training opportunities to compensate for the comparative shortage of live exposure is extremely important; and
- The topics covered during the inspections have a common link to effective control and management of risk on the incident ground.

**5.30.6** Of further interest to FCR 2010 are those areas that the HSE detail under '**other matters**' and ones that NFRS must consider in the review process as they directly impact on the decision making process that will provide the response model of the future, in that, individual FRS's need to consider further:-

- The extent to which fire-fighters should or should not take risks to save property;
- Whether retained duty staff can fulfil all of the operational duties of a fire-fighter, given the time they have available for training;
- Clarity about how FRS can meet public expectations on water rescue; and
- How best to develop and implement consistent national guidance and improve inter - operability on those matters that affect every FRS.

**5.30.7** Also in need of consideration is the recent health and safety review, commissioned by the coalition and completed by Lord Young, with a view that this area and its regulation has gone too far and is now affecting commercial enterprise and stifling activity across the whole of the UK. Of particular note is the content in relation to Police and Fire Service recommendation.

*'That Police officers and fire-fighters should not be at risk of investigation or prosecution under health and safety legislation when engaged in the course of their duties if they have put themselves at risk as a result of committing a heroic act. The HSE, Association of Chief Police Officers and Crown Prosecution Service should consider further guidance to put this into effect'.*



**5.30.8** What this actually means for health and safety management at this stage remains unclear, but when analysing impact potential, FRS's could face wide scale Barriers and concerns. However, the practices of the UK FRS have been developed through many years of experience and NFRS will continue to comply with the laws of the land in terms of risk management. But, will also continue to reduce the risk faced by its employees and those affected by its activities to as low as is reasonably practicable in the pursuance of (FRSA 04).

**5.30.9** Regardless of what the previous details mean, the FCR findings have paid regard to these statements and how they may affect our future response model and how the service plans and manages its business generally. This information is combined with our Incident data in the decision making process to reflect the concerns of the HSE and evidenced findings of this review.

**5.30.10** The specific issues raised by the HSE report will be subject to impact analysis by NFRS and it is a further conclusion that an updated training needs analysis be completed in relation to RDS training provision.

**5.30.11** Further analysis should seek to identify those areas / activities of the role that may not be required of this duty system, this clearly will be viewed with a degree of controversy, however, other services have taken this approach and this may address the concerns raised by the HSE and deliver the needs of NFRS together.

## **5.31 Working Time Directive**

**5.31.1** The Working Time Directive applies to all workers, with certain exceptions such as those who are self-employed or fall within the confines of Article 20.

**5.1.1** The Service has to take all reasonable steps in keeping with the protection of the workers' health and safety, to ensure that workers do not work for more than an average of 48 hours in each seven days (Reg. 4). The hours to be counted include overtime.

**5.31.2** Working time is defined in Regulation 2 as:

- 'working' at the 'employer's disposal' and 'carrying out his activities or duties' (NB: all three of these elements must be satisfied);
- periods when the worker is receiving relevant training; and
- any additional period specified in a relevant agreement for the purposes of these Regulations.

**5.31.3** Travel to work is not working time unless it is actually part of the work activity.

**5.31.4** The belief is that the Service would not be an exempt under Article 20, as this would require the individuals to have “autonomous decision-making powers” or be a “family worker” or “officiating at religious ceremonies”. In terms of the definition of “autonomous decisions”, this is usually in relation to Executive Managers (e.g. SMT).

**5.31.5** The implications of this are that the duty system must not exceed 48 hours on duty (currently this does not include stand-by but could if there are changes to the Working Time Directive in the future) averaged over a 17 week period. There is currently an opt-out of this provision for individuals; however, again this may change in the future.

**5.31.6** Clearly, the future may well hold some significant issues for the UK FRS, specifically around Officer provision, RDS personnel and Dual contract employees.

**5.31.7** This reports findings offer NFRS an opportunity to pre-plan some of those issues, indeed, by better allocation of resources it has the potential to enhance service provision in some areas and aspects as well as pre-empt legislative impacts.

**5.31.8** This planning should also consider the implementation of crewing models seen around the UK and have the capacity to see a varying of contract agreements that would include the expansion of part-time working.

## **5.32 Part Time Workers Regulations**

**5.32.1** The Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000 (SI 2000/1551) aims to end less favourable treatment of part-timers in order to support the development of a flexible labour market, by encouraging the greater availability of part-time employment, and increasing the quality and range of jobs, which are considered suitable for part-time work or job-sharing.

**5.32.2** The Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000 came into force on 1st July 2000. The regulations ensure that part-timers are not treated less favourably in their contractual terms and conditions than comparable full-timers, unless different treatment is justified on objective grounds.

**5.32.3** Less favourable treatment of a part-timer will be justified on objective grounds if it can be shown that it is necessary and appropriate to achieve a legitimate business objective.

**5.32.4** The findings of FCR 2010 obviously impact upon this category of employee; however, by utilising the risk-Based data, it is clear that such recommendations will fall into a '**justifiable**' category. This review is about the appropriateness of the Fire Cover model and not primarily the contract under which an employee or group of employees are engaged.

### **5.33 Drivers Regulations**

#### **5.33.1** The EC Drivers' Hours and Tacograph Rules for Goods Vehicles

(Regulation 561/2006) provide that driving time is limited and that proper break and rest periods are taken to prevent road traffic accidents.

**5.33.2** In particular the rules apply to drivers of Heavy Goods Vehicles with an overall weight over 3.5 tonnes and Passenger Service Vehicles capable of carrying more than nine people (including the driver), or traveling more than 50 kilometres from Base. The regulations also apply to occasional drivers, even if they only drive for a few hours a day or a couple of days a week. It is a legal requirement for drivers of in-scope vehicles to comply with the regulations.

**5.33.3** The EU rules do not provide an exemption from the daily and weekly rest requirements for firefighters employed on the Retained Duty System or other duty systems, who drive vehicles that fall within the scope of the legislation in their primary or secondary employment.

**5.33.4** Breach of the EC Drivers' Hours rules can result in a level 4 fine. Deliberate falsification of records can result in up to two years imprisonment and/or a fine.

**5.33.5** NFRS are already seeing the impact of this particular regulation, for example, individuals are being met with to review their continued employment by NFRS, again, the impact of this has the potential to be seen greatest within our RDS employees who drive for their primary employment. The clear knock being this may, albeit in a minority of instances affect RDS appliance availability.

## 5.34 Equalities

**5.34.1** NFRS have now received its '**Achieving**' status under the FRS equalities framework and as part of FCR 2010, the wider equalities issues have been considered, predominantly in relation to at risk groups.

**5.34.2** To support this, an Initial EIA has been created that has indicated a full EIA is to be generated also. This review already recognises that part-time workers are impacted upon, however, given the purpose of this review these are considered as justifiable when taking the measures that NFRS recommend as a whole, ensuring it delivers appropriate levels of service to wider communities, Based upon risk.

**5.34.3** NFRS will continue its efforts in relation to its Single Equalities Scheme, having set the objective to achieve an '**Excellent**' rating by 2013. This will be of significance in relation to the Capital build programme that will look to provide excellent facilities for its staff and communities that may access them.

**5.34.4** Our equalities agenda is far broader and the methods we now access to target key areas extend beyond our operational crews, for example, we now employ community advocates and education specialists, as well as working with an ever growing partnership network.

**5.34.5** FCR 2010 data will robustly support the findings to ensure its decisions are justifiable and lead to '**Creating Safer Communities**'.

## 5.35 Alternative Crewing Models

**5.35.1** During FCR 2010, a number of peer FRS's have been visited, primarily to ascertain how they had completed similar Fire Cover Reviews, however, during these visits, a number of alternative crewing models were highlighted, the following being of particular note:-

- Lancashire FRS – Variable crewing System (VCS)
- West Yorkshire FRS – Close Call Crewing (CCC)
- Leicestershire FRS – Day Crewing plus (DC+)
- Merseyside FRS – Low Level Activity and Risk (LLAR)

- 5.35.2** Although all of the above may have differing names, they are in practice, fundamentally the same. In that, they aim to provide a 24 hour fire cover model at any one location with an almost immediate turnout capability, albeit marginally slower than the traditional WDS approach and faster than the RDS model.
- 5.35.3** What all these systems offer is a significant cost potential, as they all require less personnel to operate them, typically twelve to fourteen, as opposed to twenty eight that we would find at a one Appliance WDS station now.
- 5.35.4** Those FRS's visited generally apply them in low risk areas, that also see a low call demand, for example, Retford would fall into this category if applied within Nottinghamshire. Although not initially welcomed by employee representatives, all those FRS's who now operate such systems expressed the high level of interest that their employees now show to be assigned to the stations.
- 5.35.5** This high level of interest is clearly driven by the remuneration / allowance that an employee would receive, typically 20 to 35% above the Basic salary of a competent fire fighter. All allowances are set as non-pensionable.
- 5.35.6** Employees typically work both positive and standby hours, the latter being provided with accommodation by the Service in close proximity to the station itself. Indeed, some FRS's have modified existing building stock or brought property adjacent to the affected station.
- 5.35.7** These systems effectively provide a hybrid model between the current, traditionally recognised WDS and RDS systems continued by NFRS.
- 5.35.8** During the FRS visits, each representative were questioned over the legal / employment implications and considerations, specifically in relation to the WTR and the standby elements and the counting towards working time as defined. All replied that this area was considered and researched and held the position that they continued to comply with the regulations.

**5.35.9** Although this review has not recommended the implementation of such crewing models for NFRS at this stage, they would offer future alternatives to the Service, as such, the HR team have been tasked to look at these in more detail and provide a full and final analysis on their viability for use.

## **5.36 Pre-determined Attendance**

**5.36.1** Pre-determined Attendance (PDA) is well-recognised and developed approach to incident mobilisations and systems of work right across the FRS. FCR 2010 has not looked to review PDA's specifically, however, as the review has progressed it has become apparent that some PDA's may not be appropriate or are certainly outdated. A particular example of this being NFRS attendance to the City Hospital, which saw the removal of an RDS appliance from the PDA.

**5.36.2** This single amendment had a significant financial return for NFRS, in that, due to the reduction in RDS mobilisations a saving (annually) in the region of £50K has been delivered. Given this example and access to the data and modelling NFRS now have, the Service should expand this work with the objective of identifying and updating other PDA's.

**5.36.3** Two key aspects were raised by NFRS personnel, level of service to the public and fire fighter safety, given the above example, both these aspects were positively impacted upon, in that, fire appliances are quicker to scene, thereby delivering a speedier response to both public and fire crews.

**5.36.4** The data within this review shows that the City area has most calls to alarms / incidents and this approach may realise considerable savings for the Service, but applied across the whole County would still be seen as potentially significant, for example, as much as one RDS section would cost to run.

## **5.37 Economic Loss**

**5.37.1** A growing concern nationally highlighted by the Association of British Insurers (ABI) as detailed in their 2009 publication “Tackling Fire: A call for action” is economic loss. The following section draws directly from their report.

**5.37.2** The ABI have been met to discuss in more detail the implications of their report and wider concerns in relation to FRS creation of IRMP’s.

**5.37.3** According to the ABI report:-

*“Historically, some kinds of crime, such as burglary, have tended to increase during times of economic difficulty and higher unemployment. Of which Arson accounts for around almost half of fires at businesses and around a fifth of fires at homes are deliberate. During the last recession arson increased substantially: between 1990 and 1993 the number of deliberate fires increased from 53,000 to 80, 0003”.*

**5.37.4** *The risk of being a victim of arson is not evenly spread, with those living in socially deprived areas most at risk of experiencing arson against themselves, or against their community. Arson rates are 30 times higher in poorer areas, with a 15-fold increase in the chance of death compared with affluent areas.*

**5.37.5** *Financial pressures on businesses and increasing unemployment can provide the motivation and the opportunity for some people to commit both fraudulent and malicious arson at a time of economic pressure. Businesses and the public sector are also keeping a tight reign on costs and housekeeping and maintenance may suffer as a result making a fire more likely. Empty shops and businesses, a common feature of recession, are particularly vulnerable to fire; crime and arson attacks and ABI members are reporting that they are facing an increase in the number of large multi-million pound fire loss claims.*



- 5.37.6** *Fire does not just cost money, it causes deaths and injuries and it has a wider effect on society and the economy. It disrupts people's lives and it can destroy their most valued possessions. Fire can cause havoc in schools, hospitals and care homes and it can cause businesses to close down, in some cases permanently, resulting in job losses.*
- 5.37.7** *The Insurance Industry Working Group report advocates sharing research and data to help bring about a collective understanding of the key impact of different risks, such as fire and to set priorities for public spending on risk reduction.*
- 5.37.8** *This paper builds on the work of the IIWG by highlighting recent trends in fire and putting forward proposals, which, if implemented, will help to reduce these risks. Responsibility for the Fire and Rescue Service has now been fully devolved to the Scottish Government, the Welsh Assembly Government and the Northern Ireland Executive.*
- 5.37.9** *More work is needed from all stakeholders – the governments of the United Kingdom, the Fire and Rescue Service, the insurance industry, businesses and others – to make sure that the number of fires, deaths, injuries and the economic consequences of fire are.*
- 5.37.10** As a result of the ABI research and summarised within their report, a number of proposals were detailed as follows:-
- In light of the increasing cost of fire, there should be targets to reduce the economic cost of fire in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. This will require the governments of the UK and the insurance industry to develop credible measures for the economic cost of fire, which, can be used by local fire services to measure and improve performance.
  - The next National Frameworks, which set the strategic direction of the Fire and Rescue Authorities and the Service, need to give a far higher priority to the economic consequences of fire.
  - The Fire Protection Association (FPA) should provide Chief Fire Officers with information about the costliest fires in their areas to help inform them about their causes.

- The police and local Arson Task Forces (ATF's) need to work more closely together to target arsonists and bring them to justice. Local police forces should dedicate officers to the fight against arson by working with local ATF's.
- Insurance, Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) and police investigators should also work more closely together and agree a common methodology for fire investigation.
- The ABI will refocus the work of the Arson Prevention Bureau (APB) to raise awareness among insurance customers and others of the risk of arson and to publicise insurance industry successes in bringing prosecutions against both malicious and fraudulent arsonists.
- The Insurance Fraud Bureau (IFB) should consider how it might add value to tackling fraudulent arson, potentially including data sharing and intelligence activities to identify organised fraudulent arson and assisting with investigations.
- The governments of the UK and local government, working with the Arson Control Forum (ACF), Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRP) and others, should resource and lead national campaigns to tackle arson. To make the public, schools and businesses aware of the risk of arson and what they can do to reduce it (for example by attaching a higher priority to arson within fire risk assessments). The campaigns should include providing information and guidance on arson, how common it is, where it usually starts and some commonsense suggestions to reduce the risk.
- The UK governments, the Fire and Rescue Authorities (FRA's), the insurance industry and the business community need to work together to promote good fire risk management during the recession. This will involve the distribution of good quality risk management guidance and advice and guidance by insurers and brokers and more visits to businesses by local FRS's.

- FRA's need to continue to develop and share best practice on home visits particularly on how they can best target and protect the most vulnerable in our society through fire safety education and by fitting smoke detectors where they live.
- A wide-ranging review of the case for sprinklers and effective fire compartments in new buildings should be jointly led by the UK administrations in the light of the increasing cost of fire. Independent Project Boards involving officials and stakeholders such as insurers, the business, education, care home and health sectors and the fire industry should oversee the work, which should also examine international experience.
- The work should include residential buildings, warehouses and other single storey buildings and should include other uses like care homes, schools and hospitals.
- The UK governments, construction industry and insurance industry need to set up task forces to urgently consider what can be done to better understand the fire performance of Modern methods of Construction (MMC) building types and how to reduce the risks associated with them. The task force should also consider how these building types could be more easily identified by the Fire and Rescue Service, the insurance industry and others.

**5.37.11** As the above proposals from the ABI clearly articulate, much is required of the UK FRS, as such, NFRS already have some of the key elements operating within Nottinghamshire, and however, this review has observed some fragmentation in the risk information process. For example, the gathering of data comes in a number of forms, dependant on the directorate and is subject to the perceived purpose and subsequent use of that data; therefore, risk information is not handled holistically.

**5.37.12** NFRS has access to vast data in a number of formats and departments, that work to some degree in isolation and it is a key conclusion from FCR 2010 that these be drawn together and a more integrated, intelligence led systems Based approach be applied, for example, the creation of a central data, information and knowledge hub.

**5.37.13** This will allow NFRS's three main elements (Prevention, Protection and Response) to draw information from one location within the service. This has presented FCR 2010 a series of Barriers throughout, NFRS should take advantage of the future service re-structure to deliver a function that could be significantly improved and deliver far deeper returns to the communities and commerce of Nottinghamshire in relation to both risk management and reduction.

## **5.38 Regional perspective**

**5.38.1** While ever the Coalition Government do not envisage public services being restricted or bound by regional working, within the UK FRS this has seen some real benefits and is likely to continue, albeit, adapted to meet need. In relation to Fire Cover, the relationship that NFRS has with its neighbours remains key.

**5.38.2** This report finds that closer collaboration and use of both assets, functions, and should not be limited to the use of fire appliances that are near to County boundaries.

**5.38.3** During FCR 2010, the neighbouring Services have been met to discuss the activity-taking place around the provision of services, with particular focus upon Fire cover. What is clear is that all services are devoting similar amounts of energy to reviewing their Fire cover. Clearly, if all Services remain in isolation in the delivery of Services real opportunity will be missed and issues for the future will not be addressed with foresight.

**5.38.4** Given this activity and critically, is that little common ground is being identified other than in limited areas and the review recommends that this activity requires greater coordination to deliver an appropriate and proportionate Response model.

- 5.38.5** The 13/16 arrangements within FRSA 04 provide for individual FRS's to discharge functions to another FRS where this makes both operational and economic sense in the course of delivering a public service.
- 5.38.6** An example of common ground has been the use of software systems and risk mapping that could be far more widely applied and offer useful insight as to the level of fire cover that would be required closer to border areas.
- 5.38.7** Both Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire have used similar approaches and this has great potential to address the M1 corridor issue of fire cover that has been discussed for many years, but not looked into and dealt with. Given this, the review finds that this now be taken on board and resources committed to providing a model for the future.
- 5.38.8 Regional Control Centre (RCC)** – during the FCR 2010, the future of the RCC has become more uncertain with the recent notification that the National Government led project may be abandoned. However, this now poses NFRS with an issue to address, in that, what provision do we now need to make for the future.
- 5.38.9** At present, NFRS have an establishment above that prior to RCC with the introduction of the Initial Staffing Pool (ISP). Clearly, the Service now needs to address, not only this over provision but also look at how Fire Control will look in the future.
- 5.38.10** All FRS's are in the same position and again this now provides a clear opportunity to design a function that reflects the needs of the service. It cannot be separated from FCR 2010 activity, in that, Fire Control and its staff are integral to our Response model in terms of support and resolution of emergencies.
- 5.38.11** It is therefore, given the recent news in relation to RCC that the findings of this review that the future of Fire Control be drawn into the Implementation and Change team remit to ensure this is fully integrated into our response model planning.

## 6 Nottinghamshire context

### 6.1 NFRS's vision - *'A safer Nottinghamshire by putting safety at the heart of the community'*

6.2 Nottinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service (NFRS) have one very clear and simple aim – to make Nottinghamshire a safer place to live and work. This may sound straightforward, but achieving this aim relies on a great many people and organisations working together with the same goal in mind.

6.3 Fortunately, NFRS's partners in the Councils, Police, Health, Education and other local services are also striving to achieve similar improvements. NFRS are therefore working in close partnership with them to pool efforts and make a greater difference than could possibly be achieved by working alone.

6.4 This overall aim is supported by six objectives, which highlight the work NFRS need to do in order to achieve its aim.

### 6.5 NFRS objectives

6.5.1 The following six objectives underpin all NFRS activities during the lifespan of the 2010-2013 Service Plan. NFRS have identified the areas of work it believes will help it to achieve its aim and make a positive difference to people's lives, which gives NFRS a very clear focus on its priorities for the future.

6.5.2 Everything NFRS does over the next three years links into one or more of these objectives, so that its efforts are strengthened and will maximise opportunities to make improvements.

#### 6.5.3 Objective 1: Prevention

We will:

- Work with young people to reduce arson, accidental fires and road traffic collisions (RTC's);
- Focus on those most at risk from fires and other avoidable injuries;
- Work with partners to make our communities safer; and
- Use and share data to identify those most at risk.

#### **6.5.4 Objective 2: Protection**

We will:

- Maintain a risk-Based approach to enforce our statutory responsibilities;
- Assist and support those responsible for fire safety within business; and
- Work to reduce the economic cost of fire.

#### **6.5.5 Objective 3: Response**

We will:

- Use our resources to meet the risks within our community;
- Gather and use risk-Based information to inform our response; and
- Provide the highest standards of training, PPE, appliances and equipment that we can, to keep our employees safe.

#### **6.5.6 Objective 4: Resilience**

We will:

- Respond to growing risks from the environment; and
- Work with our partners to ensure an effective response and recovery to major events.

#### **6.5.7 Objective 5: Diversity and Workforce**

We will:

- Recruit a workforce that reflects our community; and
- Recruit and develop our employees to the highest standards to maintain and promote high standards of health, safety and wellbeing for all our employees.

#### **6.5.8 Objective 6: Governance and Improvement**

We will:

- Strive to become an excellent Authority; and
- Use our resources efficiently and effectively to provide value-for-money

## 6.6 Local context

- 6.6.1 Geography** - Nottinghamshire lies in the heart of England and covers an area of 805 sq miles, with a population of just over one million people and a workforce of 360,000.
- 6.6.2 Population** - The largest concentration of people is found in the Greater Nottingham conurbation, the suburbs of which lie mostly in the County. In total, including Nottingham City (292,400) Greater Nottingham has a population in excess of 656,900. The other main County towns are Mansfield (87,500), Kirkby-in-Ashfield (27,000), Sutton-in-Ashfield (45,400), Newark (26,700), Worksop (43,500) and Retford (21,700).
- 6.6.3 Demographics** - Nottingham itself is a city of contrasts. It has the highest rate of employment growth of any major UK city, and an attractive and successful city centre. It is a leading city in the East Midlands region; its shopping facilities are ranked as amongst the best in England (outside London) and it has a vibrant and growing leisure and cultural scene.
- 6.6.4** However, it also has some of the worst areas of deprivation and under-achievement in the country. Greater Nottingham is a big conurbation – one of the 10 largest in the country – but only half the population live within the city boundaries. Deprivation in Nottinghamshire is above the national average, with a deprivation score of 113 (GB as a whole = 100) and health, education and crime above the national average. Nottingham city has the highest level of deprivation.
- 6.6.5** Despite its wealth and commercial success, many Nottingham city residents live in areas of deprivation. In fact, over 60% of Nottingham's population lives in an area of deprivation and 13 of the 20 city wards are within the 10% most deprived nationally, with pockets of deprivation in other wards.
- 6.6.6** This presents a problem for NFRS and similar authorities when comparing performance within Authorities, which are more affluent. Many of the incidences of fire are manifestations of deep social problems, which exist in more deprived areas. We are working hard to develop links and partnerships at district level to deal with these issues.



**6.6.7** Although the performance indicators we use are primarily an output measure, we do invest a substantial amount of resources in prevention work. Due to the socio- economic and deprivation factors, the performance indicators are only a crude measure and do not fully represent the preventative work that goes into solving the problems of these areas.

**6.6.8** We have therefore embarked upon a Knowledge Transfer Partnership with Nottingham Trent University to evaluate the impact of community safety initiatives. This will attempt to identify the relationship between inputs and outcomes in this complex area of inter-dependencies. We believe this is the first such initiative in the country.

## **6.7 Economy**

**6.7.1** Nottinghamshire has successfully managed the changes forced upon it during the last 20 years. These changes have had a major influence upon mining and some manufacturing industries, and the communities they supported. Overall, unemployment has been relatively low. However, labour market disparities remain, with qualification and skills levels causing concern. In 2008, the recession began to impact upon the local economy and employment, and substantial numbers of job losses were reported.

**6.7.2** Nottinghamshire has become economically diverse and innovative however, some areas of the county share problems, which are faced by the wider East Midlands region, primarily that of a low skills/low innovation/low wage economy.

## **6.8 Our role - Nottinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service**

**6.8.1** NFRS employ 1,150 people working to provide services to the public, including fire fighters, fire control operators, IT professionals, estates management, finances, HR professionals and safety advisors.

**6.8.2** The Service currently has 24 fire stations positioned geographically across the County, staffed by Whole-time and retained duty fire fighters. NFRS have recently introduced a Specialist Rescue Team (SRT) as one outcome of its Best Value Reviews into Special Service Calls (SSC) and Road Traffic Collisions (RTC), Based at three locations and provide support at incidents such as rescues from height, water, multiple road traffic collisions or building collapse. In 2008/ 09 NFRS attended 15,337 incidents, 6,323 of these were fires, 6,587 were false alarms and 2,427 responses were to other emergency incidents (SSC's).

**6.8.3** Nottinghamshire and City of Nottingham Fire Authority is an independent body comprising 18 elected councillors from the City and County Councils. These councillors ensure that the Fire and Rescue Service meets both its statutory obligations and provides a value-for-money service to the public. This is achieved by a robust committee structure providing scrutiny in areas such as Finance, Human Resources, Community Safety and Service performance.

## **6.9 Partnership and community engagement**

**6.9.1** NFRS are working in Partnership with other agencies to reduce the effect of fire-related crime in respect of arson. We have specific initiatives in relation to young people such as the Prince's Trust, and the Bendigo project, which are intended to promote community cohesion and sustainable communities. Our district structure makes our delivery function co-terminus with the boundaries within the county and city, and has helped to embed our district management within the Local Strategic Partnerships (LSP's).

**6.9.2** This has provided a mechanism whereby we can assess the priorities and the needs of the community. By linking our community initiatives to the Government's PSA and LAA themes, we ensure that our vision is aligned to the two Sustainable Community Strategies and the strategies of other partners.

**6.9.3** The introduction of our district structure has enabled us to be more responsive and react quickly to the priorities of our partners. An example of the benefits of this is our involvement with Local Area Agreements, where we have included 'stretch' targets as part of the agreement. We are an integral part of the process and are recognised as a senior partner. We have taken the lead on developing risk management within the LAA groups, and seconded staff to work with partners in several areas of activity.

**6.9.4** We continue to build strong partnerships with the media within the county and city via our dedicated Corporate Communications team, which also leads on communications for the RMB and RCC. They are key to communicating our aims, objectives and key fire safety messages to our communities.

## **6.10 The challenges we faced**

Over the past 10 years, Fire Authorities have operated in a challenging industrial relations environment where many change initiatives were resisted by the service. This did impede progress in some respects, although it did not prevent overall improvement in service delivery. Industrial relations have now improved greatly, NFRS are working in a consultative and constructive manner with the trade unions, and this has helped to secure a smooth transition for a number of recent improvements introduced into the organisation.

## **6.11 Modernisation**

We have met the challenges of modernisation by leading from the front in many respects. We made improvements to working practices ahead of most services, many of whom are now wrestling with the challenges we overcame some time ago. We have already implemented significant and innovative changes to our organisation and intend to continue with others that will lead to an even more efficient and effective service in line with the objectives set out in our Service Plan 2010-2013.

## 6.12 Sustainable Communities and Aligned Core Strategy

**6.12.1** Sustainable Community Strategies are key long-term planning documents for improving the quality of life and services in a local area. Every council is expected to have one – developed and agreed with its Local Strategic Partnership.

**6.12.2** The purpose of a Sustainable Community Strategy is to set the overall strategic direction and long-term vision for the economic, social and environmental wellbeing of a local area – typically 10-20 years – in a way that contributes to sustainable development in the UK. It tells the '**story of the place**' – the distinctive vision and ambition of the area, Backed by clear evidence and analysis. Given this, it is obvious that the Sustainable Community Strategies of the local authorities will need reflecting in the aligned Core Strategies, which will set out how their spatial planning elements will be delivered.

**6.12.3** Greater Nottingham's Local Strategic Partnerships are based on the various council's administrative areas, for instance, the Rushcliffe Local Strategic Partnership covers the Rushcliffe Borough Council area, and the Ashfield Local Strategic Partnership covers the Ashfield District Council area. A Local Strategic Partnership is a body consisting of many key local stakeholders and service providers who have a responsibility to progress the quality of life at a local level, such as health representatives, or representatives of the police.

**6.12.4** A council will need to have full regard to the vision outlined in the corresponding area's Sustainable Community Strategy when preparing its Core Strategy. Therefore, it is important to demonstrate how the two respective documents will complement one another. Clearly showing the general conformity between both Strategies is a requirement of the Planning Inspectorate's 'Tests of Soundness', and is needed for a Core Strategy to be found 'sound' and be able to progress on to adoption.

**6.12.5** All councils have been required as part of the Local Government Act 2000 to prepare Community Strategies. However, these now defined as *Sustainable* Community Strategies, with the publication of the UK's Sustainable Development Strategy giving this decision additional impetus.

**6.12.6** It is from Sustainable Community Strategies that Local Area Agreements are developed and it is these agreements, which help to bring together, and co-ordinate, a variety of strategic plans, which assist with the delivery of positive actions at a local level to improve the general quality of life for residents.

**6.12.7** Across the Greater Nottingham conurbation, there has been mixed progress in the speed at which the various council's have been able to make the transition between an adopted Community Strategy and a Sustainable Community Strategy, however, all councils will have adopted Sustainable Community Strategies by the time the Core Strategy is published.

**6.12.8** Previously the Regional Spatial Strategy (RSS) set the minimum amount of new housing required for both Greater Nottingham and the constituent councils between 2006 and 2026, as set out in the following table.

	<b>Annual RSS requirement (2006 – 2026)</b>	<b>Total (2006 – 2026)</b>
<b>Hucknall (part of Ashfield)</b>	180	3600
<b>Broxtowe</b>	340	6800
<b>Erewash</b>	360	7200
<b>Gedling</b>	400	8000
<b>Nottingham City</b>	1000	20000
<b>Rushcliffe</b>	750	15000
<b>Greater Nottingham</b>	3030	60600

**6.12.9** Although the Coalition has removed, the requirement to maintain an RSS this does not remove the need for Local Authorities to consider future development and this will continue to be in accordance with the Aligned Core strategies. Where these are of particular importance to NFRS is the location of building development and whether they are commercial or domestic in type.

**6.12.10** For example, medium to high cost domestic property in existing low risk areas, would not introduce higher levels of risk, however, the introduction of lower cost and social housing developments would see a different risk profile.

**7.0 Project Methodology** - This section of the NFRS Options report is aimed at providing readers with the framework within which the report has been produced and the vast scope and detail which has been researched and collated to deliver this report.

### **7.1 FCR 2010 Project framework**

**7.1.1** Throughout the FCR 2010 work, the NFRS project management framework has been utilised to allow the project team and its contributors to understand what outputs / deliverables have been agreed and who has a role in producing those deliverables. From January 2010, the Project Manager ensured that the Strategic Managers and Fire Authority Members were made fully aware of the work that would take place (See. Project Work Proposal, as detailed within section 1 of this report)

**7.1.2** As part of the Review process, a risk log for the project has also been developed by the FCR 2010 Project Manager, in consultation with NFRS's Risk Manager; this has also been forwarded to the Services Strategic Managers and CMB (See. Risk log) with key risk issues through the projects life having been highlighted within individual CMB reports.

**7.1.3** The project has also been recorded upon the 'TRACK' system allowing those with access rights to monitor the progress of the FCR 2010 work. This information is coordinated via NFRS's Corporate Services (Programme Manager).

### **7.2 Professional judgement**

**7.2.1** Although this report provides clear evidence for its recommendations, professional judgement is key to arriving at those recommendations. Professional judgement has been drawn from the cooperation of NFRS departments, for example, Finance, Human Resources (HR), and Information Technology and externally from the methods and experiences applied by peer FRS's and professional organisations.

**7.2.2** This judgement has been crucial throughout the project lifespan to coordinating the vast array of elements that have been necessary to deliver this report.

### **7.3 FRS visits**

**7.3.1** As part of the FCR 2010 project, it was recognised from the outset that NFRS had not, for some considerable time performed such a piece of work on this scale, as such, it was key to access the experiences of other FRS's throughout the Country. These visits and the resulting relationships have proved to be invaluable in the formulation of this report. Those worthy of note being Devon & Somerset FRS, Kent FRS, GMC, Merseyside FRS, Derbyshire FRS, West Yorkshire FRS, South Yorkshire FRS and Leicestershire FRS.

**7.3.2** Lessons that have been collated include the need to use technology in the process, for example, computer modelling, covered later within this section, as well as how FRS's have been able to implement their recommendations and in particular, the amount of time and effort that is required to enable a meaningful and proportionate consultation process.

### **7.4 Historical incident data**

**7.4.1** Setting the statistical foundation for FCR 2010 places significant reliance upon the demands faced by NFRS over previous years and what period of data should have been included and represented. In consultation with the services Information Systems and Performance teams and taking into account the views of other FRS's having completed similar work the resulting period for reference has been agreed as five years; being both robust and meaningful, this period runs from January 2005 to January 2010.

**7.4.2** Worthy of note that the preceding statistical work completed to influence the shift changes (ORH) also used a statistical period of five years up to January 2005, this allowed for a running consistency across the two projects.

## **7.5 Computer modelling**

**7.5.1** Throughout the FCR project, it remained in clear focus the need to ensure that planning assumptions and resulting recommendations should be based upon sound data. The FRS nationally, have been introduced to and invested heavily in computer modelling systems, most notably the CLG provided Fire Service Emergency Cover (FSEC) tool.

**7.5.2** When IRMP was introduced in 2004 the Fire Service Emergency Cover Toolkit (FSEC) use was mandatory, this has subsequently been changed within the National Framework 2008/11 document to non-mandatory use.

**7.5.3** This has however presented a number of challenges to many FRS's and further identified gaps during the FCR 2010 project in Nottinghamshire's ability to routinely and systematically assess demand and apply appropriate and proportionate resources beyond the traditional standards set from earlier national reviews into standards of Fire Cover. The following sections have been included to remove that area of concern for NFRS and ensure a robust process is accessible.

**7.5.4** To address and resolve these issues the FCR 2010 project has identified a number of systems that have, subsequently been used to form and support the process. It should also be noted and is covered in more detail later, that all these elements of the process have been subjected to external scrutiny and validation.



## **7.6 GeognoSIS**

**7.6.1** GeognoSIS is a web browser Based GIS tool that FCR 2010 has used to geographically represent our incident demand profile in relation to our current resource allocation, the following details are contained within the FCR 2010 platform:-

- NFRS Station locations;
- Neighbouring FRS station locations (incl. travel times);
- Incident locations;
- Travel times Based upon the road network speeds;
- Travel times Based upon NFRS incident data;
- High risk site information;
- Heritage information;
- Flood mapping;
- School locations;
- Fatality and casualty information by location;

**7.6.2** It provides a clear and understandable picture of how NFRS either meets or has the potential to meet its 10-minute attendance measure in wider parts of the County at those times where demand is greatest, e.g. daytime periods.

**7.6.3** Using Isochrones to display travel times, it also allows NFRS to identify those areas that border other FRS's where a better response model could be applied, thereby making fuller use of resource by geographic location. Again, NFRS by better planning and collaborative working will continue to provide an effective level of cover and potentially reduce its cost profile.

## **7.7 The Fire Service Emergency Cover (FSEC) toolkit**

**7.7.1** NFRS's FSEC model has required extensive work to ensure that it reflects the current Baseline for resource allocation and Service performance. The Information team have invested 6 months into ensuring that where FSEC is applied for the FCR 2010 project, it results can be taken as significant and reliable.

- 7.7.2** Given the gap in usage of FSEC and investment to have it updated, the FCR project manager has ensured that this work has also been subject to professional scrutiny, as such, an external professional has been commissioned to validate this work (Gill Usher Consultants).
- 7.7.3** This part of the report was prepared for NFRS managers as an independent evaluation of the current position with FSEC. There has been considerable effort undertaken by the service to get FSEC up to date, particularly in the dwellings module. The ICT Support Officer has been commended for a systematic approach, research and implementation of the underpinning work required by FCR 2010.
- 7.7.4** There have been a number of scenario options modelled against an original and updated Base case. GUC have assessed the inputs and modules to identify areas that affect the outputs generated. Some changes have been made to create a new Base case referred to in this report as GUC Base Case. The scenarios have been re-run, cloned from this dataset. We have also identified further areas and offer recommendations of activity required to direct a work plan to enable modelling to continue in support of proposed options. The updated Base case and associated datasets have been installed on the FSEC machine.
- 7.7.5** The FSEC review report was produced, as far as possible in a non-technical style; however, it should be understood that the software and data embedded within FSEC is necessarily of a technical nature. Technical advice and support relating to the action plan can be supplied on-site with the practitioners if required. The purpose of this document was to crystallise the manager's thoughts and perspective and add focus to the FSEC update activities and future requirements.
- 7.7.6** In summary, there were a number of anomalies that existed that affected the original Base case model. Where these are referred to in the document, have already been addressed in the preparation of the GUC Base Case, they were also marked as 'COMPLETED'. The resulting cost benefit spreadsheet is now sound.

**7.7.7** Continuing from this point, FSEC will be compared to our other modelling applications, with the aim of identifying how these systems can be used collectively to further identify and support appropriate resource allocation decisions.

**7.7.8** This kind of interface has great potential beyond the formulation of future IRMP's, in that, were they are combined and used appropriately and intuitively they will support other shorter term issues e.g. Business Continuity and will provide operational cover Based on robust risk analysis.

## **7.8 CadCorp Workload Modeller (CWM)**

**7.8.1** CWM application is a GisLink program, created for use with CadCorp SIS Map Modeller, which stores incident-related data in an Access database for analysis and modelling.

**7.8.2** NFRS, via the Information Systems team already use CadCorp products and this has been a key factor in the procurement of the CWM module over those systems that received evaluation during the process. It has allowed a smooth development and transition of NFRS staff to apply CWM and support FCR 2010 within its timescales.

**7.8.3** CWM is a new venture for NFRS and was identified as being able to fill key gaps within the FCR project that FSEC was not able to readily in an interpretable manner fulfil.

**7.8.4** There are three functional areas to CWM:

Load 'raw' incident data into an Access database (an 'open' format) so the data:

- can be viewed in Map Modeller as view points datasets;
- can be manipulated by CWM (for Analysis and Modelling);
- Is available for any other analysis.

Incident Analysis tools for;

- response (appliance attendance) time to callouts;
- allocation of incidents or callouts to stations;
- unit utilisation of appliances by time or station;

Modelling tools to:

- predict where appliances should be Based to meet demand;
- Simulate the turnout of appliances to meet demand.

**7.8.5** The main output of the Analysis tools and the Modelling prediction is in the form of Excel workbooks. The output of a Modelling simulation is a new table in the database, which can be analysed with the Incident Analysis tools. The application uses a data Model, which is populated by incident data and is completed with information on Stations, Appliances, and vehicle classes amongst other things.

**7.8.6** This application has allowed for better triangulation of data that would support any recommendations.

**7.8.7** Current and future analysis using CWM can detail the predicted shift in workloads (incidents) given the changing appliance fleet number and location in relation to call demand. For example, the relocation of one appliance from station 19 West Bridgford to the North of the County.

**7.8.8** A recent example of this would be the creation of Highfields Fire Station and the impact that this had upon surrounding stations, in that, the workload received merely increased figures to that experienced by those stations some 3 to 5 years earlier. Therefore, the Service has significant capacity to absorb the reduction of the appliance fleet as recommended.

## 7.9 Mosaic

- 7.9.1** NFRS recognise that social composition within Nottinghamshire has a direct bearing on our service delivery, to aid us in identifying those groups at risk a sophisticated, nationally recognised profiling tool, Mosaic Public Sector™ is used. Mosaic Public Sector™ UK is a household-Based consumer classification system, which is widely used by organisations in the commercial and public sector to analyse the socio-economic composition of UK consumers at household address or postcode. Central and local government to identify areas of real social deprivation and to allocate remedial resources more effectively across the UK uses Mosaic Public Sector.
- 7.9.2** Throughout this review the data has highlighted the need to allocate resources Based on many factors and that there is a tangible relationship between incidents and levels of deprivation or conversely affluence, for example, between the City centre or Mansfield and say the general Rushcliffe district.
- 7.9.3** The findings itemise how the Fire Authority can adjust the imbalance in resource allocation that will facilitate the continued drive “**Creating Safer Communities**”.

## 7.10 Risk Mapping

- 7.10.1** The use of the following approach to Risk Mapping has been used to support the findings and future decision making process in relation to resource provision for NFRS. This Risk Mapping approach is becoming common across the UK FRS and the model selected by NFRS is already applied in other Fire and Rescue Services. It has supported their IRMP process and enabled the evaluation of risk that has been accepted and clearly illustrates risk in a visual, understandable manner. It clearly categorises risk from Fire and other emergencies and is complimentary to work already undertaken within NFRS.

- 7.10.2** The Risk mapping approach includes population factors over the area of Nottinghamshire, for example, deprivation and illustrates an objective evaluation of risk, further supporting previous work around District profiling.
- 7.10.3** As the risk mapping model has been developed by another FRS it has benefited from being reviewed and tested over time and is fully inclusive of the knowledge and experience gained of the factors which affect the likelihood of emergencies occurring and brings evidential data together with professional judgement within NFRS.
- 7.10.4** The purpose of this section of the options report is to communicate the methodology applied, that in turn has produced the risk map for NFRS.
- 7.10.5** The evaluation of risk is a well recognised function of all UK FRS's and contained in the current Fire and Rescue Service National Framework 2008-11 and further assists NFRS in the discharge of duties under the Fire & Rescue Services Act 2004 through the IRMP's iterative process.
- 7.10.6** NFRS's GIS team, taking the risk mapping approach have developed the GeognoSIS, computerised model to assist NFRS in the risk assessment process. This is able to clearly show Nottinghamshire and the risk it contains by location and is Based upon actual NFRS incident data from the previous 5 years and computer scenario planning, for example, travel times and societal risk indicators, also reflective of FSEC modeling and other chosen elements for the analysis of NFRS demand activity.
- 7.10.7** This approach is subject to external scrutiny via Nottingham Trent University (NTU) Business School on the validity of our process (See also NTU specification).
- 7.10.8** It was decided that such a map is the most readily accessible and understandable format for presenting this risk evaluation. It is also anticipated that this approach be communicated widely across NFRS in its support and use of risk reduction plans locally.

- 7.10.9** The Risk Mapping methodology was chosen as the result of field visits across a variety of UK FRS's to identify existing examples of good practice and cognisant of the timescales to which the FCR project would need to adhere to.
- 7.10.10** It has also been an objective within FCR that the methodology, where appropriate, should compliment other tools, for example, the FSEC toolkit, with data being drawn from those incidents that pose the greatest risk to life and communities.
- 7.10.11** It is a key feature of such work that the data accessed should be statistically significant, as such, given the absence of such a previous approach since 2005, a reference period of five years of complete incident data has been agreed.
- 7.10.12** Future process data reference periods should be reviewed to ensure this length of reference period remains applicable but must ensure that the Risk map remains valid. The current map draws data from 1<sup>st</sup> January 2005 to 31<sup>st</sup> December 2009.
- 7.10.13** For the Indices of Multiple Deprivation we have used the most recently published version from the Office of National Statistics. In the current map, the IMD 2007 data has been used.
- 7.10.14** Risk Mapping, when drawing on other FRS's experiences is created using a relative ranking approach, correlating six datasets as described in the following sections.
- 7.10.15** This approach provides a consistent analysis of those risk factors affecting a specific and predetermined geographical area - the Lower Layer Super Output Area (SOA). For each SOA the value from each dataset is normalised by taking the percentage value; this ranks each of the S.O.A's as a proportion of the total for each data set.
- 7.10.16** A weighting factor is then applied to each dataset, to reflect the significance of the affect on likelihood and severity of any potential outcomes of each factor relevant to each other.
- 7.10.17** The total value for each SOA then being calculated by aggregating the weighted values from each dataset and relatively ranked from highest to lowest to equate to order of risk.

**7.10.18** Risk category Bands are defined on an inter-percentile range to reflect the three levels of risk defined within our assessment process. The Bandings are calculated to reflect our priorities and professional assessment of risk.

## **7.11 Incident Data**

**7.11.1** To achieve appropriate consistency with the FSEC approach, historical incident data has been included on the Basis of past occurrences over a significant time period, in this case five years is a good indicator of the likely future pattern of events occurring.

**7.11.2** The focus on life risk, the most appropriate incident data sets have been used in the assessment. Geo-coded datasets for the following incident types have been used:

### **Dwelling Fires (All causes).**

- All incidents where Injuries have occurred.
- Incidents where there has been a recorded Fire Death.
- Special Service Calls involving any risk to life.
- Any fire in non domestic premises which has been the result of a deliberate act.
- An exact data definition is given in Appendix A

**7.11.3 Indices of Multiple Deprivation 2007 (IMD 2007)** The use of IMD was chosen because of the proven causal factors of fire and other emergencies which are included within the calculations of the IMD score.

**7.11.4** The IMD brings together 37 different indicators, which cover specific aspects or dimensions of deprivation: Income, Employment, Health and Disability, Education, Skills and Training, Barriers to Housing and Services, Living Environment and Crime.



**7.11.5** These are weighted and combined to create the overall IMD 2007.

Research documentation has been published by Communities and Local Government (then ODPM) which establishes the strong correlation between fire related injuries and death and deprivation. The IMD 2007 uses the Super Output Area (SOA) as its standard unit of population measurement and as such supports the contributing datasets as a consistent measure.

## **7.12 Geography**

**7.12.1** SOA's have been chosen as the Basic geographical unit, upon which all calculations have been made. Comprising of an average of 1500 residents (minimum size - 1000 residents / 400 households), SOA's avoid the problems caused by the inconsistent and unstable electoral ward geography. SOA's are suited for statistical comparison as the effect of population numbers can be assumed to be a constant factor and so removed from the risk evaluation. This approach is also consistent with the method used by the Office of National Statistics.

**7.12.2** S.O.A's are not subject to frequent boundary changes, so are more suitable for meaningful comparison over time.

## **7.13 Calculations**

**7.13.1** The following methodology was applied when calculating the risk scores: Data for incidents was gathered from our command and control system and the IMD scores were sourced from the Office of National Statistics.

- Using CadCorp Geographic Information System (GIS), each dataset was analysed by SOA;
- The scores for each dataset of each SOA were exported into Microsoft (MS) Excel, where each score was calculated as a percentage score per dataset, per SOA;
- The dataset weighting was then applied; and
- The weighted results in each SOA were aggregated and ranked to deliver the final risk score.

## 7.14 Risk Weightings

**7.14.1** The risk weightings applied within the model are drawn from national research which has established links between the various factors within the model. It is the most sophisticated model currently available and uses the six, most relevant, risk criteria.

**7.14.2** Probability dictates that for every occurrence of fire, there is a chance that a small number of people will be injured and an even smaller proportion will become fatalities. Fires in dwellings have been reflected as the best indicator of likelihood, outcome and risk within the model.

- The weighting of each of the variables for injuries and fatalities in fires have been Balanced to represent the likelihood of these outcomes occurring. Fatalities are very lightly weighted to reflect the extremely low level of occurrence, which could have a disproportionate effect on risk and to reflect that at such low levels fatalities are not statistically reliable as a strong indicator of risk.
- For consistency with the findings of national research we have reflected the well established strong correlation of fires occurring with socio-geographic data in respect of where people live and the relative deprivation within that particular area, as the second best indicator of risk within the model. Special services which involve life risk are primarily road traffic collisions, however rescue from height, water and extrications from other machinery are also included in the data.
- We have assumed within the model that all of these life risk incidents are actually potential injuries or worse. They are weighted to reflect the likelihood of any person suffering a severe outcome. The weighting takes into account the far higher level of occurrence of road traffic collisions which have no significant life risk outcome.

- Deliberate fires in non domestic dwellings represent additional risk to life as they are events which are not a normal occurrence. However these events rarely occur and the likelihood of a severe outcome has been established as very low through national research and the legislated fire safety provisions. We have reflected this through the weighting which has been applied.

The weighting factors used within the model were;

<b>Dataset</b>	<b>Weighting Factor</b>
All Dwelling Fires	1.9
All Injuries Occurring in Premises	0.46
Special Services Involving Life Risk	0.35
All Fire Deaths	0.04
All Deliberate Non Domestic Fires	0.05
IMD2007	1.5

## **7.15 Risk Categorisation**

**7.15.1** To ensure consistency with our response standards the existing three tier approach to risk was maintained;

- Low;
- Medium; and
- High.

**7.16** Areas designated as low risk represent areas where there is an extremely small chance of fires or other emergencies occurring and the outcomes are generally likely to be less severe.

**7.17** The Medium risk areas are those areas where the hazards have already been identified and addressed to ensure they are as low as reasonably practicable.

**7.18** High risk areas identify those areas where our focus in prevention and response will be until we have reduced the risks within these areas to a medium level.

**7.19** The Banding which accurately represents our professional evaluation of risk is;

- **Low** -the 42.5 percentile and below of S.O.A's ranked by risk score.
- **Medium** - Between the 42.5 and 91.5 percentile of S.O.A's ranked by risk score.
- **High** - the 91.5 percentile and above of S.O.A's ranked by risk score.
- **Risk Map** - The results for the risk score for each SOA were mapped according to location within Nottinghamshire.

## **7.20 Risk Map Review**

**7.20.1** The map is to be reviewed on an annual Basis, to ensure that we reflect the current risks in Nottinghamshire against the Baseline of 2010; this will be co-coordinated with the production of the IRMP. However, if any circumstance arises which materially affects the outcomes; we will produce a revised map to reflect these changes.

## **7.21 Risk Methodology Review**

**7.21.1** Work will continue to validate and further develop this methodology to ensure we are accurately reflecting reality and maintain consistency with validated national research and guidance. The methodology will be managed as a corporate function in line with the NFRS Service Plan process to ensure this development is coordinated.

## 7.22 Definitions of Incident Data.

Descriptions of the datasets used in risk map calculations.

### All Dwelling Fires

- All fires in dwellings regardless of motive.

Dwellings are defined as: - single dwelling house, houses of multiple occupancy. high rise flats over 4 stories, houses converted to flats, selected other sleeping accommodation, Caravans, Trailers, Motor vehicles, Railway rolling stock and Water craft used as permanent dwellings.

Including: -

<b>FSEC Codes</b>	01, 0203, 0204,0207,0208 (not prisons), 0303, 0306
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### All Injuries

- All fires where injuries to members of the public have occurred.

Injuries are defined as any physical injury requiring hospital treatment immediately following the incident, not including treatment at the scene or precautionary checks at hospital.

<b>FSEC Codes</b>	01, 02, 03
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### Special Service Calls Involving Life Risk

All Special Service calls where there has been a risk to life.

<b>FSEC Codes</b>	0601 - Road Traffic collisions
	0701 - Extrications
	1001 - Hazchem
	1101 - Rescues by Line
	1201 - Rescues by Ladder
	1301 - Rescues from Flood Water
	1401 - Other Special Services

All Fire Deaths - all Fatalities which are directly attributed to fire, caused by any motive in a premises.

Deliberate Fires in Non-Domestic Premises - all fires in Non-Domestic Premises started deliberately.

<b>FSEC Codes</b>	0201-Hospitals
	0202 -Care Homes
	0205 -Hostels
	0206 -Hotels
	0208 -Prisons only
	0209 -Further Education
	0210 -Public Buildings
	0211-Licensed Premises
	0212- Schools
	0213-Shops
	0214-Other premises open to the public
	0215-Factories & Warehouses
	02 16-Offices
	0217-Other Workplaces

## **7.23 Indices of Multiple Deprivation 2007 - Overview.**

The Index of Multiple Deprivation 2007 (IMD 2007) is a measure of multiple deprivation at the small area level.

The IMD 2007 contains seven domains of deprivation including:

- Income (22.5%)
- Employment (22.5%)
- Health Deprivation and Disability (13.5%)
- Education, Skills and Training (13.5%)
- Barriers to Housing and Services (9.3%)
- Crime (9.3%)
- Living Environment (9.3%)

The percentage figures in brackets refer to the weighting that is applied to each of the domains to calculate the IMD score. An IMD score is calculated for each of the 32,482 Super Output Areas in England. The higher the score, the more deprived the SOA.

There are 673 S.O.A's in Nottinghamshire.

## **7.24 Future analysis**

**7.24.1** FCR 2010 must not be seen as an end in itself, merely one stage in the ongoing process of how NFRS deal with risk reduction. This review has identified the need to apply a far more holistic approach to information and knowledge management that will drive the Services' future performance.

**7.24.2** This review has also introduced new methods of risk assessment and these will need to be subject to ongoing monitoring and review. It is therefore an expectation of this review, that future analysis will form a major part of the Services ongoing IRMP, for example, its annual update.

**7.24.3** Updates should also ensure they fully interact with NFRS's performance management and improvement approach, including its governance of, e.g. Fire Authority committee.

**7.24.4** A key element for future analysis, via monitoring, is to ensure NFRS are aware and informed of the impacts that result from any changes, as the change of inputs will affect risk and performance, providing a corporate evaluation of their success.

## **7.25 Scrutiny and Validation**

**7.25.1** The FCR 2010 project team carried out a number of visits to FRS's and saw the many lessons learnt from this work, this is recognised in the need to ensure that the approach of NFRS to the review of operational resources and their allocation must be subject to robust scrutiny.

**7.25.2** The following section of the Options report clearly identifies how NFRS have met that requirement in partnership with Nottingham Business School (NBS). The Service's Strategic Management has signed off the scope of work developed between NBS and NFRS.

### **7.25.3 Purpose**

**7.25.3.1** Nottinghamshire Fire & Rescue Service (NFRS) procured independent consultants to scrutinise and validate the processes and methodology undertaken and applied by NFRS in its Fire Cover review project (FCR 2010). The intention was to quality assure the processes undertaken not to comment or advise on the conclusions or the development of the services policy. NFRS also required advice on the option appraisal process applied during the course of the development of the project. This advice has been procured from NBS.



#### **7.25.4 Requirements**

- Check that the methods applied to data collection are appropriate to the project and associated tasks and provide statistically significant evidence that is accurate, valid and timely and that conclusions can be reasonably and accurately drawn from the processes applied;
- Quality assure the data gathered by NFRS for FCR 2010 and confirm that it appropriate to meet the projects aims and objectives and provide confidence to NFRS strategic managers and Fire Authority that any subsequent outcomes are Based upon robust evidence and processes;
- Identify any areas of weakness within the review and report on any potential improvements to the process or the data quality;
- Ensure that any assumptions embedded in the process are clearly articulated, appropriate to the review undertaken and have been robustly tested;

#### **7.25.5 What its not?**

**7.25.5.1** NBS were not required to provide comments or recommendations to NFRS on the outcome of the review or any subsequent conclusions or decisions arising from the review. These remained a matter for NFRS.

- The scope of the task will concluded with submission of the final report relating to the process undertaken. Any decisions on the implementation process and any additional work arising out of NBS recommendations do not form part of the current requirements. NFRS need to decide upon any recommendations that it deems appropriate to implement and any further work in relation to implementation will be subject to a new project phase and require a new specification to

## **7.25.6 Access to data systems**

**7.25.6.1** To enable NBS to reasonably achieve the specification requirements, NFRS provided access to its data and systems that hold, process and report that data, these include, but not limited to:-

- IRIS data;
- MIS (where appropriate);
- FSEC;
- Workload Planner
- Risk Mapping;
- Mosaic (incl. Origins);
- Views;
- Crystal.

**NBS Q.A. report content to be added here.**

## **7.26 Data Quality Audit (NCC)**

**7.26.1** Emphasised throughout this report has been the position that NFRS fully understand that its FCR 2010 outcomes will be challenged. The following section details the outcomes the data quality audit that it was commissioned via NCC to look at the IRS data on which much of the services performance management approach and decision making is Based. Key findings and actions are itemised and are subject to review within Corporate Services.

**NCC audit report findings to be added here.**

## **8 Environmental considerations**

- 8.1** It would be remiss of any review of Fire Cover to discount the impact of both climate change and our approach to incident management combined (including Response); therefore, this section highlights the need to consider the environmental aspects of our future planning scenarios with a far greater lead in time. This will clearly allow NFRS as a public body to contribute longer-term to our immediate and wider role in sustainability.
- 8.2** We have invested heavily into our corporate / strategic environmental management agenda; however, this has been driven by compliance in a non-operational sense.
- 8.3** FRS's will come under increasing pressure to respond and deal with emergencies to the same degree; this is also covered within this report in relation to the application of HMEPO's. Considering this and referring to the data within the appendices, specifically in relation to secondary fire types, the NFRS findings allow for an appropriate response to these fire types. Identified clearly as one of the largest calls upon our response resources.
- 8.4** NFRS, by using its crewing capacity differently and implementing alternative appliances will be far better placed to address this area of demand and retain its central / standard appliance fleet for those incidents that require them.
- 8.5** This section has taken most of its information (as secondary data) from the CLG report that investigated the potential effects of climate change on Fire and Rescue Services in the UK. We know our climate has changed over the last century and is likely to continue to change throughout the 21st century, affecting all aspects of the UK's environment, society, and economy. (See also 'Stern' report).
- 8.6** In 1997, the Government set up the *UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP) (1)* aiming to encourage organisations to look at how vulnerable they would be to climate change and therefore prepare for its impacts. UKCIP produced a wide range of research, guidance and tools for different sectors. In 2002, UKCIP with others produced a report detailing future climate scenarios Based on the regional climate modelling of the UK.

- 8.7** Their report examined past events, and assessed their effects on Fire and Rescue Services. The likelihood of such an event happening in the future is then determined using the climate change scenarios. This combination of an effect and a probability provided a Basis on which future assessments of the effects of climate change would be drawn.
- 8.8** The report considered impacts on Primary, Secondary fires and Flooding etc... Climate scenarios show that climate change will lead to an increase in the frequency of hot summers and therefore to an increase in the number and severity of grassland fires, amongst others, requiring significant extra effort from Fire and Rescue Services. These summers are predicted to be very dry, which may lead to water shortages. Water shortages during summer are likely to impact on Fire and Rescue Services in the UK in both training and fire fighting.
- 8.9** The report also showed that increased winter rainfall and higher sea levels would lead to an increase in the frequency of flooding events during winter. Nationally, measures have been taken to address this, for example, with improved flood defences, UK FRS's role specifically has seen new pumping equipment and innovative appliance design, issues such as training and access to water rescue craft.
- 8.10** Fire and Rescue Services are expected to be dynamic and flexible, and able to change and adapt to suit the emergencies for which they are needed. The UKCIP report recommended that the monitoring of climate change research should be continued, this would ensure that Fire and Rescue Services would be kept apprised of current climate change scenarios and ideas, and that decisions that are being made could be made with an awareness of potential climate change impacts.
- 8.11 Primary and Secondary Fires** - The Department of the Environment report specifically detailed the effects that the hot summer of 1995 had on various areas of everyday life, including Fire and Rescue Services in the UK. One of the findings of the report is that there is a clear and demonstrable link between hot dry summers and the number of fires.

**8.12** This relationship was investigated by analysing the numbers of primary and secondary fires with the climate variables for that year. The number of fires in the UK between 1973 and 2003 were included within the sample and analysis carried out by the Department of the Environment, who analysed the data for secondary fires between 1984 and 1995, and found that there was a clear upward trend with time. A linear trend line applied, the years containing the hot summers of 1989, 1990 and 1995 were clearly present as large positive anomalies.

**8.13** The numbers of “additional” secondary fires in the anomalous years were:

- 28,804 in 1989
- 37,459 in 1990
- 88,636 in 1995

**8.14** These large numbers of extra fires clearly mean more work for the FRS's, and this can be seen to a lesser degree within the attached data appendices for the summer months in particular and comparing year with year e.g 2007.

**8.15** This directly links to the Department of the Environment with regard to summer climate and anomalies in the number of fires, specifically.

- The mean summer (June, July and August)
- The mean high summer (July and August) England Temperature for each year;
- The total summer (June, July and August) England and Wales rainfall in each year; and
- The total high summer (July and August) England and Wales rainfall in each year.

**8.16** CLG used these results to state that:

*“For a 1°C increase in summer temperatures, the Central England Temperature regression equations indicate an increase in the number of outdoor fires of between 24,000 and 40,000 per year for England and Wales and, for a 2°C increase, between 47,000 and 79,000. When these results are expressed as percentages, the rise in the number of secondary outdoor fires due to a 1°C summer temperature increase would be between 17-28% whilst a 2°C temperature change would lead to a 34-56% increase. Although these figures may appear unrealistically large, it should be noted that the increase in secondary fires in 1995 (+3.5°C), relative to the 1994 figure was 54% (+113,611 fires).”*

- 8.17** The climate change scenarios used in UKCIP 02 indicate that by 2080, average summer temperatures will have increased by between 1°C and 5°C. Temperature increases of this size suggest a large increase in the number of secondary fires. The period 2021 to 2050 is forecast to witness a significant increase in the number of hot summers. This will bring a consequent increase in the number of secondary fires, and beyond this, there will also be a measurable increase in average summer temperatures even during non-anomalous summers, resulting in a general increase in the average number of secondary fires.
- 8.18** If the average number of secondary fires increases then this has the potential to create serious implications for the Fire and Rescue Services.
- 8.19** Fire statistics data is collected by CLG and is published as the Fire Statistics Monitor. Of the 378,100 secondary fires reported in 1995, 267 grassland fires merited completion of a Primary Fire Damage Report (FDR 1) Form. This means that they were upgraded from secondary to primary fire status, and indicates that either property or life was at risk, or that more than four appliances were used at the incident.
- 8.20** Fifty percent of the primary grassland fires were dealt with using one or two appliances and in 50% of incidents, the appliances were back on station within 2 hours of receiving the call. The most resource intensive 25% of primary grassland fires took 5 hours or more to deal with, and involved 7 or more appliances.
- 8.21** Using the historic increase in the numbers of serious grassland fires and the CLG estimates of the resources required for grassland fires, it could be predicted that another hot year like 1995 could see 200 additional primary grassland fires. With 100 of those lasting longer than 2 hours, and requiring more than 2 appliances, and 50 of them involving 7 or more appliances, and lasting over 5 hours.

- 8.22** Whilst an increase in the number of secondary fires will not create an increase in the number of fire fatalities or casualties, as secondary fires are those, which do not involve fatalities casualties or rescues, they are still required to be attended by the Fire and Rescue Services. The extra workload of attending potentially up to 50% more incidents will stretch the resources of the UK FRS. The report indicated some of the following factors for consideration, fire crews will be tired from attending more incidents, sickness and injury levels may rise due to fatigue, and equipment will be under more strain due to increased usage.
- 8.23** This increase in workload will have the largest impact on those more rural Fire and Rescue Services. Due to the spread of this type of incident and our data from the previous five years, this is seeing an impact upon NFRS, higher workload of this type and the impacts may fall heavily on fire fighters working on the retained duty system.
- 8.24** Fire fighters working on the retained duty system are paid for every call out that they attend, more call outs will mean that NFRS will require more work from their RDS employees.
- 8.25** This will have budget implications, and may create difficulty with employers who release their staff to carry out fire fighting duties. If fire fighters working the retained duty system are required to work more hours, as opposed to using larger numbers of staff doing fewer hours, then this may affect the goodwill of employers to release their staff, as well as the number of people who are able to be a retained Fire fighter.
- 8.26** NFRS have already completed a review into the RDS in the service, among those actions, highlighted being the work required to build relationships with local employers and the growing issue of recruitment and retention of RDS Based personnel. This has in part been addressed via dual contract staff but is not a solution in itself.

**8.27** Dual contract employees by having a Wholetime contract for 42 hours with NFRS already will need this to be considered in relation to the WTR that apply to NFRS as the employer. Also of note is that where a dual contract employee is injured, in one role that requires an absence from the workplace, then it is the two roles from which they would be absent. Clearly, this may in future, pose NFRS concern and some measure has already been taken to limit the number and type of this contract.



## 9 Management and Command Capacity


9.1 The following section of the FCR 2010 review report seeks to address the subject of Management (Uniformed) capacity of NFRS and how it can best move forward in its structure. It is important to recognise that the Service has gone through a number of changes to structure in recent years, in particular the reduction from 35 SM (FDS) to 28 and reorganisation at principal manager level.

9.2 It must also be recognised that for any adjustment at whatever individual level of management will require changes to structure, workload distribution and responsibilities throughout the whole service to ensure NFRS are still equipped to deliver its key functions, objectives and duties.

9.3 The attached appendices clearly show the incidents that have attracted NFRS officers to deploy to operational incidents and the reducing numbers at which they would be required over the last five years of collected data used as the reference period for this report.


9.4 Additionally, taking the point (10.1) above into account NFRS has remained relatively stable regardless of demands placed upon it from a managerial perspective. The following sections look to detail and make recommendation as to the level and usage of managers across NFRS.

### 9.5 Brigade Manager (BM) Provision



- 9.5.1** The FCR 2010 did not initially seek to review or make comment in relation to the principal management team explicitly, this has been agreed as a task for those currently in role to review and determine the demands placed upon them presently and those envisaged in future and feed into the review process. It is recognised by the review however that issues have been addressed at this level of the service in relation to their ability to provide enhanced service resilience in terms of the now present 'Continuous' cover arrangements.
- 9.5.2** The strategic team will now look at the future make up of the strategic team, in particular given the pressure to provide service savings and the management structure this will take to deliver over the life of the latest Comprehensive Spending review (CSR) and resulting support grants.
- 9.5.3** Clearly, any findings detailed within this review will have direct and indirect impact on the operating framework of the Brigade Managers, specifically, the future numbers of middle and senior managers. Therefore, the review does make comment as to how NFRS may choose to look from a more holistic point of view.
- 9.5.4** Any implementation of findings to the management capacity of NFRS must be carefully planned given the changes that the service is likely to experience, and as an example, too early an implementation may leave additional difficulties behind with respect to introducing a significant change programme and the necessary management capacity to enable that process to be realised. This should be dealt with from a risk-assessed approach, via a clear implementation plan with a dedicated change team.
- 9.5.5** As an example, other FRS's deploy a Gold rota for operational cover, that see's the combination of BM and AM roles within their service. In addition, this approach should be considered as a viable solution for NFRS. This may see in future years less post holders with increased areas of responsibility / expanded portfolios. If this is taken as a recommended solution the service will need to commence this foundation work at the earliest opportunity, and will clearly see a new line management structure.

**9.5.6** The remaining Brigade Managers should also look to amend their rota, in that the suggested model clearly shows seven managers, of which six would be operational and four would provide the executive decision-making role / contact at any point in time. These would act as continuous cover, but would provide the individual with more work life Balance as one group, as opposed to the two groups in operation at present.




**9.5.7** This opportunity will make best use of the vacation of posts through natural wastage and keep service costs to a minimum, for example, the retirement of a Brigade Manager would / may require the enhancement of AM's to provide functions outside of their current role map and beyond that detailed in their national terms and conditions.

**9.5.8** Acting on the findings would see significant savings to the Fire Authority, both financially and moreover, the statement that this would make would also be seen as significant and demonstrate a clear commitment that NFRS is determined to provide a Balance in its review outcomes.

## 9.6 Area Manager (AM) provision

9.6.1 Below is the current organisational structure for the substantive, uniformed posts.



9.6.2 NFRS have previously communicated it's intent to reduce its uniformed Area Manager (AM) establishment from five to four as part of the Job Sizing collective agreement (November 2008).

9.6.3 This piece of work has now been encompassed within the Fire Cover review (FCR 2010) project that will deliver this options report as to how and on what information the Fire Authority and Fire Service strategic management Base its future resource allocation decisions.

9.6.4 NFRS Area Managers at present remain part of the nationally agreed Terms and Conditions, 6<sup>th</sup> Edition (Grey book).

9.6.5 In recent years, we have seen the introduction of the updated Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (FRSA 04) and further the introduction of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA 04), which is also subject to review through the CCA enhancement programme.

9.6.6 The Service's Strategic Managers have recently moved to continuous cover arrangements and consists of four uniformed and one non-uniformed strategic manger, the latter does not form part of the command and control function at strategic level. The information for this decision will be included as part of the AM issue and falling within the scope of the Fire Cover review.

- 9.6.7** NFRS as a Category 1 responder agency under the CCA 04 umbrella also provides proactive support and influence to the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) providing managerial support to the Strategic and Tactical co-ordinating groups within a Multi agency event. These statutory duties are additional to the core statutory functions of NFRS within its own FRSA 04 and clearly present additional managerial obligations.
- 9.6.8** Within the NFRS Incident Command System (ICS), the current AM's would not normally be mobilised to Fire Service incidents unless the incident had 14 Pumps / Appliances in attendance, however, AM's do have the discretion to mobilise prior to this criteria being met.
- 9.6.9** The NFRS ICS was formally reviewed in 2003 and has been modified since to take into account the updates to nationally adopted guidance (Fire Service Manual - ICS Vol. 3). The national manual is under review again with volume four being created.
- 9.6.10** In the last 5 years and since the ICS review, 1 incident has required an AM to be mobilised due to NFRS ICS triggers being met and there is clearly a decreasing likelihood / frequency of such triggers being met given the scale of incidents for an AM to be routinely present.
- 9.6.11** Increases in natural events (Flood) have however placed, at times, a significant yet short-term demand over a number of days for managerial / operational intervention and this may, without amendment, continue to rely upon the existing recall to duty approach, particularly in those circumstances that a multi –agency command system has been activated e.g. SCG.
- 9.6.12** It should also be noted that since the introduction of CCA 04, Fire and Rescue Services have been obligated to develop their approach to business continuity for dealing with extraordinary events, these may require the service and employees to work outside of normal day to day practices e.g. shift times / length or location of work. This may also require contract of employment to be varied and reflect such arrangements

- 9.6.13** This report serves to highlight the options available to NFRS in reducing the current number of uniformed AM's from five to four initially and should be taken in the context that the decision to do so has been taken previously as part of the agreed 'Job Sizing' collective agreement (2008).
- 9.6.14** However, having cognisance of the Brigade Manager structure, it is seen as viable to reduce the uniformed AM establishment in time to provide a single group to provide the operational (command and control) function within NFRS.
- 9.6.15** Such an approach will also reflect previous recommendations from the Audit Commissions report 'Rising to the Challenge' for FRS's to release efficiency savings, as such, the findings contained within this report demonstrates a real commitment by NFRS to do so. It should also be noted the significance that any senior managerial reduction may signal across the organisation and externally at a time when public funding arrangements receive increased attention and pressure.
- 9.6.16** NFRS must also continue to provide a quality level of service, albeit reduced during extraordinary events and must ensure it is able to implement appropriate Business Continuity measures.
- 9.6.17** It should be noted as part of this report that resilience is hinged upon any organisation having access to appropriate and proportionate resources to be able to function, it should not be confused with the need for each organisation being able to provide that resilience in isolation.
- 9.6.18** Key to moving forward will be the Learning and Development of those employees performing the AM role in future, for example, CBRN Silver or Gold Command.
- 9.6.19** Furthermore, will be the need to address the issue of security as set out in the Security framework that will ultimately allow NFRS senior operational managers to fully perform their roles in a multi agency environment.

**9.6.20** Fire and Rescue Services (FRS) are also obliged to consider and where appropriate introduce collaborative working arrangements with other FRS's and this should look to include the use of senior managers. While this has not been included as an option given the timescales for the FCR 2010, it should be explored further with neighbouring Services.

**9.6.21** The above issue should also look to tie into the review of AM provision in future as the preferred option may not continue to be fit for purpose and will allow for meaningful dialogue between FRS's, or further adjustments within NFRS in isolation. Specifically the viability of combining BM and AM post holders into one operational cover rota and maintaining executive decision making through the remaining principal managers. This may therefore lead to further establishment reductions.

**9.6.22** The current AM profile, should each individual choose, has the potential for the following impact to occur within NFRS, it does not however include the ability of any individual to vacate their post for other scenarios e.g. promotion to another role or Service:-

- 2 AM retirement 2011
- 1 AM retirement 2012
- 1 AM retirement 2014
- 1 AM retirement 2016

**9.6.23** FRS receives regular Fire fighter Pension Scheme Circulars (FPSC), of specific relevance in this report is FPSC 11 / 2009 and the ongoing discussions in relation to public sector pension schemes and allowances being offered by individual FRS's. CLG, at this stage have indicated the decision to apply allowances could sit with the discretion of local authorities and whether the allowance would attract a pensionable status, however, additional cost is likely to sit with the authority also.

**9.6.24** Detailed within the 2008 'Job Sizing' Collective Agreement, the reduction from five to Four AM's will be as the result of natural wastage / retirement, promotion or transfer from post of existing AM's.

- 9.6.25** It is the reviews finding that where a combined 'Gold' rota is agreed this would see a further reduction to three (uniformed) AM's within the Service.
- 9.6.26** The removal of and non-replacement of these two posts under current (2010) figures would realise a saving to NFRS annually of approx £170K. If both posts are assumed Area Manager B at competent rate, and subject to old pension arrangements and given this would be achieved through a retirement process due to full service, the review considers this figure realistic.
- 9.6.27** Although, as is already stated earlier in the review, remuneration of AM post holders would be required due to a move away from national terms and conditions and this figure would clearly reduce the savings detailed within 10.6.26
- 9.6.28** To receive early benefit from the released efficiency savings this could be implemented and achieved by August 2011, however, NFRS need to Balance this in relation to any period of transition, including changes to management structures, lines of responsibility and shifts in workload up to and beyond implementation and ensure that capacity is available to deliver the required change programme.
- 9.6.29** Once agreed the implementation should aim to be no later than the setting of the 2011 Annual Leave (AL) process for the remaining AM post holders. A caveat does however apply in that post holders may not retire move etc and as such would affect the actual date for delivery.
- 9.6.30** Clearly the implication of moving away from national terms and conditions are likely to create a degree of apprehension in both post holders and employee representatives and the negotiating process must ensure clear employee engagement is maintained whilst remaining focused upon the organisational needs of NFRS, e.g. the provision and appropriateness of managerial and operational personnel to discharge its duties.



**9.6.31** Given the details contained above in relation to allowances and working practices, this must be subject to formal review, for example, initial 6 months and Annual Leave year end. This will ensure the needs of the service are being satisfied and that initial concerns of the post holders are being considered.

**9.6.32** By subjecting, any new arrangements to review will ensure that NFRS introduces flexibility to working practices and is better placed to amend them where conditions require it, for example, changes to the LRF that lead to the AM arrangements not being applicable.

**9.6.33** Additional to the above are the longer term allocation of roles at the AM level and the results of the review into the Principal level of management and the potential to amalgamate the two aspects and provide managerial / operational cover in one combined group and this should be developed as a matter of course.

**9.6.34** This recommendation could be achieved, including the necessary organisational work by no later than the planned 2012 retirement profile contained earlier within this review report.

## **9.7 Group Manager (GM) provision**

**9.7.1** When comparing the NFRS GM establishment to other FRS's it has been necessary to put into context the varying approaches applied by individual services during the rank to role process and the varying results that this has left services to deal with.

**9.7.2** NFRS does however show a comparatively lower number of GM's when referring to the 2009 CIPFA statistics. Indeed when considering our neighbours and their structural make up (Lincolnshire and Northamptonshire) using the same figures show they employ 12 and 11 GM's respectively and Derbyshire reportedly have 17 GM's in post, however, further context should be applied, in that, these will be a mix of GM (A) and GM (B).

- 9.7.3** The GM (uniformed) provision is currently eight within NFRS, as the result of the rank to role and job sizing process (2008) the increase from seven arising within the Services Equipment and Transport function. This is in addition to the non-uniformed managers already in post from the Transport element.
- 9.7.4** The remaining post holders are spread across the service as follows:-
- 4 in Response Delivery - South / City / North East and North West
  - 1 in Fire Protection
  - 1 in Corporate Services
  - 1 in Response Resilience
- 9.7.5** It was the intention that the GM's should operate on a 7-week rota, however, as there are 8 in post this was extended to an 8-week rota.
- 9.7.6** Within the reference period of the review and following the ICS review, all GM have attended approximately 11 incidents where the ICS triggers have been met in a five-year period. To note however is that incidents do exceed eight appliances once a GM may be in attendance and the total incident involvement is approximately fifty in the five-year reference period.
- 9.7.7** However, the reducing number of incidents being attended by Uniformed employees continues to raise a variety of questions, these include the ability of employee's to maintain their operational competence. Further the justification of roles being allocated as a uniformed post, expanding this further may present the service with claims around equal pay, however, this will be justified or otherwise through an equal pay claim.
- 9.7.8** It is the finding of this review that NFRS should look to move from its current position (8 GM's) on the current rota of 1 available, to one that will see 6 uniformed GM's across the Service, this is seen as achievable by natural employment process e.g. upon the retirement / move of current post holders.

- 9.7.9** This will reflect the operational demands placed upon the Service's GM cohort of managers in ordinary operating times and ensure that their exposure to areas of operational competence is maintained, including the multi agency arena, without a disproportionate impact upon the managerial areas of responsibility in their roles.
- 9.7.10** This reduction in number should take place at the retirement of post holders and allow for the service to re-organise its activities and re-allocate managerial functions and responsibilities appropriately. Therefore, working on the profile above these two post reductions should occur in spring 2011 and 2012 respectively as the result of retirement as the trigger or sooner where other triggers occur, for example, transfer or promotion of post holders.
- 9.7.11** The removal of and non-replacement of these two posts under current (2010) figures would realise a saving to NFRS annually in the region of £125K if both posts were assumed to be Group Manager B at competent rate. Being subject to old pension arrangements and given this would be through a retirement process due to full service the review considers this figure to be realistic.
- 9.7.12** Where a single post is removed and a delay / review period between the move from 8 to 7 and subsequently 7 to 6 a saving of £61 279 annually is realised.
- 9.7.13** Clearly, where the service decides to recruit personnel to perform functions behind the above reductions, significant savings would be lost and may well contradict the primary purpose of the reduction within the current operating climate.
- 9.7.14** Furthermore, the service should also look to use the GM's more to support the Incident command System, particularly when not providing 'Primary' cover (e.g. monitoring).

**9.7.15** This is already implicit in daily activity but the service should look to formalise this by the generation of a new updated collective agreement with its middle managers, for example, nearest officer used or reduction in the level at which ICS triggers are set. It may also be prudent to introduce a shadow rota for those occasions where demand exceeds normal day-to-day levels, e.g. Multi agency events.

## **9.8 Station Manager (Flexible Duty System)**

**9.8.1** In the course of the FCR 2010, a number of factors have been considered in relation to the amount and disposition of the NFRS's SM (FDS), including the operational demand that has been placed upon this tier of management. The number of specialist roles (e.g. FI / HMEPO) and the distribution of those specialists across the 28 SM (FDS) and the expectations from the service of its SM (FDS) cohort, for example, partnership working, operational and managerial responsibilities.

**9.8.2** The current distribution of SM (FDS) is as follows:-

- 12 x SM (FDS) Response
- 4 x SM (FDS) Response / Resilience
- 2 x SM (FDS) Prevention
- 3 x SM (FDS) Corporate Services
- 5x SM (FDS) Protection
- 1 x SM (FDS) L&D
- 1 x SM (FDS) Finance & Resources

**9.8.3** Appendix A –County Overview, details the number of mobilisations made by NFRS's SM's over the review reference period (annually), it must be considered that the review has not detailed those occasions of simultaneous activity that may have presented a resilience issue, which may have been dealt with via a recall to duty approach.

**9.8.4** It is clear that on certain occasions the Primary SM FDS are fully deployed and require recall to duty to support Service demand, however, it also indicates that on the vast majority of occasions, this number proves to be sufficient for the demands placed upon NFRS e.g. 4 / 5 operational SM's are proportionate for the needs of the Service.

- 9.8.5** It is further recognised by this review, the importance of the SM (FDS) and impact in the delivery of service objectives across all departments that these post holders have had in recent years of change, this should be expanded, in that a significant change programme is upon NFRS again.
- 9.8.6** Additionally considered as an issue to factor in, are the figures employed by other FRS's as a comparison (see CIPFA statistics) this should be done with caution however, given that the priorities of individual FRS's may vary greatly, but does give an indication across the UK FRS.
- 9.8.7** As with the services operational station Based staff, recent years have seen a continued and steady decline in demand for SM's to be called away to operational incidents. This is further supported by initial work completed by the Services Operational Assurance Team (OAT).
- 9.8.8** Further, throughout the review many personnel have expressed the view and concern in the loss of experienced officers due to an increased number retiring from the service and the issue that this may leave behind when combined with reduced call outs for the remaining SM's.
- 9.8.9** Clearly, the counter to this could be to send officers to more incident types, requiring a review / amendments of the ICS triggers employed by NFRS; or reduce the number of officers who proceed to more incidents and gain experience from those incidents.
- 9.8.10** The potential retirement profile for the next three years is as follows:-
- 2 x SM FDS during 2010
  - 6 x SM FDS during 2011
  - 2 x SM FDS during 2012
- 9.8.11** At the time of review, NFRS has also Back filled two secondment posts that are included in the figures above making the business decision that the two post holders would not be likely to return to NFRS and even if this did occur posts would be vacant by that point.
- 9.8.12** It is therefore the finding of this review that the Service could reduce the number of SM (FDS) to 20 overall. This approach will involve reducing numbers under the current retirement predictions.

**9.8.13** The removal of and non-replacement of these eight posts, under current (2010) figures would realise a saving to NFRS annually of £508K. If all eight posts were assumed to be Station Manager B at competent rate, and subject to old pension arrangements and given this would be through a retirement process due to full service the review considers this figure to be realistic.

**9.8.14** Acceptance and implementation of these findings will clearly require the structure of the service to be reviewed and amended to detail where posts would be removed to ensure the service continues to deliver key functions in the pursuit of key objectives.

**9.8.15** This should include the teams affected (line managers) who will implement the changes and could include the review team to coordinate any transition that is agreed upon because of this review report.

**9.8.16** It is further identified that the ICS system be looked at in relation to levels of mobilisation set within NFRS and how the service looks to respond to, supervise and manage operational incidents, for example, SM's at four appliances and GM's at six appliance incidents etc.

**9.9 Station Manager (42)** - At this time NFRS have 8 station managers employed on 42 hour contracts, these deployed as per below:-

- L&D
- Equipment
- Resilience
- Support
- CFS
- FP
- Corporate
- SRT

**9.9.1** These roles / post holders are required to fulfil the current national role map for Station Manager, but are not currently actively planned into providing operational cover as part of the response element of NFRS beyond the maintenance of competence for each post holder.

**9.9.2** Regardless of overall SM numbers the provision of an operational function should be introduced, that will better support those currently in role and deliver increased flexibility to NFRS, for example, a smooth transition to an FDS role where cover may be required at short notice or recall to duty. This will also ensure that post holders achieve the full SM rolemap.

**9.9.3** However, as part of the Services future structure, these roles should be included in the need to review the continued viability of the post being uniformed or not, Balanced against the Operational requirements of NFRS.

## **9.10 Day Duty Staff**

**9.10.1** NFRS employ its uniformed staff across a broad range of roles.

Locally we see these divided between the 'Ridership' (those on operational appliances) and Day Duty Staff who make up the uniformed 'Establishment'. Day Duty Staff are engaged in many of the service's departments, for example, Learning and Development, Fire Protection and Corporate Services.

**9.10.2** Many of the roles in which a uniformed employee is engaged are sometimes specialised in relation to skills requirement and narrower in their focus in terms of its objectives, for example, Business Planning, Employee Development, Policy and Procedure production.

**9.10.3** It is a well know fact that staff that move into Day Duty roles would predominantly require extensive initial skills acquisition and investment by the Service and in some cases would see the individual remain in post for a relatively short period of time, prior to transferring to a new role.

**9.10.4** NFRS have for some time applied its 'Transfer and Progression' policy, within which uniformed employees are able to apply to change both work locations and role, either within Band or via promotion. One stage of the process in respect of specialist posts requires the individual to complete a specific process Based upon the role being applied for.

**9.10.5** This has, amongst others had two main impacts in that some posts have failed to attract sufficient numbers of employees to fill posts, in some cases exceeding two years and on a positive note has ensured the person of 'best fit' is successful in securing the post.

**9.10.6** Additional to the above factors, having received focus and addressed by NFRS is the issue of re-deployment of operational employees, these being short or long-term requirements based upon individual circumstances. Clearly, NFRS are unable to ensure its ability to re-deploy all future cases and the Service needs to ensure its ability to meet its objectives. This is of relevance in that each employee must have the required skills for the post, or they are able to acquire the necessary skills.

**9.10.7** The FRS's image has evolved with reasonable momentum over the past few years and we have seen a move towards the employment of more specific role focused personnel, for example, our Community Advocates and (Non-uniformed / non-Grey Book) Fire Protection employees.



**9.10.8** Uniformed Day Duty post holders are expected to maintain operational competencies and these skills were previously seen as essential in providing operational resilience across the organisation. Operational knowledge was also seen as essential to be able to perform in the role, NFRS may accept this in part, however, it is not reflective of all roles that fall within the Day Duty category, or in the numbers that it would apply to.

**9.10.9** Many of the Day Duty roles we now see across the organisation already have the skills, knowledge and experience to adequately perform roles within NFRS that would previously have been the reserve for uniformed employees.

**9.10.10** NFRS have already actioned the 'Post Conversion' policy in respect to posts that have remained vacant within the Service. We have seen this used within both the Fire Protection, Fire Prevention and Learning and Development departments, some posts have seen former uniformed employees now occupy non-uniformed roles following retirement.

**9.10.11** The above point does highlight the intrinsic value that the Service would place upon operational experiences within a team, but not that the whole team would necessarily require the same skills. This issue then provides NFRS opportunity to review the allocation of uniformed employees to all Day-duty roles.

**9.10.12** NFRS currently have 94 WM (B) posts within its establishment in comparison to like Services having around 75 WM's. Of the 94 NFRS have around 45 WM's are engaged in Day-duty roles, (at the time of this review and detailed above this figure is being subject to change.)

**9.10.13** In addition, given the budgetary pressures NFRS now face, all departments are required to review their costs, as such; it is a conclusion of FCR 2010 that over the period of the Comprehensive Spending Review that the number of Uniformed Day-duty roles could be reduced, for example, this may see a reduction in the region of twenty.

**9.10.14** The previous point does not directly require the employment of 20 non-uniformed replacements, in that, a non-uniformed employee would not be required to maintain any operational competencies in their current form. This means an increased capacity to focus upon the function of the Day-duty post and would lead to an overall reduction in the total workforce numbers and consequently cost to the Service.

**9.10.15** This report has already identified roles WM level and these departments, which have already seen post-conversions, and FCR 2010 concludes that this initiative could be expanded to beyond the 20 WM's posts and further look to review those at CM and FF with a consideration to reducing this number also.

**9.10.16** FCR 2010 would also advise that the above findings must be complimentary to delivering the Services key objectives and proposals that arise from future structures. For example, NFRS must ensure that it is able to provide integration across Response, Prevention and Protection and the retention of some uniformed Day-duty roles with a department may remain both a sensible and key asset e.g. some Fire Protection WM's may continue to be necessary.

**9.10.17** FCR 2010 within its review has looked at the demands placed upon it operationally in relation to Day-duty staff and how these have been shown to provide organisational resilience. As such, few examples over the reference period are available to demonstrate the full value of this part of Service delivery.

**9.10.18** Business Continuity arrangements currently quote that a figure of 56 Day Duty posts should be maintained as a resilience element. However, this figure does not refer to the Services available Business Impact Assessments (BIA's) that are subject to review at this time. This figure provides an overall number that should the need arise would provide 2 fire appliance, should that be what is actually required.

**9.10.19** As we know, this would under normal operating parameters require 40 fire fighters, 8 crew managers and 8 Watch Managers. Clearly, the Service does not have this mix of personnel available from its Day Duty staff to be operationally available in extraordinary occasions such as pandemics or spate conditions.


**9.10.20** Additionally, in relation to the pandemic example, NFRS would be unable to predict or make accurate plans that depend upon the availability of Day duty staff and has a primary reliance upon the sheer number of uniformed staff instead.

**9.10.21** Also apparent through the review, is the growing number of Services who effectively provide resilience beyond their uniformed post holders. As such, NFRS should look to its non-uniformed employees and how they are potentially better placed and equipped to provide specific functions that will ultimately reduce demand and therefore impact upon the uniformed establishment.


## **10 Specialist functions - Fire Investigation**

- 10.1** Under the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (FRSA 04) (Part 6 - Section 45), it is a statutory duty for Nottinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service (NFRS) to investigate fires, and it must do so via identifying and deploying “authorised officers” (*an employee of the Fire Authority who is authorised in writing*) to discharge that function.
- 10.2** To date NFRS has discharged this area of its responsibility by training and utilising its Flexible Duty System Station Managers (FDS) (SM). At present the service has, seven such Station Managers where Fire Investigation forms part of their role and these are spread across numerous NFRS departments.
- 10.3** Anecdotal comments have been made through the review process in relation to the impact that attending and pursuing Fire Investigations has on those departments where a SM is also a Fire Investigation Officer (FIO), further anecdotal comments have also centred on the skill that those Officers now have and the reward they gain, both professionally and personally from the role.
- 10.4** The comments around impact appear to centre upon Response Directorate SM roles, where the service now has an ever-increasing role within our multi agency partnerships and the short notice that an FIO would get in which to be able to plan or re-schedule other elements of their workload.
- 10.5** Additional to this is the apparent cultural view of what constitutes the ‘Day Job’ and that such functions as Fire Investigation are a voluntary matter for the FDS staff, such an historic approach also does not ensure that tasks and functions required of the service SM cohort are evenly distributed. This view would not be that taken by NFRS, in that, this function is a statutory element for all FRS’s and is underpinned in the FRS role maps and further job descriptions.
- 10.6** NFRS also has a coordinating role for Fire Investigation within its Arson Task Force (ATF). This role will soon be enhanced with the Services investment and commitment to the provision of a dedicated Fire Investigation vehicle. This role will continue to command great significance in relation to combating Arson, preventing further fatalities as a result of fire and contributing to the reduction of economic loss that result from fire within Nottinghamshire.
- 10.7** During the two years 2008 and 2009, NFRS were required to carry out 141 and 160 fire investigations respectively; the tables below detail the timings for those to be initiated and the days on which they occurred.


Fire Investigations by Day of week 2008




FI's by Hour 2008



### Fire Investigations by Day of Week 2009



### FI's by Hour 2009



**10.8** NFRS have also delivered increased level 1 FI awareness to its operational staff in an attempt to enhance their ability in the detection of cause and this has been a contributory factor in the increase in call out / demand of level two FIO's.

- 10.9** Nationally this area is also receiving increased attention, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) listing it as one of the areas that needs to be focused upon as a collaborative issue, for example, Police, insurers and FRS's working more closely in relation to performing Fire Investigation or dealing with their outcomes. NFRS, within the ATF employ a warranted Police Officer, which greatly enhances the scope and effectiveness of our ATF and seen as good practice nationally.
- 10.10** During the review process the ABI have been met and their views are represented in part by the content of the findings, specifically in relation to the emphasis that local authorities must place on the economic impact of fire.
- 10.11** The Fire investigation role has gained increased and wider attention from that of the more traditional view, being a uniformed officer providing NFRS with the appropriate cover, indeed, Forensic Science is now included within the 'Skills for Justice' remit and academic establishments now offer qualifications in Fire Scene Investigations.
- 10.12** NFRS is signed up to a regional Fire Investigation working protocol, however, this appears to have had more prohibitive / limited impact than its true potential suggests, for example, the differing approach and level of consistency that is applied by contributing FRS's and the expectations required for individual County Coroners and how this best reflects upon the submitting FRS.
- 10.13** The impact of this consistency from the NFRS perspective has been that it would not necessarily look to call other FRS Fire Investigators into the boundary of Nottinghamshire, but it would be comfortable with its own Fire Investigators travelling over border. The result of this in part undermines regional / collaborative working practices and provides greater scope if suitably invested in and addressed.
- 10.14** In respect of 10.12 above, NFRS has worked hard to establish and promote a closer working relationship with the County Coroner and the Service would wish to expand this further and must remain integral to its approach to Fire Investigation. Due regard should be placed on the degree of influence a Coroner can exercise over individual FRS's, for example, the issuing of Rule 43 letters, designed to influence FRS activities that may result in practices that seek to prevent future fatalities.
- 10.15** NFRS's record of accomplishment is seen as very positive with the Nottinghamshire Coroner and provides an opportunity for NFRS to build on this in partnership with the Coroners office.

**10.16** Given the approach by NFRS, it is also evident that success is also achieved in relation to the successful conviction of offenders and this must be a key aim for the service to maintain and where practicable improve.

**10.17** A number of options exist for NFRS in moving the Fire Investigation remit forward, including:

- Continue to use FDS SM roles to provide cover
- Discharge the function to another FRS
- Provide a dedicated (uniformed) team within NFRS
- Provide a dedicated (non-uniformed) team within NFRS

**10.18** Clearly each of the previous options have strengths and weaknesses, however, the FCR 2010 project identifies the following option, in that NFRS should seek to form and implement a dedicated team of non-uniformed staff to provide its F.I. function. It should also seek to gain support from its regional / border FRS neighbours to act collaboratively as one team, thus maintaining good / best practice as well as a far wider consistency in approach to fire investigation generally.

**10.19** It should also be explored to incorporate the role into Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) roles and therefore Nottinghamshire Police may see this as a complimentary approach. This will clearly have legal implications in relation to statutory duties and employment.

**10.20** It is envisaged that NFRS would require four staff to provide suitable cover, given the workload that they could expect to undertake and this would further ensure sufficient out of hours cover is sustainable. This number would of course need to increase should additional FRS's decide to act in collaboration with NFRS, for example, five staff across two / three FRS's etc.

**10.21** The existing SM (FDS) who are qualified and deliver the F.I. role should continue to do so, however, this would be in a mentoring capacity while the dedicated team forms and develops, over time they would act as a secondary call facility to provide an element of resilience, the Service would not look to replace these posts.

**10.22** A dedicated team while ever reduced in number would ensure a high degree of organisational consistency, individual competence and that managerial control could be assured over a statutory function, it will also provide a vehicle to increase confidence in NFRS via the Coroners office.



- 10.23** The new team should be provided with appropriate development and could be used greatly in other tasks, for example, Void and Derelict initiatives, Fire Protection activity, staff training and development e.g. delivery of Level 1 awareness sessions, all of which have the potential for delivery across Authority boundaries.
- 10.24** Further benefit to this approach will also be the removal of the need for individuals to maintain such a wide range of operational competencies and as such would see efficiencies being released from a move to this recommended option.
- 10.25** As any team member would be required to demonstrate competence it may take approximately 18 months to have a fully functioning team in the new, identified format, however, this will depend on those recruited into the team as they may well have previous experience and suitable supporting qualifications / competencies.
- 10.26** A clear issue is the implementation process of such a move, specifically how this approach is to be funded. Given the services under spend in relation to salary and the suite of recommendations contained within the review, for example, savings made through the reduction of Area and Group Managers etc, it is seen essential to view the whole and as being well placed to achieve the team as recommended from savings across NFRS.
- 10.27** The implementation tasks should be carried out by the ATF and overseen / coordinated by an implementation manager with overview for all review findings to ensure all chosen recommendations remain holistic across NFRS and complimentary to each other. This will require the formulation of project plans and creation of Job Descriptions etc to derive true costings.

## **11 Targeted Response Vehicles (TRV's)**

- 11.1** The Targeted Response Vehicle (TRV) fulfils a distinct role, at the present time Nottinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service (NFRS) send at least one appliance, crewed by up to five whole time personnel (or six on retained duty), to incidents. These appliances carry all the equipment that is required to resolve most incidents.
- 11.2** Throughout a 24-hour period, activity at one fire station will follow a broadly similar pattern to other fire stations, NFRS use two traditional differing duty systems, Wholetime Duty System (WDS) and Retained Duty System (RDS), both systems are replicated across the Service. During the day, WDS appliances are available to attend incidents, carry out community safety, partnership work and training. This activity will reduce during the night, resources will continue to be available to attend incidents and take part in training but the amount of community safety and partnership work will reduce. RDS appliances are available to attend incidents throughout the 24 hours, the training of RDS personnel takes place on station twice a week at specific times, RDS personnel are part time workers and may hold other full time jobs.
- 11.3** A Targeted Response Vehicle (TRV) is smaller than a traditional appliance. TRV's are used across the UK for a wide variety of incidents, including rubbish fires, vehicle fires and some special services, but it is not primarily used to tackle building fires or where fire has the possibility of spreading to a building. Calls taken for the TRV are scrutinised by control staff to ensure Fire fighter and public safety is maintained. These vehicles are crewed with a 'smaller crew', one being a supervisory manager.
- 11.4** Each TRV is based at one location; however, its turnout area is substantially larger covering numerous station grounds, North and South of the County. Personnel will report for duty at one location and typically may not return to that location until the end of the shift.
- 11.5** TRV's will allow front line appliances to concentrate on core activities by being available for the more serious events and help prevent crews from suffering interruptions to their other activities.

**11.6** The TRV's will also provide the Service with a highly visible presence, for example, at community events. There is potential to support a large community safety working area, as flexible attendance times gives the vehicle flexibility to cover larger areas.

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**11.7** Many incidents can be resolved using fewer personnel, for example, a secondary fire located in a bin may only require the equivalent of a bucket of water to extinguish it. The purchase of an additional specialist appliance would address the need to use a standard appliance to resolve a small incident. It will also ensure that standard appliances remain available for incidents that require resources and personnel over and above that carried on the TRV.

**11.8** The TRV will fulfil two functions;

1. Smaller fires and incidents where our services are required account for the majority of calls attended by NFRS (see figures). Utilising a TRV will minimise the resource requirements for these lesser incidents freeing up time to carry out other duties.
2. The costs incurred through the Retained Duty System (RDS) amounts to many thousands of pounds each year, £158.00 on average for each turnout for wages alone. The TRV will reduce the number of turnouts made by RDS appliances. (See table.....showing costs for all secondary and vehicle fires attended by RDS)

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**11.9 The Appliance.**

**Visits carried out...** Staffordshire Fire and Rescue Service (SFRS)  
Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service (MFRS)  
West Midlands Fire and Rescue Service (WMFRS)

**N.B.** Key to note that these services are looking or have replaced their first generation appliances with improved version given the role and success they have delivered.

**11.10** Of the three Service's that NFRS investigated, one has a modified airport vehicle (West Midlands FRS) and the other two have Mercedes Sprinter type vehicle (Staffordshire FRS, Merseyside FRS). SFRS have based their vehicle on a four-wheel drive chassis as their vehicle is often used off road and MFRS on two-wheel drive. The size of the appliance was seen as an advantage by all Services as the

size has allowed better access to incidents and support activities due to its smaller width. It is anticipated that the smaller size will prove to be an advantage within Nottinghamshire when encountering the problems caused in built up congested areas within both the City and the County. The personnel (both crews and managers) in the Services visited were welcoming and very open about their vehicle and had positive opinions.



**11.11** The appliance was seen by drivers as being more agile and responsive in conurbation. Fully equipped TRV's cost around £125,000 and they are expected to work for at least six years. A fully equipped appliance cost is approximately £275,000 and is subject to approximately £20,000 running costs throughout its life of 12 years.

**11.12** Equipment stored throughout the vehicle is accessible either through the rear door or purpose built lockers. (see pictures)



**11.13** Both services with the Mercedes type vehicle were In agreement that the overall stowage and type of the equipment carried was good Based upon incident need and type, this being the second generation TRV so it has been tried and tested with the specification already in place. NFRS will identify the equipment to be carried by referring to current suppliers and need.



**11.14** The defined use of the appliance determines the quantity and size of equipment carried within the vehicle. (See incident type list.)

**11.15** Each appliance covers a large geographical area for example up to five station areas and can be mobilised to an incident within a 20-minute footprint. The vehicle supports community safety work throughout several station areas.

**11.16** Mobilising Criteria for these vehicles are as follows; It is vital that incident mobilisation of this vehicle is correctly established and controlled. Initial identification of the type and location of the incident has a direct bearing on the resource to be mobilised. It is imperative that any fire, which is close to a property or

has the possibility to spread beyond the point of origin, is attended by a standard appliance so as to mitigate any possibility of fire spread. If a TRV becomes available it should be redirected to the incident, this will allow the appliance at the incident to become available for other calls.

#### **11.17 Examples of usage:-**

- Secondary incidents (see below for the full list) will be attended by a TRV irrespective of there being another appliance closer.
- Special service calls. Initial research has identified lift release and effecting entry as key incidents, see below. Where appropriate, for example at repeat calls to commercial premises, consideration should be given to levy a charge from these special services.
- The TRV should be sent to all lift releases irrespective of the locality. If these incidents are repeat calls then a charge may be applied.
- 'Person locked in' calls will be dealt on a discretionary Basis, if there is any consideration of a threat to the person then the nearest appliance should be sent.

**11.18** Additionally an incident, which has occurred in a location, which requires additional control, will be attended by an appliance carrying a crew of four or more. TRV's should not be used on fast roads such as motorways and some A class roads without additional resources to ensure safe systems of work can be maintained.

<b>TRV Incidents</b>	
<b>Fires</b>	
Vehicle fires	Not HGV and not on motorway dual carriageway or major A roads.
Rubbish bin fires-domestic/public.	<5m from property and little possibility of fire spread.
Grass Fires.	Not woodland.
Rubbish/bonfires Fires.	<5m from property and little possibility of fire spread.
Pillar Box.	
Fire All Out.	
Telephone Kiosk.	
Tree Fire.	
Other small Fires	
<b>SSC.</b>	
Effecting Entry.	Chargeable SSC*
Lift Release.	Chargeable SSC*
Object on Person. (i.e. ring on finger)	
Petrol / Diesel Spillage.	Small quantities.
Water Endangering Electrics.	
Child in Car.	
Provision of Water.	
<b>Other.</b>	
Boarding Up.	
Hot Spotting after calls.	
Humanitarian Services.	
Assist Ambulance.	
Accessibility to Stores.	
Movement of Appliances.	
Transporting non-mobile equipment.	
Community Safety Events	
Personnel movement.	
Salvage services at incidents.	

**11.19 Conclusion** - Targeted Response Vehicles (TRV) are a proven positive addition to Fire Services' resources. A TRV increases the capacity larger appliances have to respond to life threatening incidents by tackling fires that traditionally have required the attendance of an appliance crewed by between four and six personnel. The introduction TRV's will reduce the number of smaller incidents attended by larger appliances, which will allow NFRS to offer an improved response.

**11.20** TRV's will also provide a reduction in mobilisation costs for RDS stations; each mobilisation attracts a payment of £158 (average) for wages alone.

**11.21** This report has shown a clear picture that the incidents attended by one appliance are a huge drain on the resources of NFRS. On average we attend 6,000 smaller fires (secondary and vehicle), we spend on average over 2,490 hours per year at secondary fires (average/year 2005-2009, 1631 hrs WDS, 859 hrs RDS).

**11.22** The TRV Base is less important than an understanding of the principles of its operation, the turnout area will cover a large geographic area that includes several stations and will be available to assist at community safety events, for example open days and fetes as well as removing the need for WDS to leave other core activities such as training.

**11.23** Predicted TRV used will be predominantly in the Ashfield, Mansfield and Worksop areas (North East of the County) and Stockhill, Arnold and Central (South East of the County) and would operate between 1100 hrs and 2300 hrs when the largest number of single appliance incidents occur.

**11.24** The workload modeller (see section 6) has shown that the worst (busiest hour) scenario over the years 2005-2009 would be that two TRV's would be available to attend 63% of the incidents during that hour, the majority of the time they would be able to attend virtually all 'TRV incidents'.

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## **12 Special Appliance Provision**

**12.1** Special appliance provision covers all those vehicles which provide a particular function to support and resolve operational incidents within NFRS and would include:-

- Breathing Apparatus Unit;
- Aerial Ladder Platform;
- Incident Support Unit;
- Foam & Water Unit;
- Environmental Protection Unit;
- Incident Response Unit;
- High Volume Pump;
- Command Support Unit;
- Dis-robe and Re-robe Units;

**12.2** This review will specifically deal, at this stage, with the key areas of its findings, namely ALP / B.A.U / HVP / IRU / EPU and CSU. Traditionally, special appliances

supplied by NFRS have been located at numerous locations and are crewed by a mix of RDS and WDS personnel.

- 12.3** Mobilisation of 'Special Appliances' has also seen the need for it to be accompanied by a front line fire appliance, that would provide the necessary crew numbers on arrival at the incident to deploy the required function(s), for example, B.A. Main Control as opposed to the need for the appliance at the incident. This has been governed by vehicle design as much as any other issue and is addressed as a longer-term conclusion resulting from this review.
- 12.4** NFRS have now taken over the National Resilience assets from the 'New Dimension' work streams, now integral to local and National Emergency Response, a clear example, being the use of HVP's at the Buncefield incident.
- 12.5** Previous appliance procurement does not appear to provide for inter-service collaboration rather it has catered for local need only. Clearly, this is an area that NFRS is able to and should address in future e.g. provision of a single Environmental Unit between a number of Services / Agencies.
- 12.6** The above point is further supported from the reduction of incidents across the UK FRS and increasing financial pressures and scrutiny that the service will face in the years ahead. These factors lead to the need to better collaborate in the delivery of functions by these appliance / vehicle types.
- 12.7** NFRS have previously reviewed and discussed the use of non-operational personnel to provide crewing to these vehicles e.g. HQ non-uniformed and while ever this Review does not discount this as one approach; it does question whether this theory can be transferred into a practicable application that would require a disproportionate level of investment to maintain longer term.
- 12.8** This review also recognises that the location of special appliances can and does have varying degrees of impact upon the crews, for example, the ongoing maintenance of the associated competencies, from the minimal e.g. ISU to the more complex HVP and IRU. This issue may prove specific in relation to our RDS sections when linking to the HSE findings going forward.

- 12.9** The previous point also relates to what the service continues to expect from its part-time employees and should further support the application for an updated TNA to this sector of NFRS's workforce. This will seek to address some of the currently received concerns raised by the HSE.
- 12.10** In relation to inter-service support, we have seen many examples where this would include special appliances, for example, Aerial Ladder Platforms being called into the County on a regular Basis, due in the main to a reduced reliability of our own ALP's. However, regardless of the cause in unavailability of NFRS's own resources it has proven to be an effective aspect of incident resolution.
- 12.11** Special appliances have also had the tendency to deliver single functions and this review finds that this approach provides operational limitations and concludes that appliances with lower levels of demand have greater scope to be multi-functional, e.g. B.A. Main Control and Command Support or EPU / B.A.U, much of these are intrinsic issues Based upon organisational need driving design.
- 12.12** This review has covered in many sections the need for wider collaboration with peers and partners, however, going forward this will also require greater attention to be paid to the IRMP's of our peers that impact upon the agreed 13 / 16 arrangements. For example, where in future IRMP's FRS's decide the future of special appliances this may well be factored into our operational response model.
- 12.13 High-Volume Pump (HVP)** - was provided to NFRS under the New Dimensions project, this has now been subject to 'Transfer of Assets' to NFRS and form part of the UK National Resilience Framework, indeed, our support of a national framework is now a tried and tested function, including, Buncefield and wide area flooding incidents.
- 12.14** The HVP is currently crewed by RDS personnel, predominantly from Newark and Ashfield Fire Stations, with the appliance and ancillary equipment being located across both locations. This has not created any identifiable issues and NFRS must be cognisant of the national planning assumptions made originally on the location of such national assets.

- 12.15** Given the predicted environmental concerns of the future, this may see the HVP deployed on a frequent and regular basis and the skills, knowledge and experience gained by the current crews will be invaluable. Additionally NFRS receive central funding to maintain competent personnel and linking this to the fact that our RDS crewed model does appear beneficial. This being Balanced against competing priorities, for example, HSE findings and core needs of NFRS.
- 12.16** This review has concluded that this model of supporting the HVP is both proportionate and reasonable, but that control of the number of individuals and sections be reinforced and kept to the minimum required to be operationally effective.
- 12.17** In addition, where possible the ancillary equipment could be better located at the Highfields site in future; given this was one of the design considerations and the likely replacement of the Newark site as part of the capital programme for the coming years.
- 12.18** The above point may well present additional logistical / maintenance issues, for example, trained staff will be further from the equipment, but this is seen as tolerable in comparison to wider concerns, such as, buildings and equipment storage.
- 12.19 Breathing Apparatus Unit (B.A.U)** - is currently located at Highfields Fire Station and is crewed by RDS employees at Highfields and Eastwood, clearly this review has identified potential changes to the response model, for example, Station 29 RDS, and where these findings are taken forward will have consequential impacts on other areas of NFRS, the B.A.U is no exception.
- 12.20** The current vehicle has been the subject of review for some years in relation to vehicle replacement, although fit for purpose will need replacement in the short term. However, given the low level of usage this has not created any significant concerns for NFRS.
- 12.21** Nationally, B.A. Main Control has been one element of general B.A. procedures to receive updates and deep review, this review sees a coincidental opportunity to address the vehicle provision, collaborative working and procedural updates at the same time.

- 12.22** In relation to equipment supplied by the B.A.U and since its introduction, NFRS have moved on in relation to its facilities, e.g. B.A. compressors. This poses the question as to what is actually needed from this single function vehicle, for example, could the B.A. Main Control function be provided by the EPU and could this also transport a bulk supply of B.A. cylinders.
- 12.23** The falling demand for incident response must be considered in this matter, in that, when looking at the attached appendices, creates a need to look at the viability / benefit of like for like provision as opposed to the amalgamation of functions on a single vehicle e.g. BAU and EPU combined.
- 12.24** Where the B.A.U is mobilised and accompanied by a fire appliance, this results in the fire cover this appliance provided now not being available and when in attendance at incident the appliance invariably is not required and becomes a mode to transport the crew only. Again, with a different vehicle design, NFRS could see special appliance functions arrive at scene with appropriate crewing and maintain the fire appliance at its base station, we already see this with the “Incident Support Unit”.
- 12.25** Subject to the implementation of the findings that affect the crews also used to provide the B.A.U, consideration should be given to the most appropriate future location relative to trained personnel, e.g. Eastwood. Ideally, NFRS would see this at the same site or next nearest, e.g. Stockhill, based upon the suggested conclusions within FCR 2010.
- 12.26 Environmental Protection Unit (EPU)** - As with the whole UK FRS, the Service is signed up to a Memorandum of Understanding (M of U) with the Environment Agency, in that, the Fire Service will respond to incidents likely to create an environmental / pollution concern. The EA continue to provide the equipment to deal with these types of incidents and NFRS provide the vehicle and personnel.

**12.27** Currently the EPU is located at Stockhill Fire Station and jointly crewed by Stockhill and Carlton crews and annual mobilisations are relatively low (see appendices).

**12.28** The Service now also equips each front-line fire appliance with the ability to deal with lower level incidents by using the “grab packs” and for the vast majority of incidents these prove sufficient in resolving the incident without requiring the EPU.

**12.29** NFRS have recently replaced the EPU vehicle, which signifies a longer-term investment in this function, but equally, provides an opportunity to enter / offer collaborative working arrangements with peer services and is reiterated throughout this whole review.

**12.30** Fire Service involvement in dealing with environmentally damaging incidents is set to increase and receive continued focus, including the effects of our own fire fighting actions, for example, “water run off”, and the legal and financial risk implications that these may present NFRS. Clearly, the Service has well developed policies and procedures in managing this specific risk and our usage of HMEPO’s and wider relationships with partner agencies.

**12.31** Given the relationship with multiple functions, this review concludes that the crewing should see a Wholetime provision maintained, however, should other findings be actioned the knock-on outcome could see the EPU move base locations, e.g. Carlton. This reflects the professional judgement of the Service and computer modelling / Risk Mapping in relation to areas of demand and how this affects the availability of fire appliances.

**12.32 Aerial Ladder Platform (ALP)** – currently NFRS support two ALP’s, it is well recognised that these vehicles can be integral to incident resolution, but that they have a limited demand, thus the low level of mobilisations that the five year data clearly shows (see appendices). The current two are allocated to Mansfield and Highfields fire stations and are subject to jump crewing arrangements e.g. the crew from the fire appliance at station move onto the ALP when called to crew it.

**12.33** A key point of discussion in relation to the ALP's is the low level of reliability and availability that they have become renowned for across NFRS. However, from the FCR 2010 point of view it has provided the perspective and support for its key finding that two is in fact an over provision based upon NFRS incident demand and the availability of these appliances within adjoining FRS's.

**12.34** Clearly, in relation to Risk profile the greater Nottingham areas presents the higher risk exposure and this review concludes that any reduced provision would be best service in this location e.g. Highfields.

**12.35** The Service should therefore enter into and formalise its section 16 arrangements for High-rise support to the North of the County, should this be the more expedient solution when required for incidents.

**12.36** Additionally, the service could look to utilise the SRT as an element of crewing for the remaining ALP, when taken in the context of the many findings from this review and the impact these have beyond the base location any decisions taken must be cognisant of these complexities.

**12.37 Incident Response Unit (IRU)** – having been provided by the IRU by the New Dimensions project, this asset has now been transferred to the FRS. NFRS has maintained the equipment at the West Bridgford Site and is supported via numerous stations across the organisation.

**12.38** This arrangement will see change, regardless of FCR 2010 findings, in that, the protocol for the number of staff required to mobilise with the appliance has been reduced. Consequently, NFRS will no longer be required to maintain the number of trained personnel to support the IRU in future and this review concludes that this should be addressed asap.

**12.39** Clearly the stations will be identified once the findings of this review are supported or amended via the Fire Authority and may further be subject to full public consultation when appropriate to do so.

**12.40** However, should the current base station be affected, specifically in terms of its location the IRU could be located to the Highfields site, again as identified as part of this particular sites design / capacity.

**12.41** Also, NFRS will need to assess the impact of moving an appliance, if supported, from the site to the North of the County as this does not automatically transpose that the crew will all follow, specifically where this affects particular skills e.g. Fork lift operators.

**12.42** Given the nature of the vehicle and equipment, this review concludes that the model of primary support being provided by the WDS should continue with secondary support from RDS personnel where necessary, again, this may serve to reduce the train implications upon crews going forward.

**12.43 Command Support Unit (CSU)** – the current provision for command support is in a state of transition both in relation to provision and vehicle, for example, NFRS are engaged in the ECSV (national) arrangements from our Mansfield station and locally with both Mansfield and Arnold. The Service still awaits the dedicated ECSV without definitive timescales for delivery, but NFRS have procured its own replacement to serve in its place and update the support we are able to offer for incident resolution.

**12.44** Until the above situation is resolved, CR 2010 concludes that arrangement should continue as is. However, findings indicate the potential to relocate our own CSU closer to the City area, for example, Arnold Fire station. Clearly, this is again linked to many other aspects in the FCR findings and will be dependant upon the Fire Authority approval to action any of the identified issues.

**12.45** The above is applicable, in that, the majority of incidents are within the Greater Nottingham area and the station already provides crewing to the CSU and would require minimal additional support to action, this also frees up the Mansfield crews, should the ECSV come on line.



## **13 Station findings**

- 13.1** The appendices to this document contain activity data and current station locations. The following section of FCR 2010 provides a narrative that supports the five-year data sample and communicates NFRS's interpretation of that data and the proposals for its future station locations and Fire Appliance provision.
- 13.2** A five-year data sample is chosen to analyse within our approach to Risk Mapping and Workload modelling systems. This is both significant and robust as a sample size that spans a sufficient timeframe to both reflect our historical performance and go some way to predicting future activity and risk.
- 13.3** The outcomes will challenge NFRS, in that they are a change from the status quo position, to which interested parties have acclimatised. The steady state is clearly valid and relevant where Risk and Demand also adheres to these conditions, or legislation and regulation adhere to the status quo, or provides NFRS sufficient exemption from general legislation e.g. Working Time Regulations.
- 13.4** As neither Risk nor Legislation has remained static, it is understood that our Response model is unable to remain static, for example, where we see increases in our response times in medium or high-risk areas, and continue to be under pressure to meet our attendance measure of 10 minutes. This review provides the Fire

Authority with clear outcomes, which either, accept increased response times, or amend the disposition of its resources to reflect the objectives, which it has set.

**13.5** FCR 2010 at the outset made some assumptions, based upon many years of fire service evolution, in that, given the disposition of its communities (population) that generally its fire stations would be found in appropriate locations. This report has concluded that this assumption is generally reflective of our County, but given the significant drop in call demand and reducing levels of risk across the City and County, the number and mix of its Response resources are not the optimum for responding to the County's current risk profile and geography.

**13.6** This report has clearly detailed the techniques used to support this review; however, given the subject, these will generate scrutiny. All communities and interested parties would prefer to see a Fire Station located nearby, or certainly for it to remain where they remember it to have been and any attempt to change this will give rise to concern in relation to public safety and ultimately loss of life.

**13.7** Key to deciding where a Fire station is located, is not just a matter of risk, but how communities perceive and understand the level of risk to which they may (or not) be exposed (e.g. Vulnerability). The Risk Mapping process should therefore be used to inform and educate internally and externally and seek to provide confidence and detailed information upon which reasoned opinion can be formed.

**13.8** FCR 2010 will clearly be seen as delivering cuts, given the current economic environment, however, the Fire Authority agreed that this would already be part of its IRMP, aimed at '**Creating Safer Communities**'. Although NFRS had intended to re-invest any identified savings through FCR into its Preventative and Protective activities, which will both deliver significant and proactive reductions in risk; they will now potentially form part of the budgetary savings.

**13.9** It should also be clear, that whether the outcomes are part of a Fire Cover Review or budgetary Cuts, the process of Risk Assessment would still be the method by which NFRS would identify those issues, for example, a station in a low risk area with two appliances would still be highlighted within its findings.

**13.10** During the past decade NFRS has developed and implemented its Sustainable Capital Building programme in relation to its Fire Stations, this will continue, but to a reviewed timetable.

- 13.11** Although FCR 2010 has used a five-year data sample, it should be encouraged to look Back beyond that period in relation to call demand, for example, ten to fifteen years, as this would show reductions from approximately 22 000 and 29 000 incidents (annually) respectively, yet our Fire Appliance fleet has remained virtually constant.
- 13.12** The allocation of Fire Appliances had been based upon models that exceed sixty years of age, having received periodic updates (e.g. standards of fire cover) and former parish Based services. NFRS are no longer formed in this way; it is a Combined Fire Authority that deals in risk, regardless of political boundary (e.g. City and County).
- 13.13** Risk can be addressed in a number of ways; NFRS like all FRS's have three main areas, Prevention, Protection and Response. The latter is used when all other measures and systems have been breached, avoided, missed or failed. NFRS's aim is to prevent an incident before the risk is realised and requires our reactive intervention to attempt to mitigate the impacts of the incident.
- 13.14** As an example, using our Workload modelling, NFRS have on average six of its units (fire appliances) active out of its thirty-six in any one hour. Clearly, NFRS will be asked, what about the large-scale incident or numbers of incidents that occur simultaneously, as an answer, in the five –year period the maximum units utilised in any one hour has not exceeded 30.
- 13.15** It should also be remembered that all FRS's operate to its 13 / 16 arrangements that include mutual assistance, should we find an extraordinary rise in demand that would require these measures to be actioned.
- 13.16** NFRS's Call Demand profile is also important to note (e.g. what we attend and when), this evidence can be seen clearly within the attached Appendices. What we do see is that we attend most of our incidents during the day, when our Communities, Roads and Businesses are most active and almost half of our incidents are of a secondary type. This is in comparison to the same resources being available regardless of demand during a 24-hour period.

**13.17** The following section is broken down by site and should be read in conjunction with the appendices for the County Overview and District specific profiles to provide the necessary context.

**13.18** The 'County Overview' within the Appendices not only represents the detailed analysis carried out by NFRS but also details the data via CLG / Fire Statistics monitor (09 / 10). The CLG report clearly shows how Nottinghamshire is improving, in terms of risk reduction and incident demand. Our County is becoming safer, the drivers and reasons for this are complex, what we do know for a fact is, and fewer incidents now require an emergency response.

**13.19** In relation to our peers, NFRS still have areas for improvement with our performance, but we are closing the gap, for example 'All fires or primary fires'. The City of Nottingham sees the highest percentage of incidents, with City stations accounting for 34% of the total.

**13.20** It would be simplistic to draw conclusions that any reduction to those appliances would be detrimental however, with thirteen appliances serving the Greater Nottingham area and falling call numbers mean we see a year on year increase in capacity.

**13.21** In 2009, NFRS attended 6315(approx 45% of total) false alarms, 6421 fires and 2463 Special Service Calls. Of our fires the majority of incidents to property are made up of 'Vehicles' and 'Structures 'Sheds/Garages' and the service attended 3878 secondary fires in comparison to 2456 primary fires.

**13.22** Clearly, from the data, false alarms continue to be a persistent drain upon our resources and FCR 2010 identifies that this area receive a dedicated, renewed focus, for example, the UwFS is a more target-hardened stance by NFRS. This approach commenced in December 2009 and its impact will be reviewed as part of NFRS data update to include 2010 information, outside of this reviews reference period.

**13.23** The demand curve and associated data also details the occurrence of fire fatalities and contrary to the widespread view that people die at night rather than day is not supported by FCR 2010. During the night period, 0000 hrs and 0700 (2005-09) NFRS saw 11 fire fatalities and 0700-2400 saw 21 fire fatalities.

**13.24** Our busiest stations Central and Stockhill see incident activity in the region of 2500 and 2000 respectfully, as a comparison this is approximately half that either station would have been attending between 5 and 10 years ago.

**13.25** As we would have assumed and expect our RDS sections are generally the quietist with some exceptions, such as, Edwinstowe in comparison to Retford. Collingham is the service's quietest station (approx 70 incidents) with almost one third of their incidents over-border (Lincolnshire).

**13.26** FCR 2010 has also made an analysis of response times, bearing in mind we as a service have a performance measure of 10 minutes, the data within 'County Overview' shows both good performance (City) and poorer performance. As the data excludes call handling, any time over 8.5 minutes would prove difficult to achieve our own target.

**13.27** If this is indeed accurate, in 2009 we saw the following with average arrival times exceeding 10 minutes, again this excludes call-handling time. The cumulative effect seeing a service return against its 90% target of 82% (2005-09).

Appliance	Time in Mins.		Appliance	Time in Mins.
T12P1	(8.83)		T12P2	(11.08)
TO1P2	(9.82)		T13P1	(12.44)
TO5P2	(8.48)		T14P2	(9.40)
TO6P1	(8.92)		T15P1	(10.83)
TO7P1	(8.74)		T16P2	(8.61)
TO8P2	(8.44)		T17P1	(10.64)
T10P1	(9.71)		T26P2	(8.56)
T11P1	(11.0)		T28P1	(9.23)
			T29P3	(11.26)

**13.28** When referring to the CLG Report (2009) on Response, our times are increasing but marginally less than that of the national picture. However, this is likely to

continue in the years to come and the review findings attempt to address this should the Fire Authority wish to maintain this as a target.

- 13.29** In developing a response model, response times need to be contextualised in relation to their interaction with risk, locality, community type etc and should not be used in isolation.
- 13.30** Two thirds of our incidents are dealt with by one appliance, and this needs to be considered in relation to average peak unit utilisation ( 6 / hour) and a general progressive fall in call demand, also relative to the services officer provision that see our SM(FDS) attending 40-60 incidents per year and our AM's approximately 1-5 per year.
- 13.31** GeognoSIS data and the response matrices also reveal some interesting issues, notably at Station 19. This station, amongst other areas serves the Rushcliffe district, which is the lowest risk area of the County. Only a minority of its calls are actually around the built up area of West Bridgford (30% over five years).
- 13.32** FCR 2010 has also provided a simple cost overview, the data includes premises, salary cost only 2009 / 10, and if the service assumes that this cost were divided by the call / mobilisations per site we have been able to rank all of our existing stations. The results of this are within the County Overview and each district data profile, but as an example, we see Central the most efficient at approximately £500 / mobilisation in comparison to Collingham at approximately £2700 / mobilisation.
- 13.33** Via the Service's finance department, we have applied a set unit cost of £158 for our RDS appliances; this has allowed FCR 2010 to compare like with like when costing activity of these stations.

### **13.34 Station 01 – Mansfield**

- 13.34.1** When referring to the FCR 2010 data (incl. Risk Mapping), Mansfield fire station is located in the middle of high and medium risk areas, indeed Mansfield is well known as being a highly deprived area 34<sup>th</sup> (of 354- IMD 2007)). It has five out of the top 50 SOA's that are identified as high risk in both City and County. This level of risk is predominantly the product of the number of Dwelling fires, Injuries in Premises and levels of deprivation.

- 13.34.2** The station currently houses 1 WDS Appliance, 1 RDS Appliance, 1 ALP and provision for the CSU / ECSV. Appliances at Ashfield, Warsop and Blidworth also support the area.
- 13.34.3** The station has seen a steady reduction of incident mobilisations from 2005 (1948) to 2009 (1561) for both the WDS and RDS appliances combined, that reflects the area of Mansfield in relation to the risk mapping.
- 13.34.4** As is the general theme 'Mobilisation to in Attendance' times have increased TO1P1 in 2005 (6.54 minutes) and 2009 (7.42 minutes) and TO1P2 in 2005 (8.40 minutes) and 2009 (9.82 minutes), excluding call handling time and for the purpose of FCR 2010 a standard time of ninety-seconds is applied. Against the Service's attendance of 90% in 10 minutes sees a return of 84% for TO1P1 (6% shortfall) and 50% for TO1P2 (40% shortfall) when looking at first in attendance data.
- 13.34.5** Mansfield RDS (2009) maintained a lower level of availability with approximately ninety days 'Off the Run' (OTR). This despite having a relatively good catchment area e.g. number of population in close proximity to the station. Clearly, at nearly one third of the year unavailable and given the risk profile this issue needs to be addressed to ensure NFRS receive the service it requires and makes provision.
- 13.34.6** As a cost model, taking the expense of having the current provision (e.g. staff costs and site running costs) divided by the number of mobilisations sees a return of approximately £1000 per mobilisation, making it as the 12<sup>th</sup> least expensive; clearly, these are not reflective of all activities.
- 13.34.7** As the travel isochrones detail within the district appendices, when mobilised from the station the WDS appliance reaches well into the Ashfield area to the west and edge of the Warsop area with a 10-minute travel time.
- 13.34.8** The WDS personnel now also provide support for National Resilience assets e.g. ECSV. The station currently also provides NFRS's

own CSU and one of the ALP's within the fleet; the latter issue of special appliance provision is dealt with in more detail within both the report text and supporting appendices.

**13.34.9** Given the data on which NFRS have Based the findings, these confirm that the provision of one WDS and one RDS to be appropriate for the duration of the predicted implementation period. However, the availability of the RDS appliance needs to be addressed by the Group Management and RDS support role, in coordination with the implementation and change team.

**13.34.10** It is also identified that the ALP at station Mansfield is an over provision and this is dealt with in more detail separately by FCR 2010.

### **13.35 Station 02 – Blidworth**

**13.35.1** When referring to the FCR 2010 data (incl. Risk Mapping), Blidworth Fire station is located in a low risk area, however, it is in the middle of a wider medium risk area, both Mansfield 34<sup>th</sup> (of 354 – IMD 2007) and Newark and Sherwood 163<sup>rd</sup> (of 354 – IMD 2007). The medium risk can be attributed to the level of Special Service calls and Deprivation that these areas of the County reflect. In relative terms, the area does not see excessive levels of fire, either 'Domestic' or 'Other Building' fires that result in injuries or fatalities.

**13.35.2** Its location in relation to Ashfield and Mansfield provide an appropriate and proportionate response support function as well as cover across the centre of the County towards Southwell.

**13.35.3** In terms of mobilisations, 2005 to 2009 the station saw a progressive reduction (377 to 273), however, a concern to the service may be the increase in 'Mobilisation to in attendance' times (excl. call handling) which see an increase from 9.25 minutes (2005) to 10.65 (2009), which only sees a return against the NFRS measure of 53% (37% shortfall). As



with all others, this excludes 'call handling times' and for the purpose of FCR 2010 a standard time of ninety seconds is applied.

**13.35.4** The section also maintains a good level of availability, with approximately seven days 'Off the run' (OTR), however, this needs to be kept under close supervision when taken alongside the lower percentage for attendance measure.

**13.35.5** As a cost model, taking the expense of having the current provision (e.g. staff costs and site running costs) divided by the number of mobilisations sees a return of approximately £700 per mobilisation; clearly, these are not reflective of all activities and in comparison to other stations place it as second least expensive.

**13.35.6** FCR 2010 conclude that this station should continue as is from this review in relation to Fire Cover, however, FCR 2010 does also question the viability of them being expected or able to maintain support for the IRU and HVP and advises that this be addressed. Specifically in relation to the Health and Safety section of this report, dual contract and WTR related issues. This will be coordinated via the implementation and change team.

### **13.36 Station 05 – Ashfield**

**13.36.1** When referring to the FCR 2010 data (incl. Risk Mapping), Ashfield is situated in an area of predominantly medium risk but also includes some high-risk areas. Ashfield is comparable with the Mansfield area; unsurprisingly given they are adjacent to one another. It also finds it with high levels of deprivation 84<sup>th</sup> (of 354 – IMD 2007) which places it third most deprived when looking at both the City and County. The level of risk assessed over the five-year period can be attributed to the number of dwelling fires, injuries and deprivation.

**13.36.2** Ashfield Fire Station currently houses one WDS appliance, one RDS appliance and a high volume pump as part of the National Resilience

assets. The area is also adjacent to appliances at Mansfield, Hucknall, Blidworth and Alfreton (Derbyshire).

**13.36.3** The station has seen a reasonable and steady reduction of incidents mobilisations from 2341 (2005) to 2009 (1806) for both the WDS and RDS appliance combined.

**13.36.4** As is the general theme 'Mobilisation to in Attendance' times have increased for both appliances, for example TO5P1 in 2005 (6.54 minutes) to 2009 (6.95 minutes) but this is not considered significant to NFRS and excludes call handling time. This sees a return against NFRS's attendance measure of 81% over the five-year reference period. TO5P2 in 2005 (6.94 minutes) to 2009 (8.48 minutes) this sees a return against NFRS's attendance measure of 68% (28% shortfall). As with all others, this excludes 'call handling times' and for the purpose of FCR 2010 a standard time of ninety seconds is applied.

**13.36.5** The RDS appliance shows (2009) reasonable levels of availability with only 14 days (approx) in total Off the Run (OTR). A concern to be investigated further is the above in attendance time despite good availability and should be dealt with by Group Manager or coordinated by the implementation team.

**13.36.6** As a cost model, taking the expense of having the current provision (e.g. staff costs and site running costs) divided by the number of mobilisations sees a return of approximately £1500 per mobilisation, clearly, these are not reflective of all activities and in comparison to other stations place it as fourteenth most expensive.

**13.36.7** Given the data contained within this review and the level of risk, FCR 2010 confirm that the station should see no change to staffing arrangements during the period of proposed implementation (e.g. 4-5 years) resulting from this review.

### **13.37 Station 06 – Edwinstowe**

**13.37.1** When referring to the FCR 2010 data (incl. Risk Mapping), Edwinstowe is situated within a low risk area, however, the surrounding areas are medium risk. Newark and Sherwood district is ranked at 163 (of

354 –IMD 2007) authorities nationally in terms of deprivation, which places it as the fourth most deprived in comparison to the City and County in total. The levels of medium risk for the immediate area are predominantly as the result of a combination of Special Service Calls and elements of Deprivation. The only high risk within the entire district is found within Newark itself.

**13.37.2** The station has seen an increase in incidents during the data reference period (2005-2009), these are made up of SSC's and secondary type incidents, which reflects the level of incident type across NFRS but not the trend direction (e.g. increase).

**13.37.3** The station is adjacent to stations at Blidworth, Warsop, Worksop, Retford, Mansfield and Tuxford, with Service Development Centre in close proximity. It currently houses 1 RDS appliance and office accommodation for CFS teams.

**13.37.4** Edwinstowe sees its 'Mobilisation to in Attendance' times as having been relatively constant during the reference period, understandable given the type of roads from which the area benefits. Against the NFRS Attendance measure sees a return however of only 57% (33% shortfall) from 90% of all incidents within the 10 minutes measure. As with all others, this excludes 'call handling times' and for the purpose of FCR 2010 a standard time of 90 seconds is applied.

**13.37.5** The appliance maintains a fair level of availability (2009) with approximately twenty-five days 'Off the Run' (OTR), however, this creates NFRS increasing concern across this area of the County given the widespread nature of communities and rise in incidents. This (at time of report) is being mitigated via the Group Management team.

**13.37.6** As a cost model, taking the expense of having the current provision (e.g. staff costs and site running costs) divided by the number of mobilisations sees a return of approximately £750 per mobilisation, clearly, these are not reflective of all activities and in comparison to other stations place it as fifth least expensive.

**13.37.7** Given the data (incl. Risk Mapping) FCR 2010 has not only looked at this station's resources but also the station adjacent to it. When looking at the County area from Mansfield across, to include Tuxford, this review identifies that the replacement of the two part time appliances of Edwinstowe and Warsop with a single full time appliance towards the Ollerton area would improve the service delivery model.

### **13.38 Station 07 – Warsop**

**13.38.1** When referring to the FCR 2010 data (incl. Risk Mapping), Warsop is situated in predominantly medium to low risk areas, contrasting to the Mansfield built area but reflective of the more rural areas of the total district. This level of medium risk can be attributed to the recorded levels of deprivation (IMD 2007) and to some degree the Special Service Calls to occur (RTC's) within this part of the district.

**13.38.2** Warsop currently houses one RDS appliance and is adjacent to Mansfield, Edwinstowe, Worksop and Shirebrook fire stations.

**13.38.3** The station has seen a marginal increase in mobilisations from 2005 (294) 2009 (852), this centres on the lower level, secondary type incidents.

**13.38.4** As with the general theme 'Mobilisation to in Attendance' times have increased only marginally from 2005 (8.48 minutes) to 2009 (8.74 minutes). This sees a return against the NFRS attendance measure of only 62% (28% shortfall). As with all others, this excludes 'Call handling

times' and for the purpose of FCR 2010 a standard time of 90 seconds is applied.

**13.38.5** The appliance (2009) maintains a good level of availability with approximately three day OTR only. As a cost model, taking the expense of having the current provision (e.g. staff costs and site running costs) divided by the number of mobilisations sees a return of approximately £700 per mobilisation. Clearly, these are not reflective of all activities and in comparison to other stations place it as fourth least expensive.

**13.38.6** Given the data (incl. Risk Mapping) FCR 2010 has looked not only at the station itself but also at the stations around it. When looking at the County area from Mansfield across to Tuxford this review identifies that the replacement of the two RDS appliances at Warsop and Edwinstowe with a single WDS appliance towards the Ollerton area, would improve the service delivery model.

### **13.39 Station 08 – Worksop**

**13.39.1** When referring to the FCR 2010 data (incl. Risk Mapping), Worksop is situated in predominantly medium and high-risk areas, indeed, it sees three out of the top fifty SOA's (10<sup>th</sup>, 33<sup>rd</sup> and 34<sup>th</sup>) within Worksop itself. This level of medium to high risk can be attributed to a combination of Dwelling Fires, Injuries in Premises, Special Service Calls involving life risk and Deprivation, accounting for four out of the six elements used to produce the risk maps.

**13.39.2** Worksop station currently houses one WDS appliance, 1 RDS appliance and in the short term the Service's Northern SRT contingent. The station is also adjacent to Harworth, Retford, Warsop, Edwinstowe and Clowne (Derbyshire).

**13.39.3** The station has seen only a marginal reduction in incidents attended from 2005 (1342) to 2009 (1265) which shows its relative and expected performance given the above risk factors for the Worksop immediate area.

- 13.39.4** As with the general theme 'Mobilisation to in Attendance', times have increased from 2005 TO8P1 (5.97 minutes), T08P2 (7.90 minutes) to 2009 TO8P1 (7.00 minutes), and TO8P2 (8.41 minutes). This sees a return for 2009 against the NFRS attendance measure of 84% for TO8P1 (6% shortfall) and 64% for TO8P2 (24% shortfall). As with all others, this excludes 'call handling times' and for the purpose of FCR 2010 a standard time of 90 seconds is applied.
- 13.39.5** The degree of combined shortfall provides support for the FCR 2010 findings, specifically considering the type of risk area in question and the lower levels of resource that Worksop experiences in comparison to lower risk areas, for example, 'Rushcliffe'.
- 13.39.6** The attached RDS appliance for 2009 had a fair level of availability with approximately thirty-two days 'Off the Run' however, given the risk area and likely times of unavailability e.g. during peaks in the demand curve, this requires NFRS to address this issue corporately and is therefore supported by this reviews findings.
- 13.39.7** As a cost model, taking the expense of having the current provision (e.g. staff costs and site running costs) divided by the number of mobilisations sees a return of approximately £1100 per mobilisation, clearly, these are not reflective of all activities and in comparison to other stations place it as sixteenth most expensive.
- 13.39.8** Given the data (incl. Risk Mapping) FCR 2010 identifies the need for a more equitable allocation of resources to better support the risk profile of the Worksop area, in that, personnel from a lower risk area be transferred to the Worksop site during periods of highest demand, predominantly from the early afternoon to late evening e.g. 1400-2200 hours.
- 13.39.9** This effectively provides increased capacity to proactively address risk through the Service's preventative initiatives via Fire Crews and will address both appliance availability and the Service's attendance target.

#### **13.40 Station 10 – Harworth**

- 13.40.1** When referring to the FCR 2010 data (incl. Risk Mapping), Harworth is situated in entirely medium risk SOA's. This level of medium risk can be attributed to a combination of Special Service Calls, Deprivation and Dwelling fires accounting for three out of six elements used to generate the risk mapping.
- 13.40.2** Harworth station currently house one RDS appliance, it is adjacent to fire stations at Misterton, Worksop, Retford, Maltby and Rossington (South Yorkshire). Of note in relation to Harworth, we see this becoming an increasingly 'Dormitory style' area that services the South Yorkshire areas of Sheffield, Rotherham and Doncaster and is attracting a reasonable level of development.
- 13.40.3** Also given the dialogue with South Yorkshire and their own financial pressure, we may well via reviewed 13/16 arrangements see increased demand on the Harworth appliance and this forms part of NFRS findings to fully review and vary its current 13 / 16 agreement.
- 13.40.4** As with the general theme 'Mobilisation to in Attendance' times have increased from 2005 (8.64 minutes) to 2009 (9.71 minutes). This sees a return for 2009 against the NFRS attendance measure of only 68% (22% shortfall). As with all other appliances, this excludes 'call handling times' and for the purpose of FCR 2010 a standard time of ninety seconds is applied. Given the level of incidents and risk area, this is currently tolerable but the FCR 2010 recommendations may go some way to assist an improvement in these figures (e.g. RDS support pool).
- 13.40.5** The Harworth RDS for 2009 maintained excellent levels of availability with approximately one day 'Off the Run' only and this is consistent with year on year performance. It would be worth NFRS investigating what enables this to be achieved consistently and use this to assist those sections with a lesser level of performance.
- 13.40.6** As a cost model, taking the expense of having the current provision (e.g. staff costs and site running costs) divided by the number of mobilisations sees a return of approximately £815 per mobilisation,

clearly, these are not reflective of all activities and in comparison to other stations place it as ninth least expensive.

**13.40.7** With the exception of the above issues, FCR 2010, conclude that Harworth should continue as is, for the present time.

#### **13.41 Station 11 – Misterton**

**13.41.1** When referring to the FCR 2010 data (incl. Risk Mapping) Misterton is situated in a low risk area, but does see some minor impact from Deprivation.

**13.41.2** The station currently houses one RDS appliance, it is adjacent to fire stations at Harworth, Retford, Gainsborough (Lincolnshire) and Epworth (Humberside) and the area is seeing some levels of development.

**13.41.3** Given the dialogue with Lincolnshire and their own financial pressures, we may well via a reviewed 13 / 16 agreement see increased demand or collaborative working in future years in this part of the County and this will be clarified in the coming months and beyond.

**13.41.4** Misterton RDS for 2009 maintained a reasonable level of availability, with approximately twelve days 'Off the Run' (OTR) however, given the low levels of risk and call demand this does not present



significant concern in itself, but will still be analysed further to see how this can be reduced or mitigated (e.g. RDS support pool) as appropriate.

**13.41.5** As a cost model, taking the expense of having the current provision (e.g. staff costs and site running costs) divided by the number of mobilisations sees a return of approximately £1260 per mobilisation, clearly, these are not reflective of all activities and in comparison to other stations place it as eighteenth most expensive.

**13.41.6** As with the general theme 'Mobilisation to in Attendance' times have increased from 2005 (10.09 minutes) to 2009 (11.65 minutes). This sees a return of only 49% (41% shortfall). As with all other appliances, this excludes 'Call handling times' and for the purpose of FCR 2010 a standard time of ninety seconds is applied. This area is to receive further analysis in relation to incident time and location to ascertain a clearer understanding for the lower levels of performance and how this is to be improved.

**13.41.7** With the exception of the support conclusions for activity within this section, FCR 2010 concludes that Misterton should continue as is, for the present time.

## **13.42 Station 12 – Retford**

**13.42.1** When referring to the FCR 2010 data (incl. Risk Mapping) Retford Fire station is situated in a predominantly low risk area with medium risk as you travel further out from the station. This level of risk being attributed to Special Service Calls, Dwelling fires and some elements of Deprivation with Bassetlaw as 34th (of 354 -IMD 2007) nationally.

**13.42.2** Retford station currently houses one WDS and one RDS appliance and is adjacent to fire stations at Worksop, Harworth, Misterton, Tuxford and Edwinstowe.

**13.42.3** The station has seen a marginal reduction in mobilisations from 2005 (791) to 2009 (754) with both the WDS and RDS combined, bearing in mind some mobilisations are to the same incident and therefore does

not correlate that Retford had 754 incidents (2009) e.g. Retford actually had 395 incidents.

**13.42.4** Given the low level of incident demand, this appears reflective of the low to medium risk area to which Retford serves.

**13.42.5** As with the general theme 'Mobilisation to in Attendance', times have increased from 2005 T12P1 (7.88 minutes), T12P2 (9.08 minutes) to 2009 T12P1 (8.83 minutes), and T12P2 (11.08 minutes). This sees a return for NFRS against the attendance measure for 2009 of (69% T12P1 and 55% - T12P2) giving shortfalls of 21% and 35% respectively. As with all other appliances, this excludes 'Call Handling Times' and for the purpose of FCR 2010 a standard time of ninety seconds is applied.

**13.42.6** The RDS appliance for 2009 maintained excellent levels of availability with less than one day 'off the run' and this is consistent with year on year performance. It would be worth NFRS investigating what enables this to be achieved consistently and use this to assist those sections with a lesser level of performance.

**13.42.7** As a cost model, taking the expense of having the current provision (e.g. staff costs and site running costs) divided by the number of mobilisations sees a return of approximately £1953 per mobilisation, clearly, these are not reflective of all activities and in comparison to other stations place it as twenty-third most expensive.

**13.42.8** Given the data from FCR 2010 (incl. Risk Mapping), this review concludes that Retford could become a day duty Based station (7 days / week) and look to maintain the two appliances as RDS through the right time periods. This will see the capacity released and diverted to other sites, in particular, Worksop, which show both significantly higher levels of risk and activity.

**13.42.9** Given the conclusions above, this will have impacts on the RDS section and the Group Management, RDS support officer and Implementations team should look to identify and agree what these impacts are and how they may be addressed, for example, the need to

have a larger section, additional supervisory managers or support from the RDS support pool if established.

### **13.43 Station 13 – Tuxford**

**13.43.1** When referring to the FCR 2010 data (including risk mapping) Tuxford Fire Station is situated in a medium risk area, including the adjoining Newark and Sherwood district. This level of risk Based upon the five-year data can be attributed to Special Service Calls mainly with some elements of dwelling fires and injuries occurring in premises in the immediate Tuxford area.

**13.43.2** Tuxford currently houses one RDS appliance but on completion of the refurbishment will see the arrival of the Service's SRT on site and is adjacent to stations at Edwinstowe, Retford and Newark.

**13.43.3** The station has seen a marginal reduction in mobilisations from 2005 (270) to 2009 (223) and incident demand for the station of 137 down to 111 in 2009.

**13.43.4** As with the general theme 'Mobilisation to in Attendance' times have increased from 2005 (11.17 minutes) to 2009 (12.44 minutes). This sees a return of first attendance for 2009 of 41% (49% shortfall) against the NFRS attendance measure. As with all other appliances, this excludes 'Call handling times' and for the purpose of FCR 2010 a standard time of ninety seconds is applied.

**13.43.5** Tuxford RDS for 2009 maintained reasonable level of availability that resulted in approximately twenty days 'Off the Run' (OTR), however, this creates NFRS increasing concern across the whole County given the widespread nature of the communities served by this station and the likely coincidence with peaks in incident demand.

**13.43.6** As a cost model, taking the expense of having the current provision (e.g. staff costs and site running costs) divided by the number of mobilisations sees a return of approximately £850 per mobilisation, clearly, these are not reflective of all activities and in comparison to other stations place it as eleventh least expensive.

**13.43.7** Given the data from FCR 2010 and taking a holistic view of this section of our County from Tuxford to Mansfield, it is identified that Tuxford continues, as is, where a WDS appliance is made available towards the Ollerton area.

**13.43.8** FCR 2010 further finds that in conjunction with the Group Management and RDS support officer, both availability and response times are analysed further and addressed for example, access to RDS support pool, if established.

#### **13.44 Station 14 – Southwell**

**13.44.1** When referring to the FCR 2010 data (incl. Risk Mapping) Southwell Fire Station is situated in a predominantly low risk area with medium risk, mainly to the northern side. This level of risk can be attributed Based upon the five year data sample and can be attributed to Special Service Calls and to some degree dwelling fires, however, the

latter has seen zero fire deaths and low numbers of injuries occurring in premises.

- 13.44.2** Southwell currently houses one RDS appliance and is adjacent to fire stations at Newark and Blidworth.
- 13.44.3** The station has actually seen a marked increase in mobilisation from 2005 (101) to 2009 (203).
- 13.44.4** As with general the theme 'Mobilisation to in Attendance' times have increased from 2005 (8.56 minutes) to 2009 (9.40 minutes). This sees a return for 2009 against the NFRS attendance measure of only 58% (32% shortfall). As with all NFRS appliances, this excludes 'Call handling times' and for the purpose of FCR 2010 a standard time of ninety seconds is applied.
- 13.44.5** Southwell RDS for 2009 maintained a good level of availability with approximately four days 'Off the Run' (OTR). This level of appliance availability is encouraging given the number of adjacent RDS sites and the stations support and proximity to the Newark area.
- 13.44.6** As a cost model, taking the expense of having the current provision (e.g. staff costs and site running costs) divided by the number of mobilisations sees a return of approximately £805 per mobilisation, clearly, these are not reflective of all activities and in comparison to other stations place it as eighth least expensive.
- 13.44.7** Given the data within this review and risk profile for the area in which Southwell support, this report concludes that the station should remain with its RDS provision, during the period suggested within FCR 2010.
- 13.44.8** Regardless of the status quo for Southwell, two issues require attention to ensure they are maintained as a minimum and preferably improved e.g. Availability and Response times. This should see the Group Management, RDS Support Officer and FCR implementation team working together to analyse root causes to availability and attendance times.

## **13.45 Station 15 – Collingham**

- 13.45.1** When referring to the FCR 2010 data (incl. Risk Mapping) Collingham Fire Station is situated in low risk areas, of the six elements which produce the risk mapping, Based upon a five year data period, the review sees some minimal deprivation impact and low levels of Special Service Calls.
- 13.45.2** Collingham currently houses one RDS appliance and is adjacent to fire stations at Newark and North Hykeham (Lincolnshire).
- 13.45.3** Over the reviews reference period Collingham has seen a progressive reduction in incident mobilisations from 2005 (105) to 2009 (84) which correlates to thirty-six incidents (2005) and twenty-five incidents are either to the Newark area or over border into Lincolnshire.
- 13.45.4** As with the general theme 'Mobilisation to in Attendance' times have increased from 2005 (9.32 minutes) to 2009 (10.83 minutes) against the NFRS attendance measure. This sees a return for 2009 of only 52% (38% shortfall), as with all NFRS appliances, this excludes 'Call Handling times' and for the purpose of FCR 2010 a standard time of ninety seconds is applied.
- 13.45.5** Collingham RDS for 2009 maintained a reasonable level of availability with approximately fifteen days 'off the run'.
- 13.45.6** As a cost model, taking the expense of having the current provision (e.g. staff costs and site running costs) divided by the number of mobilisations sees a return of approximately £2500 per mobilisation; clearly, these are not reflective of all activities and in comparison to other stations place it as the most expensive.
- 13.45.7** Given the data within this review, specifically in relation to Risk and Call demand placed upon the station, FCR 2010 concludes that the

provision of a Fire station in Collingham exceeds the requirements of the Service and its level of risk can be proportionately covered from adjacent stations.

### **13.46 Station 16 – Newark**

**13.46.1** When referring to the FCR 2010 data (incl. Risk Mapping) Newark Fire Station is situated in an area of mixed risk, predominantly low to medium, however, it does also have areas of high risk around the town's built area. This level of risk can be attributed to the level of dwelling fires, injuries occurring in premises, special service calls and applicable levels of deprivation, nationally the Newark and Sherwood district has been ranked as 163 (of 354 - IMD 2007).

**13.46.2** Newark currently houses one WDS, one RDS appliance and until completion of the Tuxford refurbishment a contingent of the services SRT. The site is also used for the storage and deployment of National Resilience assets, including HVP, Dis-robe and re-robe. Newark is also adjacent to fire stations at Southwell, Collingham, Bingham, North Hykeham and Brant Broughton (Lincolnshire).

**13.46.3** Newark as a station has seen some fluctuation over the five year reference period in mobilisations from 2005 (909) to 2009 (885) but this is clearly minimal in terms of reductions.

**13.46.4** In relation to 'Mobilisation to in Attendance' times, the WDS has seen a minor increase from 2005 (7.06 minutes) to 2009 (7.30 minutes) but the RDS appliance has seen a minor decrease from 2005 (8.72 minutes) to 2009 (8.61 minutes). This is not consistent with trends across the Service generally and should be analysed further in relation also to consistent levels of mobilisations. As with all other appliances, this excludes 'Call Handling time' and for the purpose of FCR 2010, a standard time of ninety seconds is applied.

**13.46.5** Newark RDS (2009) maintained an excellent level of availability, with less than one day 'off the run' (OTR) and is consistent with year on year performance. It would be worthy for NFRS to analyse what enables this to be achieved considerably and use this to assist those sections with a lesser level of performance (see RDS review).

**13.46.6** As a cost model, taking the expense of having the current provision (e.g. staff costs and site running costs) divided by the number of mobilisations sees a return of approximately £1500 per mobilisation, clearly, these are not reflective of all activities and in comparison to other stations place it as twenty-second most expensive.

**13.46.7** Given the data within this review and the risk profile within which the station operates and serves, this report concludes that the station should continue as is in relation to crewing arrangements for the current period. However, the review does identify that the site should look to be relocated to a more easterly position e.g. towards the A1 side of the town centre. This reflects the fact that the current site is in need of significant re-build / refurbishment and provides an opportunity to provide a more appropriate provision in terms of site and location.

### **13.47 Station 17 – Bingham**

**13.47.1** When referring to the FCR 2010 data (including risk mapping), Bingham Fire station is situated in an area of predominantly low risk. This level of risk can be attributed to Special Service calls and minor elements of deliberate non-domestic fires and deprivation in Bingham only, nationally the Rushcliffe district has been ranked as 331 (of 354 – IMD 2007) placing it in the top few percent of least deprived areas.

**13.47.2** Bingham currently houses one RDS appliance and is adjacent to stations at Newark and West Bridgford.

**13.47.3** Bingham has seen a steady reduction in incident mobilisations over the five year reference period from 2005 (228) to 2009 (125), which can be predominantly explained below when addressing the stations availability.

**13.47.4** As with the general theme of ‘Mobilisation in Attendance’ times have increased from 2005 (9.39 minutes) to 2009 (10.64 minutes). This sees a return against NFRS’s attendance measure of only 42% (48%



shortfall), as with all appliances this excludes 'Call Handling time' and for the purpose of FCR 2010 a standard time of ninety seconds is applied.

**13.47.5** Bingham RDS (2009) maintained a low level of availability with approximately one hundred and thirty six days 'Off the Run' (OTR). This has been a persistent issue experienced at the Bingham site, with a number of factors in recent years contributing, for example, a low establishment and difficulty in providing supervisory management.

**13.47.6** The Service has attempted to address this and has resulted in a better establishment, supervisory management saw the Service finance the re-location and use of a WDS Supervisory Manager under dual contract terms but this employee is no longer fulfilling this role. The result for NFRS being that the appliance is unavailable during the daytime hours (weekdays).

**13.47.7** As a cost model, taking the expense of housing the current provision (e.g. staffing and site running costs (2009)), divided by the number of mobilisations, sees a return of approximately £1314 per mobilisation. Clearly, these are not reflective of all activities and in comparison to other stations, places it a nineteenth most expensive.

**13.47.8** The Bingham area is planned to see further development over the coming years, including housing and road infrastructure. This clearly means that NFRS will retain a response provision in Bingham, given its geographic location to other sites and County itself.

**13.47.9** Given the data within this review and the risk profile the station operates and serves, this report concludes that the station should continue as an RDS site fundamentally, however given the low levels of availability, the review proposes the establishment of an RDS support function, which should be used to enhance the section. This would predominantly see it supported during weekdays that coincides with the demand curve. It should also be in conjunction with the sections identification of its future supervisory managers as a matter of urgency.

## **13.48 Station 18 – Central**

- 13.48.1** When referring to the FCR 2010 data (including risk mapping), Central Fire station is situated in an area dominated by medium and high risk SOA's. This level of risk can be attributed to dwelling fires, injuries occurring in premises, fire deaths, deliberate non-domestic fires and levels of deprivation within the City. Nationally Nottingham City has been ranked as 13<sup>th</sup> (of 354 – IMD 2007) placing it in the top five percent of most deprived areas. Applying the risk mapping therefore shows forty-six out of the top fifty SOA's as high risk located in the City boundary.
- 13.48.2** Central currently houses two WDS appliances and is adjacent to stations at Highfields, West Bridgford, Stockhill, Arnold and Carlton.
- 13.48.3** Central has seen a steady and continued reduction of incidents from 2005 (2739) to 2009 (2511) for both appliances combined. A point to note that 2009 saw an increase, this is attributed to the closure of Dunkirk Fire station. Also as previously detailed within this review, looking over a ten to fifteen year period, the reductions can be seen as more significant.
- 13.48.4** Contrary to the general theme of 'Mobilisation to in Attendance' times, Central has seen its times remain reasonably static from 2005 (5.06 minutes for T18P1 and 4.65 minutes for T18P2) to 2009 (4.90 minutes T18P1 and 4.65 minutes T18P2), which is encouraging and understandable given the general proximity of incidents to station and reduction in call numbers. This gives a return against NFRS's attendance measure of (94% and 91%) for the stations two appliances, this excludes 'Call Handling times' and for the purpose of FCR 2010 a standard time of ninety seconds is applied.
- 13.48.5** As a cost model, taking the expense of housing the current provision e.g. staffing and site running costs (2009) divided by the number of mobilisations sees a return of approximately £500 per mobilisation; clearly, these are not reflective of all activities and in comparison to other stations, which sees it as the least expensive.

**13.48.6** The City area has seen extensive redevelopment over the past decade but will remain as a key priority in relation to levels of risk, activity and vulnerability in relation to communities and individuals. Given the data within this review and supporting reviews previously, it is identified that the station should be relocated to a more southerly location, for example, London Road area towards Trent Bridge when taken in context with other elements within this review. In addition, worthy of note is the condition and ownership of the current site, resulting in both an opportunity to address risk and provide a cost effective station at an alternate location.

#### **13.49 Station 19 – West Bridgford**

**13.49.1** When referring to the FCR 2010 (including risk mapping) West Bridgford Fire station is situated in an area dominated by low risk SOA's, with some medium risk SOA's further into the Rushcliffe district. This risk can be attributed to lower levels of dwelling fires and special service calls. Nationally the risk district is in the top few percent of those least deprived areas, 13<sup>th</sup> (of 354 – IMD 2007).

**13.49.2** West Bridgford currently houses two WDS appliances and is adjacent to stations at Highfields, Bingham, East Leake and Central. The station also provides a house for National Resilience assets (IRU).

**13.49.3** West Bridgford saw a steady decrease of incidents from 2005 (830) to 2008 (663) respectively. However, with the closure of Dunkirk came an increase, 2009 seeing (927) incidents, into areas such as Clifton, Lenton and further in the Meadows area.

**13.49.4** As with the general theme of 'Mobilisation to in Attendance' times have increased marginally from 2005 (7.21 minutes T10P1 and 7.16 minutes T19P2) to 2009 (7.46 minutes T10P1 and 7.44 minutes T19P2). This sees a return against NFRS's attendance measure of 71% (19% shortfall T19P1) and 72% (18% shortfall T19P2), as with all other

appliances, this excludes 'Call Handling times' and for the purpose of FCR 2010 a standard time of ninety seconds is applied.

**13.49.5** As a cost model, taking the expense of housing the current provision e.g. staffing and site running costs (2009) divided by the number of mobilisations sees a return of approximately £1200 per mobilisation, clearly these are not reflective of all activities and in comparison to other stations which sees it as the tenth most expensive.

**13.49.6** West Bridgford will see minor development in future years; however, the type of development is unlikely to increase upon the existing low levels of risk. The remainder of the total Rushcliffe district is likely and planned to see far more extensive development, including housing and infrastructure.

**13.49.7** This development will require NFRS to take a longer-term view of its resource disposition to ensure it is best placed to provide an appropriate and proportionate response model. As such, when taken in context of the other conclusions within FCR 2010, it is identified that:-

- There is an over provision of one appliance in relation to risk and demand; and
- That the site is not ideally located for the needs of the longer-term.

### **13.50 Station 20 – Stockhill**

**13.50.1** When referring to the FCR 2010 data (incl. Risk Mapping), Stockhill Fire Station is situated in an area dominated by high and medium risk SOA's. This level of risk can be attributed to dwelling fires, injuries occurring in premises, special service calls and levels of deprivation. Nationally, as part of the City, sees it ranked as the 13<sup>th</sup> (of 354 – IMD 2007) most deprived areas. Applying the risk mapping to the City as a whole sees forty-six of the top fifty SOA's of high risk contained within it, many of which are served by Stockhill.

**13.50.2** Stockhill currently houses two WDS appliances, the EPU and is adjacent to stations at Central, Arnold, Hucknall and Eastwood.

- 13.50.3** Stockhill has seen a good level reduction of incidents from 2005 (2586) to 2009 (1795) for both station appliances combined.
- 13.50.4** As with the general theme of 'Mobilisation to in Attendance' times has seen a marginal increase for Stockhill from 2005 (5.55 minutes T20P1 and 5.81 minutes T20P2) to 2009 (5.80 minutes T20P1 and 6.31 minutes T20P2). This gives a return against NFRS's attendance measure (2009) of 92% and 89% respectively for both station appliances. As with all other appliances, this excludes 'Call Handling time' and for the purpose of FCR 2010 a standard time of ninety seconds is applied.
- 13.50.5** As a cost model, taking the expense of housing the current provision e.g. staffing and site running costs (2009) divided by the number of mobilisations sees a return of approximately £660 per mobilisation, clearly these are not reflective of all activities and in comparison to other stations which sees it as the third least expensive.
- 13.50.6** The area in which Stockhill operates, both City and County is likely to see continued and extensive development in coming years from housing to infrastructure. Given the level of risk that exists currently, this could prove beneficial in terms of economic and risk reduction.
- 13.50.7** This review concludes and finds that in the short term that Stockhill should continue as is. This is to be taken in the context and relationship of factors between Hucknall, Eastwood and provision of fire cover around the County border with Derbyshire.
- 13.50.8** This review has identified that meaningful dialogues between Services should commence immediately and that this is likely to see (in future) a different model applied. For example, Stockhill would split and would provide a single appliance in the current location and single WDS appliance towards Hucknall. Eastwood provision is dependant upon the outcomes of the inter-service discussions.

- 13.51.1** When referring to the FCR 2010 data (incl. Risk Mapping)  
Stapleford Fire station is situated in an area of medium risk and low risk away from the site. This level of risk can be attributed to dwelling fires, injuries occurring in premises, fire deaths and deprivation. Nationally, as part of Broxtowe district sees it ranked as 226 (of 354 – IMD 2007) most deprived.
- 13.51.2** Stapleford currently houses one RDS appliance; however, the section now also provides support for National Resilience assets (IRU) and more recently NFRS's Incident Support Unit (ISU). Stapleford is also adjacent to stations at Highfields, Eastwood, Long Eaton and Ilkeston (both Derbyshire).
- 13.51.3** Stapleford has seen a steady reduction of incidents from 2005 (297) to 2009 (157). However, this does not include the implementation of the ISU.
- 13.51.4** As with the general theme of 'Mobilisation to in Attendance' times, Stapleford has seen a marginal increase from 2005 (7.32 minutes) to 2009 (7.63 minutes). This gives a return against NFRS's attendance measure of 77% (13% shortfall) which in relation to RDS appliances, reflects well. As with all other appliances, this excludes 'Call handling times' and for the purposes of FCR 2010 a standard time of ninety seconds is applied.
- 13.51.5** As a cost model, taking the expense of housing the current provision e.g. staffing and site running costs (2009), divided by the number of mobilisations, sees a return of approximately £860 per mobilisation, clearly these are not reflective of all activities and in comparison to other stations, which sees it ranked as the thirteenth most expensive.
- 13.51.6** Stapleford RDS maintained a fair level of availability (2009) with approximately 25 days 'off the run'; however, this creates NFRS increasing concern across the whole service. This also featured within the RDS review previously completed. As such the review identifies a way to improving this in future and should be addressed via the Group

Management, RDS Support Officer and the Implementation and Change Team.

**13.51.7** Given the level of risk and wider outcomes for change resulting from this review, it is concluded that Stapleford continue as is, for the current period. However, this is clearly linked to the further conclusions to enter into meaningful discussion with DFRS in relation to the provision of Fire Cover around the border between the two Counties.

**13.51.8** In addition, the conclusions around Station 29 Highfields will have an impact upon Stapleford, for example, an increase in call / mobilisations and this will be provided via further analysis through Workload Modelling.

### **13.52 Station 24 – Eastwood**

**13.52.1** When referring to the FCR 2010 data (incl. Risk Mapping), Eastwood Fire station is situated in an area of medium risk within its immediate proximity and low risk beyond. This level of risk can be attributed to dwelling fires, injuries occurring in premises and levels of deprivation. Nationally as part of Broxtowe district sees, it ranked as 226<sup>th</sup> (of 354 – IMD 2007).

**13.52.2** Eastwood currently houses one RDS appliance; the station also provides a First Responder function and support for the Service's B.A.U. It is also adjacent to stations at Hucknall, Stockhill, Heanor and Ilkeston (both Derbyshire).

**13.52.3** Eastwood has seen a steady reduction of incidents from 2005 (442) to 2009 (293), most noticeably being the reduction of fires.

**13.52.4** As with the general theme 'Mobilisation to in Attendance' times, Eastwood has seen a progressive increase from 2005 (7.02 minutes) to 2009 (8.00 minutes). This gives a return against NFRS's attendance measure of 79% (11% shortfall), which in relation to RDS appliances, reflects well. As with all other appliances, this excludes 'Call handling times' and for the purpose of FCR 2010 a standard time of ninety seconds is applied.

**13.52.5** Eastwood RDS maintained a reasonable level of availability with approximately sixteen days 'off the run' (OTR). However, this creates NFRS increasing concern across the whole service. This also featured within the RDS review previously completed. As such the review conclusions and advice may go some way to improving this in future and should be addressed via the Group Management, RDS Support Officer and the Implementation and Change Team.

**13.52.6** As a cost model, taking the expense of having the current provision (e.g. staff costs and site running costs) divided by the number of mobilisations sees a return of approximately £761 per mobilisation, clearly, these are not reflective of all activities and in comparison to other stations place it as seventh least expensive.

**13.52.7** Given the level of risk, location and activity, combined with the wider recommendations from FCR 2010, it is concluded that Eastwood continue as is, for the current period. However, this is clearly linked to the further finding to enter into meaningful discussion with DFRS in relation to the provision of Fire Cover and the County border, also linked into Stockhill and Hucknall for future resource allocation planning resulting from these discussions.

### **13.53 Station 25 - Hucknall**

**13.53.1** When referring to the FCR 2010 data (incl. Risk Mapping), Hucknall Fire station is situated in area of medium risk, with some low risk areas to its Northern edge with its border to the City area also being medium to high risk. This level of risk can be attributed to dwelling fires, injuries occurring in premises, special service calls and levels of deprivation. Nationally, as part of the Ashfield district sees it ranked as 81<sup>st</sup> (of 354 – IMD 2007) most deprived.

**13.53.2** Hucknall currently have one RDS appliance and is home to NFRS's driving school. Hucknall is adjacent to fire stations at Eastwood, Ashfield and Stockhill also.



**13.53.3** Hucknall has seen a steady reduction in mobilisations from 2005 (511) to 2009 (295) which sees 385 down to 305 incidents attributed to Hucknall.

**13.53.4** As with the general theme of 'Mobilisation to in Attendance' times, Hucknall has seen an increase from 2005 (7.05 minutes) to 2009 (8.01 minutes). This gives a return against NFRS's attendance measure of 80% (10% shortfall), which in relation to RDS appliances, reflects well. As with all other appliances, this excludes 'Call Handling time' and for the purpose of FCR 2010, a standard time of ninety-second is applied.

**13.53.5** As a cost model, taking the expense of housing the current provision e.g. staffing and site running costs (2009) divided by the number of mobilisations sees a return of approximately £773 per mobilisation, clearly these are not reflective of all activities and in comparison to other stations which sees it ranked as the sixth least expensive.

**13.53.6** Hucknall RDS maintained an excellent level (2009) of availability with approximately one day 'off the run' (OTR). It would be worthy for NFRS to analyse what enables this to be achieved and use this to assist those sections with a lesser level of performance (see also RDS Review).

**13.53.7** Given the level of risk and activity seen by Hucknall, linked to the wider findings from this review, it is concluded that the station continue as is, for the current period. This is clearly dependant on NFRS entering into any meaningful dialogue with DFRS in relation to County border Fire Cover and impacts upon Eastwood and Stockhill.

#### **13.54 Station 26 – Arnold**

**13.54.1** When referring to the FCR 2010 data (incl. Risk Mapping) Arnold Fire Station is situated in an area of low to medium risk as part of the Gedling district, however, it borders and serves the City area, with medium to high risk. This level of risk can be attributed to Dwelling fires, Injuries in premises, Special Service Calls and Deprivation. Nationally, the Gedling district sees it ranked as 208<sup>th</sup> (of 354 – IMD 2007).

**13.54.2** Arnold currently houses one WDS appliance and one RDS appliance, the station also provides support to the services CSU and

National Resilience assets (IRU). Arnold is adjacent to stations at Carlton, Central and Stockhill.

**13.54.3** Arnold has seen a steady reduction in incident mobilisations from 2005 (2341) to 2009 (1806). Most note worthy in reductions being the RDS appliance, resulting from changes to pre –determined attendances, seeing analysis where other appliances provided a faster response to sections of the City and surrounding area. As previously stated within this review, PDA’s should be further analysed with a view to confirming they are both appropriate and able to identify savings.

**13.54.4** Contrary to the general theme ‘Mobilisation to in Attendance’ times has seen a minor reduction for T26P1 from 2005 (5.84 mins.) to 2009 (5.63 mins.) and a marginal increase for T26P2 from 2005 (5.58 mins.) to 2009 (6.08 mins.). This sees a return against the NFRS attendance measure of 89% (1% shortfall) for T26P1 and 62% (28% shortfall) for T26P2. As with all other appliances, this excludes ‘Call Handling time’ and for the purpose of FCR 2010, a standard time of ninety- second is applied.

**13.54.5** As a cost model, taking the expense of housing the current provision e.g. staffing and site running costs (2009) divided by the number of mobilisations sees a return of approximately £823 per mobilisation, clearly these are not reflective of all activities and in comparison to other stations which sees it ranked as the tenth least expensive.

**13.54.6** Arnold RDS maintained a reasonable level (2009) of availability with approximately fifteen days ‘Off the Run’ (OTR). This creates a general concern for NFRS across the County, but in relation to the Greater Nottingham area, is less significant, due to the close proximity and crewing arrangements of other appliances, combined with the fall in call demand resulting in increased capacity.

**13.54.7** Given the data within this review, it is concluded that the RDS appliance could be removed from service, leaving the one WDS appliance. The data has clearly shown a continued reduction in emergency demand being placed upon this site; this is the general theme right across NFRS, therefore, the reduction in demand leading to increased capacity for our whole Fire appliance fleet. Given the number of appliances and proximity to one another in the Greater Nottingham area, these will still provide a high level of service.

**13.54.8** A key point in relation to assuring the service delivery model around Greater Nottingham is not only the number of appliances, but also, as they are crewed permanently, they are assured with an immediate response capability, which when using GeognoSIS shows the degree of remaining coverage and the interaction of each site.

**13.54.9** Additional to the conclusions around crewing arrangements is the matter of the actual site location and as part of the Capital build programme it would prove beneficial to relocate the site, however, this would only see it move closer to the Daybrook area.

### **13.55 Station 27 – Carlton**

**13.55.1** When referring to the FCR 2010 data (incl. Risk Mapping) Carlton Fire station is situated in an area of low to medium risk as part of the Gedling district, however, it borders and serves the City area, with a predominance of medium to high risk. This level of risk can be attributed to Dwelling fires, Injuries in premises, Special Service Calls and Deprivation. Nationally, the Gedling district sees it ranked as 208<sup>th</sup> (of 354 – IMD 2007).

**13.55.2** Carlton currently houses one WDS appliance and one RDS appliance, the station also provides support to the services EPU and National Resilience assets (IRU). Carlton is adjacent to stations at Arnold, Central and Southwell.

**13.55.3** Carlton has seen a steady reduction in incident demand from 2005 (658) to 2009 (531).

**13.55.4** Contrary to the general theme 'Mobilisation to in Attendance', times have seen a negligible change from 2005 (5.58 mins. T27P1) to 2009 (6.08 mins.) and an improvement for T27P2 from 2005 (8.91 mins.) to 2009 (7.82 mins.). The latter is to receive further analysis to identify exact cause, but will be taken in context of its availability and incident locations. This sees a return against the NFRS attendance measure of 88% (2% shortfall) for T27P1 and 71% (19% shortfall) for T27P2. As with all other appliances, this excludes 'Call Handling time' and for the purpose of FCR 2010, a standard time of ninety- seconds is applied.

**13.55.5** As a cost model, taking the expense of housing the current provision e.g. staffing and site running costs (2009) divided by the number of mobilisations sees a return of approximately £1359 per mobilisation, clearly these are not reflective of all activities and in comparison to other stations which sees it ranked as the twentieth most expensive.

**13.55.6** Carlton RDS maintained a lower level (2009) of availability with approximately one hundred and eight days 'Off the Run' (OTR). This creates a general concern for NFRS across the County, but in relation to the Greater Nottingham area, is less significant, due to the close proximity and crewing arrangements of other appliances, combined with the fall in call demand resulting in increased capacity.

**13.55.7** Given the data within this review, it is concluded that the RDS appliance could be removed from service, leaving the one WDS appliance. The data has clearly shown a continued reduction in emergency demand being placed upon this site, as is the general theme right across NFRS, therefore, the reduction in demand leading to increased capacity for our whole Fire appliance fleet. Given the number of appliances and proximity to one another in the Greater Nottingham area, these will still provide a high level of service.

**13.55.8** A key point in relation to assuring the service delivery model around Greater Nottingham is not only the number of appliances, but also, as they are crewed permanently, they are assured with an immediate response capability, which when using GeognoSIS shows the degree of remaining coverage and the interaction of each site.

### **13.56 Station 28 – East Leake**

**13.56.1** When referring to the FCR 2010 data (incl. Risk Mapping), East Leake Fire station is situated in an area of predominantly low risk SOA's. This level of risk can be attributed to Special Service Calls and isolated deprivation. Nationally, as part of the Rushcliffe district, sees it ranked as 331 (of 354 – IMD 2007) of least deprived areas.

**13.56.2** East Leake currently houses one RDS fire appliance and provides a first responder capability and is adjacent to fire stations at West Bridgford, Bingham and Loughborough (Leicestershire).

**13.56.3** East Leake has seen a steady reduction of incidents from 2005 (105) to 2009 (80).

**13.56.4** As with the general theme of 'Mobilisation to in Attendance' times have increased from 2005 (7.90 minutes) to 2009 (9.23 minutes). This gives a return against NFRS's attendance measure of only 56% (34% shortfall). This area is to receive further analysis to ascertain causes for lower levels of performance, as these are predicted to continue to rise and creates concern as a general issue for NFRS. As with all other appliances, this excludes 'Call Handling time' and for the purpose of FCR 2010, a standard time of ninety seconds has been applied.

**13.56.5** As a cost model, taking the expense of housing the current provision e.g. staffing and site running costs (2009) divided by the number of mobilisations sees a return of approximately £1439 per mobilisation, clearly these are not reflective of all activities and in comparison to other stations which sees it ranked as the twenty first most expensive.

**13.56.6** East Leake RDS has maintained a fair level of availability with approximately thirty-eight days 'Off the Run' (OTR). However, this creates

NFRS increasing concern across the whole service, also featured in the RDS review previously completed. As such, the wider findings of this review will go some way to addressing this.

**13.56.7** Given the level of risk, station activity, this review concludes that East Leake continue as is. However, this is further linked to wider issues such as, station availability and response times and the implementation of other station changes, for example West Bridgford or over border.

### **13.57 Station 29 – Highfields**

**13.57.1** When referring to the FCR 2010 data (incl. Risk Mapping) Highfields Fire station is situated in an area of low to medium risk as part of the Broxtowe district, however, it borders and serves the City area, with medium to high risk. This level of risk can be attributed to Dwelling fires, Fire Deaths, Injuries in premises, Special Service Calls and Deprivation. Nationally, Broxtowe district sees it ranked as 226<sup>th</sup> (of 354 – IMD 2007).

**13.57.2** Highfields currently houses two WDS appliance and one RDS appliance, ALP and SRT, the station also provides support to the services B.A.U and National Resilience assets (IRU). Highfields is adjacent to stations at Stapleford, Central, West Bridgford and Stockhill.

**13.57.3** Highfields as a new station has not built the history of other sites, however, incident mobilisations equate to (1801) for 2009. In relation to 'Mobilisation to in Attendance' times we see the following for 2009, T29P1 (6.46 mins.), T29P2 (6.18 mins.) and T29P3 (11.26 mins.). This sees a return against the NFRS attendance measure of 85% (5% shortfall) for T29P1, 92% for T29P2 and 30% (60% shortfall) for T29P3. As with all other appliances, this excludes 'Call Handling time' and for the purpose of FCR 2010, a standard time of ninety-second is applied.

- 13.57.4** As a cost model, taking the expense of housing the current provision e.g. staffing and site running costs (2009) divided by the number of mobilisations sees a return of approximately £1160 per mobilisation, clearly these are not reflective of all activities and in comparison to other stations, which sees it ranked as the seventeenth most expensive.
- 13.57.5** Highfields RDS maintained a lower level (2009) of availability with approximately one hundred and seven days 'Off the Run' (OTR). This creates a general concern for NFRS across the County, but in relation to the Greater Nottingham area, is less significant, due to the close proximity and crewing arrangements of other appliances, combined with the fall in call demand resulting in increased capacity.
- 13.57.6** Given the data within this review, it is concluded that the RDS appliance could be removed from service, leaving the one WDS appliance with 24-hour response capability and the second WDS appliance converted to provide two TRV's at peak times of incident demand.
- 13.57.7** The data has clearly shown a continued reduction in emergency demand placed upon the Service, therefore, the reduction in demand leads to increased capacity for our whole Fire appliance fleet. Given the number of appliances and proximity to one another in the Greater Nottingham area, these will still provide a high level of service.
- 13.57.8** A key point in relation to assuring the service delivery model around Greater Nottingham is not only the number of appliances, but also, as they are crewed permanently, they are assured with an immediate response capability, which when using GeognoSIS shows the degree of remaining coverage and the interaction of each site.

## **14 Consultation**

- 14.1** As covered earlier within this report, NFRS are duty bound to consult on the outcomes resulting from FCR 2010 and would be determined by the Fire Authority's decisions Based upon the outcomes of this review.
- 14.2** NFRS could and would provide a summarised consultation document that will be understandable to interested parties on which a reasoned and informed opinion can be based. This is due for production by late January 2011 in draft form and full approval to be subject to Full Fire Authority approval 25<sup>th</sup> February 2011.
- 14.3** As the Service is a member of the Fire Services Consultation Association (FSCA), this enables access to a preferred consultation provider that deliver a proven and cost effective solution to a complex initiative, for which many FRS's have found themselves short of internal competence to deliver.
- 14.4** This process, highlighted by the FCR 2010 project lead and facilitated via Corporate Services has resulted in the initial engagement of Opinion Research Services (ORS) to provide a consultation programme for discussion by CMB and presentation to Fire Authority Members for information and approval. It is key that the Fire Authority is fully embedded into the whole process to ensure the Service provides transparent and evidence Based results.



**14.5** ORS will also provide (if agreed) an information and awareness session to the Fire Authority, thereby ensuring that all members are fully integrated into the consultation process and understand what can be expected and how this fits into NFRS's IRMP and delivers its agreed objectives.

## **15 Implementation and Change Process**

**15.1** Given the extent of this review report, it will be critical to apply an integrated project management approach to any aspect of implementation as a dedicated change programme. This will require not only Service wide, cross-departmental collaboration and the identification of a 'critical path' for required actions and milestones that are designed to deliver key outcomes, e.g. the reviews agreed findings, but also the need for inter-service collaboration on a scale not experienced by the CFA.

**15.2** This process will create stress (Carnall 2001) and organisational strain right across NFRS, either with those whom the change directly affects or those who are charged with its delivery. The FCR 2010 project has already made recommendation for the instigation of a dedicated team to oversee the change programme and should look to include some of the following concerns:-

- That NFRS look to build an awareness of the need to affect the changes recommended;
- That the case for change has been evidence led and communicated convincingly and credibly;

- Accept that it will be new ground for many across the Service and will therefore present a significant learning process and the service may not get all things right first time;
- That clear support for the change programme is provided by the CFA and strategic managers that give clear support to those involved in day-to-day implementation.

**15.3** Whatever model NFRS deploy to deliver the requisite change programme is not important in itself, what is crucial is the need for it to be unambiguous, simple, clearly understood and communicated.

**15.4** As a service, NFRS will strive for a clear outcome Based focus (e.g. desired state) as its aim that will require the creation and maintenance of strategic and political momentum. This clearly requires leadership at all level and locations of NFRS that will provide our clarity of vision in dealing with the complexities ahead.

**15.5** The FRS deals in risk and its relationship to people and place and the reduction of that risk for the good of Nottinghamshire, the implementation of change as a process will see the inputs of our risk management approach adapt and NFRS will monitor the impact of those changes and their relationship to risk reduction and as such our performance.

**15.6** This review has acknowledged our environment has and will continue to evolve, the Fire Authority further recognise the need to access its adaptive capacity to be able to deliver a service that is apolitical, appropriate and proportionate to its risk profile, whilst maintaining itself as a quality public servant.

## 16 Appendices

**Appendix. 1 – County Overview**

**Appendix. 2 – District profiles**

**Appendix. 3 – Targeted Response Vehicle**

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